

1	evening of January 8, 2006, Peterson and Flewelling had an altercation, during which		
2	Peterson backed Flewelling up against a wall and prevented him from leaving the area.		
3	Peterson then punched Flewelling in the face. Defendants, in their separate statement of		
4	facts, assert that Peterson acted in self-defense when he struck Flewelling. On October 25,		
5	2006, Peterson was sentenced to a three year term of supervised probation. Judgment was		
6	entered against Peterson ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of \$5,516.44.		
7	On December 1, 2006, Flewelling filed a lawsuit in the Pima County Superior Court		
8	against Peterson alleging that, on January 8, 2006, Peterson assaulted him, causing personal		
9	injury.		
10	Lori Peterson ("Ms. Peterson"), Peterson's mother, is the named insured on an		
11	American Family Mutual Insurance Co. ("American Family") homeowner's insurance		
12	policy. American Family provided Peterson with a defense to the state lawsuit under a		
13	reservation of rights because there was no accidental occurrence and to assert coverage		
14	exclusions for violation of law, intentional acts, abuse, imputed liability and punitive		
15	damages. On or about August 14, 2007, Peterson and Flewelling entered into an agreement		
16	for stipulated judgments and settlement of claim.		
17	Ms. Peterson's policy regarding personal liability coverage states:		
18 19	We will pay, up to our limit , compensatory damages for which any insured is legally liable because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence covered by this policy.		
20	Defense Provision.		
21	If a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or		
22	property damage caused by an occurrence to which this policy applies, we will provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We will defend any suit		
23	or settle any claim for damages payable under this policy as we think proper.		
24	American Family, Statement of Facts, p. 4, emphasis in original. The policy further		
25	provides:		
26	Bodily injury means bodily harm, sickness or disease. It includes resulting loss of services, required care and death.		
27	<i>Id.</i> , emphasis in original. The policy also includes an exclusion provision:		
28	Coverage D – Personal Liability and Coverage E – Medical Expense do not apply to:		

1	* * *	
2	17.	Violation of Law. We will not cover bodily injury or property
3		damage arising out of:
4		a. Violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted;
5	1	b. violation of any building or housing code for which any insured is convicted; or
6 7		c. violation of any criminal law for which any insured is not convicted due to mental incapacity.
8	<i>Id.</i> at 5, emphasis in	original.
9		2007, American Family filed the Complaint in this action seeking a
10	declaration that Ms. I	Peterson's policy does not provide coverage for the claims asserted in
11	the state lawsuit, a dec	claration that American Family is not required to defend Peterson in the
12	state lawsuit, and a de	eclaration that American Family is not required to indemnify Peterson
13	for the claims asserte	d in the state lawsuit.
14	On May 2, 20	008, American Family filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. A
15	response and a reply	have been filed.
16		
17	Summary Judgment I	Legal Standard
18	Summary judg	gment may be granted if the movant shows "there is no genuine issue
19	as to any material fac	t and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
20	Rule 56(c), Federal R	cules of Civil Procedure. The disputed facts must be material. Celotex
21	Corp. v. Catrett, 477	7 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
22	Therefore, the nonmo	oving party must demonstrate a dispute "over facts that might affect the
23	outcome of the suit	under the governing law" to preclude entry of summary judgment.
24	Anderson, 477 U.S. a	at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.
25	The dispute ov	ver material facts must also be genuine. Id. A dispute about a material
26	fact is genuine if "the	e evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
27	nonmoving party." Id	d. A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion
28	must set forth specific	c facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. Mere allegation and

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speculation are not sufficient to create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.
 Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). "If the evidence is merely
 colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." *Anderson*,
 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S. Ct. at 2511. However, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to
 be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. *Id.* at 255.

The Court is not to make credibility determinations with respect to the evidence
offered and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party. *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n*, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th
Cir. 1987), citing *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate "where contradictory inferences may
reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts[.]" *Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley*, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980).

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14 *Exclusion for Violation of Law*

American Family asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because of the
violation of law exclusion provision in the policy. Violation of law exclusions are
enforceable in Arizona. *American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White*, 204 Ariz. 500, 65 P.3d 449
(App. 2003). The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law for the court. *Sparks v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co.*, 132 Ariz. 529, 534, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982). The
provisions of insurance policies are to be interpreted based on their plain and ordinary
meaning. *See Millar v. State Farm*, 167 Ariz. 93, 96, 804 P.2d 822, 825 (App. 1990).

The parties dispute whether the term "arising out of" is applicable in this case because Peterson was convicted of unlawful imprisonment rather than assault. American Family asserts that the term "arising out of" does not require "direct proximate cause" but rather some relation or connection between the two events. *Salerno v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.*, 198 Ariz. 54, 58, 6 P.3d 758, 762 (App. 2000); *Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.*, 214 Ariz. 255, 265 n. 12, 151 P.3d 538, 548 n. 12 (App. 2007). "Arising out of" requires only a causal connection between the injury and the excluded conduct. *Allstate v. Johnson*, 194 Ariz. 402,

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403, 984 P.2d 10, 11 (App. 1999); *California Cas. Ins. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.*,
 208 Ariz. 416, 421, 94 P.3d 616, 621 (App. 2004).

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3 American Family asserts that the undisputed facts prove a causal connection between 4 Flewelling's injuries and Peterson's conduct which resulted in Peterson's conviction for unlawful imprisonment. "Unlawful imprisonment" is "knowingly restraining another 5 6 person." A.R.S. § 13-1303. In pleading guilty, Peterson admitted that he and Flewelling 7 became involved in an altercation, during which Peterson prevented Flewelling from leaving 8 the area, and that he hit Flewelling in the face. See Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, ¶ 5. 9 Peterson also agreed, pursuant to the plea agreement, to pay restitution to Flewelling. 10 Defendants assert, however, that the exclusion for violation of law is not appropriate where 11 the conviction for a crime involves conduct that is distinct from the conduct which resulted 12 in the bodily injury.

