NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 17-1737

ANTHONY PARKER, Appellant

v.

LEHIGH COUNTY DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 5-17-cv-00564) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) August 16, 2017

Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 17, 2017)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

In February 2017, Anthony Parker filed a civil rights complaint in the District Court against the Domestic Relations section of the Family Division of the Lehigh

^{*} This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

County Court of Common Pleas ("Family Court"). Parker claimed that the Family Court had violated his constitutional rights by dismissing his petition to modify his support order and seizing money from his bank account. Parker asked the District Court to order the Family Court to reopen the support proceedings so that he could lodge various objections. The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because, among other reasons, Parker's claims were barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Parker appealed.¹

We will affirm the District Court's judgment. The District Court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review, either directly or indirectly, the Family Court case. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars suits "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments").

¹ We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). <u>See Allah v. Seiverling</u>, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).