

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE HARRIS,)	No. CV 10-0798-RC
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	OPINION AND ORDER
v.)	
)	
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,)	
Commissioner of Social Security,)	
)	
Defendant.)	
_____)	

Plaintiff Joe Harris filed a complaint on February 5, 2010, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying his application for disability benefits. On July 9, 2010, the Commissioner filed an answer to the complaint, and the parties filed a joint stipulation on September 9, 2010.

BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2007, plaintiff, who was born on November 5, 1952, applied for disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income program ("SSI") of Title XVI of the Act, claiming an inability to work
//

1 since June 1, 2003,¹ due to breathing problems, headaches, high blood
2 pressure, and left leg problems. A.R. 14, 24-25, 130. The
3 plaintiff's application was initially denied on July 20, 2007. A.R.
4 66-69. The plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing, which
5 was held before Administrative Law Judge Stuart M. Kaye ("the ALJ") on
6 May 21, 2008. A.R. 26-51, 71. On September 22, 2008, the ALJ issued
7 a decision finding plaintiff is not disabled. A.R. 11-23. The
8 plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, which denied
9 review on November 19, 2009. A.R. 4-10.

11 DISCUSSION

12 I

13 The Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), has the authority to
14 review the decision denying plaintiff disability benefits to determine
15 if his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the
16 Commissioner used the proper legal standards in reaching his decision.
17 Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Vernoff v.
18 Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009).

19
20 The claimant is "disabled" for the purpose of receiving benefits
21 under the Act if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful
22 activity due to an impairment which has lasted, or is expected to
23 last, for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C.
24 § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). "The claimant bears the

26 ¹ On June 4, 2003, plaintiff previously applied for SSI
27 benefits, and Administrative Law Judge Earl J. Watts denied his
28 application on August 27, 2004, finding plaintiff was not
disabled. A.R. 52-63.

1 burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability." Roberts v.
2 Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122
3 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996).

4
5 The Commissioner has promulgated regulations establishing a five-
6 step sequential evaluation process for the ALJ to follow in a
7 disability case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. In the **First Step**, the ALJ
8 must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in
9 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If not, in the
10 **Second Step**, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe
11 impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting him
12 from performing basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If
13 so, in the **Third Step**, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has
14 an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the
15 requirements of the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. §
16 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If not, in the
17 **Fourth Step**, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has
18 sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment or
19 various limitations to perform his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).
20 If not, in **Step Five**, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
21 the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers
22 in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g).

23
24 Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ
25 found plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
26 April 2, 2007, the application date. (Step One). The ALJ then found
27 plaintiff has the following severe impairments: "asthma,
28 hypertension, joint pain and gastritis" (Step Two); however, he does

1 not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
2 equals a listed impairment. (Step Three). The ALJ next determined
3 plaintiff has no past relevant work. (Step Four). Finally, the ALJ
4 concluded plaintiff is able to perform a significant number of jobs in
5 the national economy; therefore, he is not disabled. (Step Five).

6
7 **II**

8 A claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is what he can
9 still do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional, and other
10 limitations. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001);
11 see also Valentine v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685,
12 689 (9th Cir. 2009) (RFC is "a summary of what the claimant is capable
13 of doing (for example, how much weight he can lift)."). Here, the ALJ
14 found plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work² "except that the
15 [plaintiff] must be able to change position at will; climb, balance,
16 stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl occasionally; and avoid concentrated
17 exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases and poor ventilation." A.R.
18 18.

19
20 At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the
21 claimant can perform a significant number of jobs in the national
22 economy. Bray v. Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009); Hoopai
23 v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007). To meet this
24 burden, the Commissioner "must 'identify specific jobs existing in
25

26
27 ² Under Social Security regulations, "[m]edium work
28 involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds." 20
C.F.R. § 416.967(c).

