

**NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION**  
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

**United States Court of Appeals**  
**For the Seventh Circuit**  
**Chicago, Illinois 60604**

Submitted March 13, 2024\*  
Decided March 14, 2024

**Before**

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, *Circuit Judge*

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, *Circuit Judge*

DORIS L. PRYOR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 23-1980

ADAM HENDRIX,  
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*

*v.*

LEONARDO GARCIA, et al.,  
*Defendants-Appellees.*

Appeal from the United States District  
Court for the Northern District of  
Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 23-cv-2120

Sharon Johnson Coleman,  
*Judge.*

**ORDER**

After a state judge entered a restraining order against him, Adam Hendrix sued the judge and others in federal court for injuries arising out of that order. The district court dismissed the case based on the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and judicial immunity.

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\* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant's brief and the record, we have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine blocks this court from addressing most of Hendrix's claims, and judicial immunity resolves the rest; therefore, we affirm.

Hendrix alleges the following events, which we take as true for purposes of this appeal. See *Sherwood v. Marchiori*, 76 F.4th 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2023). After his personal relationship with Leonardo Garcia had ended, Hendrix "protested" the breakup outside of Garcia's house. Garcia called the police for help, and an officer suggested that he seek a restraining order, which Garcia did. During a hearing in state court on the matter, Hendrix says he was not allowed to speak or present evidence. A state judge entered the restraining order, and another state judge later amended it to increase the no-contact distance. Hendrix then attempted to remove the case to federal court, but a federal district judge remanded the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Hendrix next sued Garcia, the police officer, both state judges, and the federal judge in federal court for damages caused by the restraining order. He considers the order "fraudulent," "unlawful," and the result of a violation of his constitutional rights and Garcia's perjury. The district court dismissed the case. First, relying on the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, the court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Hendrix's pursuit of relief from the restraining order. See *Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); *D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Next, the court ruled that judicial immunity protected the state judges and the federal judge for their judicial acts. Last, the court explained that there was no private cause of action for perjury.

On appeal, Hendrix contests the district court's reliance on *Rooker-Feldman*, emphasizing that his federal constitutional rights are at issue. We review de novo the district court's application of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *Fliss v. Generation Cap. I, LLC*, 87 F.4th 348, 353 (7th Cir. 2023). The doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases brought by state-court losers who complain of injuries caused by state-court judgments. *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005). Jurisdiction is lacking "even if ... the state court's action was unconstitutional." *Feldman*, 460 U.S. at 486.

The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine applies here because the injury Hendrix alleged—the "enforcement" of a "fraudulent" and "unlawful" judgment (the restraining order)—did not occur until the state judge ruled against him. *Mains v. Citibank, N.A.*, 852 F.3d 669, 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing *Harold v. Steel*, 773 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2014)). Because *Rooker-Feldman* barred the district court from hearing a case brought by a litigant complaining about injuries caused by a state-court judgment, the district court properly

dismissed claims against Garcia, the officer, and the state judges for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

That leaves only Hendrix's claim against the federal judge. Hendrix contends that judicial immunity does not protect the judge, who Hendrix says acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." *See Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978). But the judge had the authority, which means jurisdiction, to remand the order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and the judge is immune from suit for that judicial action. *See Stump*, 435 U.S. at 355–57.

We conclude by noting that the district court did not state whether it dismissed Hendrix's suit with or without prejudice. Because a dismissal pursuant to *Rooker-Feldman* must be without prejudice, *see Mains*, 852 F.3d at 678, we modify the judgment to clarify that Hendrix's claims against Garcia, the officer, and the state judges are dismissed without prejudice.

AFFIRMED