ROGERS, C. J., concurring. I agree with the majority that a claim for loss of consortium, being derivative in nature, is barred by the settlement of the directly injured party's claim. I write separately because I disagree that this issue, which has not been presented squarely by any previous appeal, necessarily has been conclusively resolved by our past decisions. As detailed by the majority and dissenting opinions, our past jurisprudence articulating the rule in question does not include a case with a procedural posture identical to the present one, which places the propriety of the rule directly at issue. See *Hopson* v. *St. Mary's Hospital*, 176 Conn. 485, 494–95, 408 A.2d 260 (1979) (recognizing, as general matter, viability of claim for loss of consortium); see also *Jacoby* v. *Brinkerhoff*, 250 Conn. 86, 93–95, 735 A.2d 347 (1999) (disallowing loss of consortium claim when purportedly injured spouse had refused to pursue any claim herself); *Ladd* v. *Douglas Trucking Co.*, 203 Conn. 187, 195, 523 A.2d 1031 (1987) (rejecting claim for postmortem loss of consortium pursuant to either wrongful death statute or common law). Furthermore, as explained by the dissent, the holdings of *Jacoby* and *Ladd* appear to rest on multiple considerations, and not merely the quoted language from *Hopson*.

In light of the foregoing, I believe that we should decide this appeal solely on the basis of the strong policy reasons enumerated in the majority opinion. Accordingly, I agree to that extent with the reasoning of that opinion, and I concur in the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to strike should be affirmed.