complaint. On November 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint.

Screening Requirement В.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

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legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. *Id.* at 1949.

II. Summary of Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is incarcerated at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility ("SATF") in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names as Defendants: Shyi-Tang Shiue, doctor at Mercy Hospital; Mamoud Rashidi, doctor at Mercy Hospital; Chief Medical Officer Enenmoh at SATF; physician assistants Peters and Jean Pierre at SATF; Mercy Hospital; and SATF.

Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment for medical treatment rising to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

A. Claims Against Defendants Shiue and Rashidi

Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 31, 2008, Plaintiff was escorted to Mercy Hospital for surgery. (Doc. 8, Second Am. Compl.(SAC) p. 3.)¹ Defendant Shiue performed the surgery, which resulted in Plaintiff being paralyzed from the waist down. (*Id.*) On August 15, 2008, Plaintiff was taken to surgery again. (*Id.*) Surgery was performed by Defendant Rashidi. (*Id.*)

All page number references refer to the court docket's numbering.

Plaintiff suffered "dropped foot." (*Id.*) Plaintiff has been left in severe pain, is mobility impaired, and unable to function in daily life. (*Id.*) Plaintiff suffers deprivation of sleep, and needs the assistance of a walker to walk. (*Id.*)

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. "The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation and citation omitted). A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) "the prison official deprived the prisoner of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," and (2) "the prison official 'acted with deliberate indifference in doing so." *Toguchi v. Chung*, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting *Hallett v. Morgan*, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, "sufficiently serious" *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must "know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety" *Id.* at 837.

"Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard." *Toguchi*, 391 F.3d at 1060. "Under this standard, the prison official must not only 'be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,' but that person 'must also draw the inference." *Id.* at 1057 (quoting *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837). "If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk." *Id.* (quoting *Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada*, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

There are no allegations that support a claim that defendants "[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff's] health or safety." *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837. At most, Plaintiff has alleged claims of malpractice. "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1977); *McGuckin v. Smith*, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), *overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller*, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Plaintiff's allegations provide no basis upon which to impose liability for violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Shiue and Rashidi.

B. Claims Against Defendant Enenmoh, Peters, and Jean Pierre

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rashidi ordered Plaintiff to receive medical care consisting of physical therapy. (SAC 3-4.) Plaintiff contends that he grieved the lack of physical therapy to Defendant Enenmoh, but did not receive a response. (SAC 4.) Plaintiff contends that he went to the doctor's line to ask Defendants Peters and Jean Pierre for prescribed physical therapy, but was deprived of that therapy. (SAC 4.)

Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to give rise to a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Enenmoh, Peters, and Jean Pierre. Defendant Enenmoh's actions in reviewing grievances creates no substantive rights, *Ramirez v. Galaza*, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), and does not sufficiently demonstrate that Defendant Enenmoh knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health or safety, *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837. Similarly, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants Peters and Jean Pierre did not provide Plaintiff with physical therapy does not demonstrate that they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health or safety. *Id*.

C. Claims Against Defendant Mercy Hospital

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Mercy Hospital violated his Eighth Amendment rights by allowing Defendant Shiue to perform surgery on him, even thought it should have known that Defendant Shiue was facing thirteen complaints of medical negligence. (SAC 5.) Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Mercy Hospital are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Under § 1983, Plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. *Long v. County of Los Angeles*, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). There is no § 1983 liability if there is no actor operating under the color of state law. Plaintiff's second amended complaint makes no allegations that demonstrate Defendant Mercy Hospital is acting under color of state law. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Mercy Hospital. The Court will recommend Plaintiff be granted leave to amend as to this claim.

D. Claims Against SATF

Plaintiff also alleges that SATF is responsible, like Defendant Mercy Hospital. (SAC 5.)

Plaintiff may not bring suit against SATF in federal court because it is a part of a state agency,

CDCR, and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. *Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety*,

488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff's claim against Defendant California Substance

Abuse Treatment Facility fails as a matter of law.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief for violation of the Eighth Amendment, or any other federal claims. Plaintiff was previously given the opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his claims against Defendants SATF, Enenmoh, Peters, Jean Pierre, Shiue and Rashidi, but has not done so. The Court recommends dismissal of those claims with prejudice. The Court will provide Plaintiff with leave to amend as to Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Mercy Hospital only. *Noll v. Carlson*, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. *George v. Smith*, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights. *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49; *Jones v. Williams*, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading," Local Rule 220. Plaintiff is warned that "[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived." King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

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1 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 2 1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; 3 2. Plaintiff's second amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim 4 upon which relief may be granted; 5 3. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants SATF, Enenmoh, Peters, Jean Pierre, Shiue and Rashidi are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; 6 7 4. Plaintiff shall file a third amended complaint as to his claims against Defendant 8 Mercy Hospital; and 9 5. If Plaintiff fails to comply, this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure 10 to state any claims upon which relief may be granted and for failure to obey a 11 court order. 12 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 13 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the plaintiff may 15 file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The plaintiff is advised that failure to file 16 17 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. 18 *Martinez v. Ylst*, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 19, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28