1 substantial numbers in the national economy that [the] claimant can
2 perform despite [his] identified limitations.'" Meanel v. Apfel, 172
3 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d
4 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)). There are two ways for the Commissioner
5 to meet this burden: "(1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or
6 (2) by reference to the Medical Vocational Guidelines ["Grids"] at 20
7 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2."³ Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,
8 1099 (9th Cir. 1999); Bray, 554 F.3d at 1223 n.4. However, "[w]hen
9 [the Grids] do not adequately take into account [a] claimant's
10 abilities and limitations, the Grids are to be used only as a
11 framework, and a vocational expert must be consulted." Thomas v.
12 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2002); Bray, 554 F.3d at 1223
13 n.4.

14
15 Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert must consider
16 all of the claimant's limitations, Valentine, 574 F.3d at 690; Thomas,
17 278 F.3d at 956, and "[t]he ALJ's depiction of the claimant's
18 disability must be accurate, detailed, and supported by the medical
19 record." Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. Here, the ALJ asked vocational
20 expert Susan Green the following hypothetical question:

21
22
23 ³ The Grids are guidelines setting forth "the types and
24 number of jobs that exist in the national economy for different
25 kinds of claimants. Each rule defines a vocational profile and
26 determines whether sufficient work exists in the national
27 economy. These rules represent the [Commissioner's]
28 determination, arrived at by taking administrative notice of
relevant information, that a given number of unskilled jobs exist
in the national economy that can be performed by persons with
each level of residual functional capacity." Chavez v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 103 F.3d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).

1 Let's assume we have a hypothetical person who is 54 and
2 then becomes 55. So, we're going to have two different
3 situations here. The first one is 54. And the next one is
4 55, okay, who has a high school education and no past work,
5 who has no exertional limitations, in other words has no
6 limitation in his ability to lift, carry, stand, walk and
7 sit except that he requires the ability to change position
8 at his own volition. In other words, if he's sitting and he
9 needs to stand up, he could do so, and so on. . . . He has
10 no postural limitations, no manipulative limitations, no
11 visual limitations . . . , no communicative limitations. He
12 would have to avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors,
13 dust, gases and poor ventilation. In addition to that, he
14 would have no severe mental impairment. Given such a
15 hypothetical, is there any work in the local or national
16 economy that such a person could perform?

17
18 A.R. 48. The vocational expert responded that such an individual
19 could work as a cashier II, Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT")
20 no. 211.462-010,⁴ and an assembler, DOT no. 712.687-010, A.R. 48-49,
21 both of which are light work.⁵ U.S. Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of

22
23 ⁴ The DOT is the Commissioner's primary source of reliable
24 vocational information. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1434 n.6; Terry v.
Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).

25 ⁵ Under Social Security regulations, "[l]ight work involves
26 lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
27 carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the
28 weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when
it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it
involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling

1 Occupational Titles, 183, 708 (4th ed. 1991). Based on this
2 testimony, the ALJ found plaintiff can perform a significant number of
3 jobs in the national economy. A.R. 22.

4
5 The plaintiff contends, however, that the ALJ's Step Five
6 determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the
7 vocational expert's testimony supports the conclusion that plaintiff
8 is disabled as of November 5, 2007, when he turned 55 years old.
9 Specifically, plaintiff argues that since the vocational expert
10 identified only light work that plaintiff can perform in response to
11 the ALJ's hypothetical question, plaintiff should be considered
12 disabled under Rule 202.04 of the Grids, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
13 App. 2, Rule 202.04.⁶ See also Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152,
14 1157 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[W]here application of the grids directs a
15 finding of disability, that finding must be accepted by the
16 [Commissioner]. That is so whether the impairment is exertional or
17 results from a combination of exertional and nonexertional
18 limitations."). The Commissioner acknowledges he has not carried his
19 burden at Step Five, but argues a remand for further proceedings is
20 necessary because the vocational expert did not specifically address

21
22 _____
23 of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a
24 full or wide range of light work, [the claimant] must have the
25 ability to do substantially all of these activities." 20 C.F.R.
26 § 416.967(b).

