1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
10		
11	JOHN HUGH PETTY,) Case No. ED CV 10-1725 JCG
12	Plaintiff,	
13	v.)) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
14	MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL) ORDER
15	COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,	
16		
17	Defendant.	
18		
19	I.	
20	INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY	
21	On November 22, 2010, plaintiff John Hugh Petty ("Plaintiff") filed a	
22	complaint against defendant Michael J. Astrue ("Defendant"), the Commissioner of	
23	the Social Security Administration, seeking review of a denial of disability insurance	
24	benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income benefits ("SSI"). [Docket No.	
25	3.]	
26	On May 19, 2011, Defendant filed his answer, along with a certified copy of	
27	the administrative record. [Docket Nos. 12, 13, 14.]	
28	In sum, having carefully studied, inter alia, the parties' joint stipulation and	

the administrative record, the Court concludes that, as detailed below, the
 Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly discounted Plaintiff's subjective
 complaints. The Court thus remands this matter to the Commissioner in accordance
 with the principles and instructions enunciated in this Memorandum Opinion and
 Order.

II.

PERTINENT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who was 53 years old on the date of his administrative hearing, has a high school education. (*See* Administrative Record ("AR") at 18, 44, 135.)

10 On February 20, 2008, Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI, alleging that he has
11 been disabled since February 4, 2008 due to a congestive heart failure and chronic
12 atrial fibrillation. (*See* AR at 116, 119, 135, 145.)

On September 17, 2009, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and
testified at a hearing before an ALJ. (*See* AR at 18-46.) The ALJ also heard
testimony from Corinne Porter, a vocational expert ("VE"). (*Id.*)

16 On November 10, 2009, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits. (AR
17 at 10-17.) Applying the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ
18 found, at step one, that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
19 his alleged onset date. (*Id.* at 12.)

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from severe impairments consisting of "atrial fibrillation; history of congestive heart failure; history of drug abuse; history of burns on both forearms, and hypertension." (AR at 12 (emphasis omitted).)

At step three, the ALJ determined that the evidence did not demonstrate that
Plaintiff's impairments, either individually or in combination, meet or medically
equaled the severity of any listing set forth in the Social Security regulations.¹ (AR

27

6

7

8

9

28

¹/ See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.

1	at 21.)
---	---------

2 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity^{2/} ("RFC") and 3 determined that he can perform light work. (AR at 13.)

4 The ALJ found, at step four, that Plaintiff lacks the ability to perform his past 5 relevant work as a pipe fitter, heavy equipment operator, construction worker, or 6 dishwasher. (AR at 16.)

7 At step five, based on Plaintiff's RFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ found 8 that "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 9 [Plaintiff] can perform," including cashier, cleaner, and hand packager. (AR at 16-10 17 (bold omitted).) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not suffering from a 11 disability as defined by the Act. (*Id.* at 10, 17.)

Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ's decision, which was 12 13 denied by the Appeals Council. (AR at 1-3, 4.) The ALJ's decision stands as the 14 final decision of the Commissioner.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

17 This Court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 18 19 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001, as 20 21 amended Dec. 21, 2001). If the court, however, determines that the ALJ's findings 22 are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record,

23

15

16

24

<u>2</u>/

25

Residual functional capacity is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1989). "Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the 26 ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in which the ALJ assesses the claimant's 27 residual functional capacity." Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 n. 2 (9th 28 Cir. 2007).

1	the court may reject the findings and set aside the decision to deny benefits.
2	Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter,
3	242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001).
4	"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
5	preponderance." Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such "relevant
6	evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a
7	conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 F.3d
8	at 459. To determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding, the
9	reviewing court must review the administrative record as a whole, "weighing both
10	the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's
11	conclusion." Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ's decision "cannot be affirmed
12	simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Aukland, 257 F.3d
13	at 1035 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). If the
14	evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's decision,
15	the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ." Id.
16	(quoting Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)).
17	IV.
18	ISSUES PRESENTED
19	Two disputed issues are presented for decision here:
20	1. whether the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion of Plaintiff's treating
21	physician, (see Joint Stip. at 4-7); and
22	2. whether the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's credibility. (<i>Id.</i> at 10-13.)
23	Under the circumstances here, the Court finds the issue of the ALJ's
24	evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility to be dispositive of this matter, and does not
25	reach the remaining issue.
26	111
27	111
28	
	4

N7
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. <u>Plaintiff's Credibility</u> Plaintiff argues that the "ALL has arread by failing to site any clear and
Plaintiff argues that the "ALJ has erred by failing to cite any clear and
convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff's subjective complaints other than to state that
in his opinion the Plaintiff's complaints are not supported by objective medical
evidence." (Joint Stip. at 12.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly
disregarded his "complaints of shortness of breath, fatigue, and chest pain, [which]
would clearly require Plaintiff to experience numerous unscheduled work breaks
during the course of a given work week." (Id.)
1. <u>The ALJ Must Provide "Clear and Convincing" Reasons For</u>
Discounting Plaintiff's Credibility
An ALJ can reject a plaintiff's subjective complaint upon (1) finding evidence
of malingering, or (2) expressing clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Benton
v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). The ALJ may consider the
following factors in weighing a plaintiff's credibility: (1) his or her reputation for
truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies either in the plaintiff's testimony or between the
plaintiff's testimony and his or her conduct; (3) his or her daily activities; (4) his or
her work record; and (5) testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the
nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which she complains. Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, the ALJ did not find evidence of malingering. (See generally AR at 10-
17.) Therefore, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's credibility must rest on
clear and convincing reasons. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040.
2. <u>The ALJ Improperly Rejected Plaintiff's Subjective Complaints</u>
After a careful review of the medical record and the joint stipulation, the
Court has considered the ALJ's sole reason for finding Plaintiff not credible, and
concludes that the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient justification for
5

