("Hernandez I"). (See also Petition at 1.)

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Doc. 4

On September 18, 2003, a Los Angeles County jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and found true various sentencing enhancements. (Petition at 2). Petitioner's sentence was 50 years to life. (*Id.*)

In *Hernandez I*, a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") was issued on the merits on January 11, 2011. On February 7, 2011, the R&R was adopted and judgment was entered dismissing the petition with prejudice. *Hernandez I*, Dkt. Nos. 34, 40, 41.) The matter is currently on appeal. *See* Ninth Circuit Docket, Case No. 11-55337.

II.

DISCUSSION

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Therefore, the Court applies the AEDPA in reviewing the Petition. *Lindh v. Murphy*, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997).

The AEDPA provides, in pertinent part: "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A district court does not have jurisdiction to consider a "second or successive" petition absent authorization from the Ninth Circuit. *Burton v. Stewart*, 549 U.S. 147, 152, 127 S. Ct. 793, 166 L. Ed. 2d 628 (2007); *Cooper v. Calderon*, 274 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001) ("When the AEDPA is in play, the district court may not, in the absence of proper authorization from the court of appeals, consider a second or successive habeas application.") (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Petition is a second or successive petition that challenges the same conviction and sentence imposed by the same judgment of the state court as in *Hernandez I*.

A federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). A court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that (1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or (2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and those new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). It is not the district court, however, that decides whether a second or successive petition meets the requirements permitting a petitioner to file a second or successive petition. Rather, "[b]efore a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1996). Absent authorization from the Ninth Circuit, this court lacks jurisdiction over the instant Petition. Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1274.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States Courts provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner." Here, summary dismissal is warranted.

III.

<u>ORDER</u>

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered summarily dismissing the Petition and action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

6/5/12	Dale S. Jischer
DATED:	
	DALE S. FISCHER United States District Judge