27 ⁶ Rule 202.04 provides that an individual is disabled if
28 that person is: of advanced age, which is 55 years old, 20
C.F.R. § 416.963(e); is a high school graduate or more, but whose
degree does not provide for direct entry into skilled work; has
prior unskilled work experience or no experience; and is able to
perform light work.

1 whether plaintiff is able to perform the limited range of medium work
2 set forth in plaintiff's RFC; rather, the vocational expert only
3 provided certain examples of work plaintiff could perform. See A.R.
4 48 ("Given [the] hypothetical, is there any work in the local or
5 national economy that such a person could perform? . . . Can you
6 give me an example?"). The plaintiff disagrees, arguing the
7 vocational expert inferentially answered the question of whether
8 plaintiff could perform the limited range of medium work set forth in
9 plaintiff's RFC when, in response to a question about whether
10 plaintiff could perform sedentary work,⁷ the vocational expert
11 responded: "I would say by nature of the definition of sedentary work
12 which requires someone to be seated predominantly six hours a day, if
13 he needs to alternate positions, there would be no sedentary work
14 available to him, only the light." A.R. 49.

15
16 The Commissioner is correct. Although Rule 202.04 provides that
17 an individual with plaintiff's education and work experience who is
18 limited to light work is considered disabled as of his 55th birthday,
19 the record does not clearly show that Rule 202.04 applies to

20
21 ⁷ "'Sedentary work' contemplates work that involves the
22 ability to sit through most or all of an eight[-]hour day."
23 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1103; see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d
24 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) ("In a work environment requiring
25 sedentary work, the Social Security Rules require necessary
26 sitting as the ability to do such for six to eight hours a
27 day."); 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a) ("Sedentary work involves lifting
28 no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or
carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves
sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often
necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if
walking and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.").

1 plaintiff. As the vocational expert's testimony makes clear, her
2 testimony only relates to plaintiff's ability to do sedentary work -
3 not the RFC's limited range of medium work. Since plaintiff does not
4 challenge the ALJ's RFC assessment that he can perform a limited range
5 of medium work, see Jt. Stip. at 4:3, and the ALJ's hypothetical
6 question to the vocational expert encompassed that RFC, the vocational
7 expert should have discussed whether plaintiff can perform any medium
8 work in the national economy.⁸ Unfortunately, she did not fully
9 respond to the ALJ's hypothetical question, and the ALJ did not
10 further pursue the matter. Therefore, a remand is required.

11 12 III

13 When the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial
14 evidence, the Court has authority to affirm, modify, or reverse the
15 Commissioner's decision "with or without remanding the cause for
16 rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072,
17 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). "Remand for further administrative proceedings
18 is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful." Benecke
19 v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, remand is the
20 appropriate remedy so the ALJ may provide the vocational expert with a
21 hypothetical question accurately reflecting plaintiff's RFC and
22 properly determining whether plaintiff is able to perform a

23
24 ⁸ Under the Act, an individual with plaintiff's education
25 and prior work experience who can perform **the full range of**
26 **medium work** is not considered disabled upon reaching his 55th
27 birthday. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 203.14.
28 Since plaintiff cannot perform the full range of medium work,
A.R. 18, without the testimony of a vocational expert, it is
unclear whether plaintiff can perform any medium work in the
national economy.

1 significant number of jobs in the national economy - both before and
2 after his 55th birthday. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 597; Harman v. Apfel,
3 211 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000).
4

5 **ORDER**

6 IT IS ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff's request for relief is denied
7 and defendant's request for relief is granted; and (2) the
8 Commissioner's decision is reversed, and the action is remanded to the
9 Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with
10 this Opinion and Order, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
11 § 405(g), and Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
12

13 DATE: November 18, 2010

/S/ ROSALYN M. CHAPMAN
ROSALYN M. CHAPMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15 R&R-MDO\10-0798.mdo
16 11/18/10
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28