discounting Plaintiff's credibility. 1

2 Here, the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence does not support Plaintiff's alleged degree of disability. (AR at 14 ("While [Plaintiff] alleges he is 3 4 unable to perform work activity, his medical records do not contain objective clinical 5 evidence to support his assertion.").)

6 In so finding, the ALJ noted that although Plaintiff "was admitted to the 7 hospital from February 4, 2008 to February 9, 2008 for shortness of breath," his 8 condition was "very well controlled during his hospitalization." (AR at 14; see also 9 id. at 169 (emergency department respiratory nursing assessment dated February 4, 2008 indicating "severity scale" of "2/10").) The ALJ also reported that "[0]nce 10 [Plaintiff] was clinically stable he had no further complaints of any shortness of 11 breath or palpitations" and "was discharged home with medication." (Id. at 14; see 12 13 also id. at 162 (Barstow Community Hospital discharge summary dated February 9, 14 2008 reporting "patient had no further complaints of any shortness of breath or 15 palpitation").) The ALJ found Plaintiff's "February 7, 2008 chest x-ray showed improving congestive heart failure" and he "was discharged with no activity 16 17 restrictions." (Id. at 14; see also id. at 224 (radiology report of Plaintiff's chest stating "[t]here has been an improvement since the previous exam").) 18

19 The Court agrees that there is no objective medical evidence in the record supporting a more restrictive RFC than that determined by the ALJ.^{3/} (See generally 20

21

22

23

24

25

26

28

27

In other words, Dr. Padmanabha's non-medical opinion that Plaintiff is unable

<u>3</u>/ Although the Court declines to address Plaintiff's claim that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of V.M. Padmanabha, M.D. ("Dr. Padmanabha"), (see Joint Stip. at 4-7), the Court notes that his conclusory opinion that Plaintiff "is totally and permanently disabled" is "not entitled to special significance." Boardman v. Astrue, 286 Fed.Appx. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished memorandum opinion) ("The ALJ is correct that a determination of a claimant's ultimate disability is reserved to the Commissioner, and that a physician's opinion on the matter is not entitled to special significance.").

1 AR at 162-316; *see, e.g., id.* at 253 (April 12, 2008 emergency department treatment
2 note indicating Plaintiff's respiratory airway is "clear," his effort is "unlabored," and
3 he has no cough).)

Although the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
conclusion that the alleged severity of Plaintiff's symptoms is unsupported by the
objective medical evidence, a lack of objective evidence supporting Plaintiff's
symptoms cannot be the *sole* reason for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony. *Rollins v. Massanari*, 261 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the ALJ failed to provide
legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony, remand is warranted on
this issue.

VI.

REMAND IS APPROPRIATE

13 This Court has discretion to remand or reverse and award benefits. *McAllister* v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989, as amended Oct. 19, 1989). Where no 14 15 useful purpose would be served by further proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate 16 17 award of benefits. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000, as amended May 4, 2000), 18 19 cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000). Where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the record that 20 21 the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly

22

11

12

^{to work is not binding on the Commissioner.} *See Ukolov v. Barnhart*, 420 F.3d
1002, 1004 (2005) ("Although a treating physician's opinion is generally afforded
the greatest weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the
existence of an impairment or the ultimate determination of disability."); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(e)(1) ("We are responsible for making the determination or decision
about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability.... A statement by a
medical source that you are 'disabled' or 'unable to work' does not mean that we
will determine that you are disabled.") & 416.927(e)(1) (same).

1	evaluated, remand is appropriate. See Benecke, 379 F.3d at 595-96; Harman, 211		
2	F.3d at 1179-80.		
3	Here, there are outstanding issues which must be resolved before a final		
4	determination can be made. On remand, the ALJ shall reconsider Plaintiff's		
5	subjective complaints and the resulting functional limitations, and either credit		
6	Plaintiff's testimony or provide clear and convincing reasons supported by		
7	substantial evidence for rejecting them. In addition, if necessary, the ALJ shall		
8	obtain additional information and clarification regarding Plaintiff's functional		
9	limitations. The ALJ shall then proceed through steps four and five to determine		
10	what work, if any, Plaintiff is capable of performing. ^{$\frac{4}{}$}		
11	Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered		
12	REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits and		
13	REMANDING the matter for further administrative action consistent with this		
14	decision.		
15			
16	Dated: August 11, 2011		
17			
18	Hon. Jay C. Gandhi		
19	United States Magistrate Judge		
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27	$\frac{4}{4}$ In light of the Court's remand instructions, it is unnecessary for the Court to		
	$\frac{4}{2}$ In light of the Court's remand instructions, it is unnecessary for the Court to address Plaintiff's remaining contention. (<i>See</i> Joint Stip. at 4-7.)		