## **NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID NOVAK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15063

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02234-JJT

MEMORANDUM\*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 25, 2016\*\*

Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

David Novak appeals pro se from the district court's order dismissing his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from his state

criminal conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

## \* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

\*\* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

## FILED

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MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. *Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP*, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal with prejudice of Novak's action against the State of Arizona was proper because it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. *See Pennhurst State Sch.* & *Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (holding that in the absence of consent, a suit against the State is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Novak leave to amend. *See Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend should be given unless the deficiencies in the complaint cannot be cured by amendment).

## AFFIRMED.