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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 03-BG-736, 04-BG-470 and 04-BG-1014

IN RE KENNETH E. WHEELER,
RESPONDENT.

A Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(Bar Registration No. 445227)

On Report and Recommendation of the
Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN 217-03, 372-00 and 515-02)

(Submitted March 23, 2005)

Decided April 7, 2005)

Before SCHWELB and REID, *Associate Judges*, and KERN, *Senior Judge*.

PER CURIAM: In its attached Report and Recommendation, in No. 04-BG-1014, the Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended that Kenneth E. Wheeler, a member of our Bar, be disbarred. On June 15, 2004, as noted in the Board's Report, Wheeler was convicted in the Superior Court of Hudson County, New Jersey, of one count of Misapplication of Entrusted Property. Bar Counsel has advised the court that on December 17, 2004, Wheeler was sentenced for the foregoing offense, and that he has not appealed his conviction.

In its Report, the Board has concluded that the offense of which Wheeler was convicted is a crime of moral turpitude *per se*. We agree with and adopt the Board's conclusion. Having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, Wheeler must be disbarred. *In re Colson*, 412 A.2d 1160, 1164 (D.C. 1979) (en banc). We also note that Wheeler has not excepted to the Board's recommendation. Accordingly, in No. 04-BG-1014,

Kenneth E. Wheeler is hereby disbarred.¹

In light of the order of disbarment, the following additional disciplinary matters relating to Wheeler are dismissed without prejudice:

1. No. 03-BG-736 (Bar Docket No. 217-03);² and
2. No. 04-BG-470 (Bar Docket No. 372-00).³

These two matters may be reopened in the event that Wheeler should apply for reinstatement.

So ordered.

¹ We direct Wheeler's attention to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g), relating to the responsibilities of disbarred and suspended attorneys.

² This is a reciprocal discipline matter which the Board has held in abeyance.

³ This is an original discipline matter in which a Hearing Committee recommended that Wheeler be suspended from practice for ninety days, but in which the Board recommended disbarment.

Bar Counsel reported Respondent's conviction to the Court on August 25, 2004. On August 27, 2004, the Court suspended Respondent pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10(c), while noting that Respondent remained suspended due to his pending reciprocal discipline matter in No. 03-BG-736 (Bar Docket No. 217-03),⁵ and directed the Board to institute a formal proceeding to determine the nature of the final discipline to be imposed and specifically to review the elements of the offense of which Respondent was convicted for the purpose of determining whether the crime involves moral turpitude within the meaning of D.C. Code § 11-2503(a). Order, *In re Wheeler*, No. 04-BG-1014 (D.C. Aug. 27, 2004).

ANALYSIS

D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) provides for the mandatory disbarment of a member of the District of Columbia Bar convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Once the Court determines that a particular crime involves moral turpitude *per se*, disbarment must be imposed. *See In re Colson*, 412 A.2d 1160, 1164 (D.C. 1979) (en banc).

The legal standard for moral turpitude was established in *Colson*. The Court held that a crime involves moral turpitude if “the act denounced by the statute offends the generally accepted moral code of mankind”; if it involves “baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man”; or if the act is “contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” *Id.* at 1168.

The Board's determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude *per se* is based solely on an examination of the elements of the statutory offense. *See In re*

⁵ The Court suspended Respondent pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(d), based on an emergency order of suspension by the State of Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk. The Court ordered the matter held in abeyance pending further order. Order, *In re Wheeler*, D.C. App. No. 03-BG-736 (D.C. July 24, 2003), (Bar Docket No. 217-03).

Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 765 (D.C. 1990) (per curiam) (citing *Colson*, 412 A.2d at 1164-67). The Court has stated that the “threshold focus of the statute . . . is on the type of crime committed rather than on the factual context surrounding the actual commission of the offense.” *Colson*, 412 A.2d at 1164. In examining the statutory elements, the Board must consider whether the least culpable offender under the statute necessarily engages in a crime of moral turpitude. *See Shorter*, 570 A.2d at 765. If the Board determines that the offense does not involve moral turpitude *per se*, a hearing is necessary to determine whether the underlying facts involve moral turpitude. *See id.* at 765.

Respondent was convicted in New Jersey state court of Misapplication of Entrusted Property in violation of N.J. Stat. § 2C:21-15. The Court has not previously addressed whether this specific crime is a crime of moral turpitude *per se* pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-2503. Therefore, the Board must review the elements of the offense to consider whether the crime is one of moral turpitude *per se*.⁶ *Colson*, 412 A.2d at 1164.

The crime of Misapplication of Entrusted Property requires evidence that the defendant knowingly misused entrusted property. *State v. Manthey*, 684 A.2d 517, 520 (N.J. App. Div. 1996) (quoting *Matter of Iulo*, 559 A.2d 1349 (N.J. 1989)). The defendant need not be proven to have acted with fraudulent intent. *Id.* The offense is similar to theft, but applies only to persons who have been entrusted with the property as a fiduciary, such as a “trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, [or] receiver” N.J. Stat. § 2C:21-15. Felony theft is a crime of moral turpitude *per se* warranting disbarment under D.C. Code § 11-2503(a). *See In re Untalan*, 619 A.2d 978, 979 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam) (“[c]rimes involving theft or fraud generally have been found to be crimes of moral turpitude.”); *see also In re Taylor*, 765 A.2d 546 (D.C. 2001) (per curiam) (theft

⁶ Because the maximum prison sentence for a violation of N.J. Stat. § 2C:21-15 is five years, *see* N.J.S.A. § 2C:43-6(a)(3), the offense is properly considered a felony under D.C. Code § 11-2503. *See In re Brown*, Bar Docket No. 88-97, slip op. at 17-18 (BPR Dec. 10, 2003), *adopted*, 851 A.2d 1278 (D.C. 2004) (per curiam).

All members of the Board concur in this Report and Recommendation except Martin R. Baach and James P. Mercurio who are recused, and Ms. Coghill-Howard, who did not participate.