American Family cites a number of non-Arizona cases in support of their assertion 13 that the conviction of the crime requires the application of the criminal acts exclusion. 14 15 Defendants, however, distinguish those cases because, in each of these cases, the criminal 16 conduct that resulted in the injuries was the same conduct for which defendants pleaded 17 guilty or were found guilty. In this case, the conduct which Peterson admitted was not the 18 same conduct which resulted in the injuries. In other words, Defendants assert that Peterson 19 could have committed the unlawful imprisonment without causing the bodily injury to 20 Flewelling. The Court agrees with Defendants that the cases cited by American Family are 21 distinguishable because those cases involved criminal convictions for conduct that resulted 22 in the injuries. Contrary to American Family's assertion, the Court does not find the phrase 23 "arising out of" to be unambiguous. See e.g., Bates v. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., 950 A.2d 186 24 (N.H. 2008) (for exclusionary language to be considered clear and unambiguous, two parties 25 cannot reasonably disagree about its meaning).

In Arizona, if a clause appears ambiguous, it is interpreted "by looking to legislative
goals, social policy, and the transaction as a whole." *First American Title Ins. Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC*, 218 Ariz. 394, 397, 187 P.3d 1107, 1110 (2008). If ambiguity then

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remains, the clause is construed against the insurer. *Id.* American Family asserts that the
clause is not ambiguous and that the injuries arose out of Peterson's conduct which resulted
in Peterson's conviction. However, the clause refers to a violation of any criminal law for
which an insured is convicted rather than an insured's conduct for which the insured in
convicted.

6 The Arizona legislature has provided that restitution is "to be paid by the defendant 7 to any person who suffered an economic loss caused by the defendant's conduct." A.R.S. 8 § 13-804(A). Restitution orders "promote the rehabilitation purposes of probation by impressing upon [a defendant] the specific consequences of his criminal activity and force 9 10 him to accept responsibility for these consequences. State v. Young, 137 Ariz. 365, 368, 670 11 P.2d 1189, 1192 (App. 1983); see also State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 30, 39 P.3d 1131, 12 1134 (2002) (restitution statutes focus on the "primary purposes of restitution: reparation to 13 the victim and rehabilitation of the offender"). However, a defendant may only be ordered 14 to pay restitution on charges that he has admitted, on which he has been found guilty, or upon 15 which he has agreed to pay restitution. *State v. Pleasant*, 145 Ariz. 307, 701 P.2d 15 (App. 16 1985). The Supreme Court of Arizona has recognized that "restitution is available for 17 damage directly caused by criminal conduct, even if the damage is not an element of the 18 crime." Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 30, 39 P.3d at 1134, citing State v. Wilkinson, 198 Ariz. 376, 19 383, 10 P.3d 634, 641 (App. 2000) (Ryan, J. dissenting).

In Arizona, public policy "proscribes indemnification of persons for losses resulting
from their own willful wrongdoing. *White*, 204 Ariz. at 504, 65 P.3d at 453. The Arizona
courts have found that "violation of law" exclusions do not violate public policy. *Id*, 204
Ariz. at 505, 65 P.2d at 454.

In looking at the incident as a whole, the parties agree that bodily injury that arose out
of a violation of any criminal law for which any insuree is convicted would not be covered.
When the entire criminal proceedings are considered, Peterson admitted that he hit
Flewelling in the face and he agreed to pay restitution for those injuries. Such admission and
agreement demonstrates that, for purposes of the criminal proceedings, Defendants

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1	acknowledged that the injuries had some relation or connection (or a causal connection) with				
2	Peterson's criminal conviction. See Salerno, 198 Ariz. at 58, 6 P.3d at 762. (App. 2000);				
3	Johnson, 194 Ariz. at 403, 984 P.2d at 11. That Peterson asserts that he acted in self-defense				
4	does not alter the fact that he acknowledged that the injuries had some relation to the criminal				
5	conviction. See generally, White, 204 Ariz. at 506, 65 P.3d at 455 ("Because [criminal				
6	defendant] waived his claims of self-defense and defense of others by pleading guilty to				
7	aggravated assault, Appellant cannot raise those defenses in the civil action.").				
8	These factors indicate that bodily injury that arises out of a violation of any criminal				
9	law for which an insured is convicted includes conduct that the insured has admitted in the				
10	criminal proceeding and conduct for which he has agreed to pay restitution. The Court finds,				
11	therefore, that summary judgment in favor of American Family is appropriate.				
12					
13	Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:				
14	1	American Family's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #24] is GRANTED.			
15	2	Judgment is awarded to American Family and against Peterson and Flewelling.			
16	3. ′	The American Family Mutual Ins. Co. policy, number 02BD-6613-01, in which			
17	Lori Peterson is the named insured does not provide coverage for the claims asserted in the				
18	Pima County S	Superior Court lawsuit, cause number C2006-6772.			
19	4. ′	The American Family Mutual Ins. Co. is not required to defend or indemnify			
20	Michael Peters	son in the Pima County Superior Court lawsuit, cause number C2006-6772.			
21	5. 7	The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and shall then close its file in this			
22	matter.				
23	DATED this 9th day of September, 2008.				
24					
25		Curicy K. Jonvenson			
26	Cindy K. Jorgenson				
27		United States District Judge			
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