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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HELM,)	1:09-cv-01756-LJO-JLT HC
)	
Petitioner,)	FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
)	SUMMARILY DISMISS PETITION FOR
v.)	WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
)	
JAMES D. HARTLEY, Warden,)	ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS
)	BE FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS
Respondent.)	

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On October 6, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). On January 11, 2010, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response to the petition. (Doc. 7). On March 12, 2010, Respondent filed the Answer. (Doc. 11). Petitioner did not file a Traverse. Petitioner challenges the California court decisions upholding a June 25, 2009, decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”). Petitioner claims the California courts unreasonably denied parole suitability in that there was no evidence that Petitioner poses an “unreasonable risk of danger,” that reliance upon the circumstances of the commitment offense alone does not establish “current dangerousness,” and that the decision was not supported by “some evidence.” (Doc. 1, pp. 17-33).

1 I. Preliminary Screening of the Petition.

2 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition
3 if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is
4 not entitled to relief in the district court” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
5 The Court must summarily dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any
6 attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” Habeas Rule 4;
7 O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490
8 (9th cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition (1) specify all grounds of relief available to
9 the Petitioner; (2) state the facts supporting each ground; and (3) state the relief requested. Notice
10 pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a real possibility of
11 constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski, 915 F.2d at
12 420. Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to
13 summary dismissal. Hendricks, 908 F.2d at 491.

14 Further, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the Court may dismiss a
15 petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the
16 respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory
17 Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 Adoption; see Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th
18 Cir.2001).

19 II. Failure to State a Claim Cognizable Under Federal Habeas Corpus

20 On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
21 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas
22 corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063
23 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 118 S.Ct. 586
24 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 6, 2009, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of
25 the AEDPA.

26 Here, Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the California Department of Corrections and
27 Rehabilitation who is serving a sentence of sixteen years-to-life imposed in the Sacramento County
28 Superior Court after Petitioner’s 1991 conviction for second degree murder with use of a deadly

1 weapon. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Petitioner challenges the June 25, 2008 decision of the BPH finding him
2 unsuitable for parole.

3 Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: (1) there was no evidence that Petitioner
4 poses a “current unreasonable risk” of danger to public safety; (2) the BPH improperly weighed the
5 various factors of parole suitability in violation of due process; and (3) the BPH’s decision was
6 unsupported by “some evidence.” (Doc. 1, pp. 17-33).

7 A. Substantive Due Process Claims And California’s “Some Evidence” Standard

8 As can be readily seen, all three grounds for relief argue, in essence, that the BPH’s decision
9 is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and/or that the BPH improperly considered and
10 weighed the evidence that was presented. As discussed below, all of these claims sounds in
11 substantive federal due process and are not cognizable in these proceedings.

12 The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of
13 Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless
14 he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states that the federal courts
15 shall entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus only on the ground that the petitioner “is in
16 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§
17 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000); Wilson v.
18 Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010); see also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section
19 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of
20 habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v.
21 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28
22 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court resulted
23 in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
24 Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that
25 was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
26 State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

27 Because California’s statutory parole scheme guarantees that prisoners will not be denied
28 parole absent some evidence of present dangerousness, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held

1 that California law creates a liberty interest in parole that may be enforced under the Due Process
2 Clause. Hayward v. Marshall, 602 F.3d 546, 561-563 (9th Cir.2010); Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d
3 606, 608-609 (9th Cir. 2010); Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213 (2010), *rev'd*, Swarthout v.
4 Cooke, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2011 WL 197627 (Jan. 24, 2011). The Ninth Circuit instructed
5 reviewing federal district courts to determine whether California’s application of California’s “some
6 evidence” rule was unreasonable or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
7 of the evidence. Hayward v. Marshall. 603 F.3d at 563; Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d at 608.

8 On January 24, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a *per curiam* opinion in Swarthout v. Cooke,
9 562 U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2011 WL 197627 (No. 10-133, Jan. 24, 2011). In that decision, the
10 United States Supreme Court characterized as reasonable the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
11 Ninth Circuit that California law creates a liberty interest in parole protected by the Fourteenth
12 Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which in turn requires fair procedures with respect to the liberty
13 interest. Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, *2.

14 However, the procedures required for a parole determination are the minimal requirements
15 set forth in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct.
16 2100 (1979).¹ Swarthout v. Cooke, 2011 WL 197627, *2. In Swarthout, the Court rejected inmates’
17 claims that they were denied a liberty interest because there was an absence of “some evidence” to
18 support the decision to deny parole. In doing so, the High Court stated as follows:

19 There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the
20 expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their
21 prisoners. (Citation omitted.) When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due
22 Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication—and federal courts will review the
23 application of those constitutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we have
24 held that the procedures requires are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner
25 subject to a parole statute similar to California’s received adequate process when he was
26 allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole
27 was denied. (Citation omitted.)

28 Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, *2.

The Court concluded that the petitioners had received the due process to which they were

¹ In Greenholtz, the Court held that a formal hearing is not required with respect to a decision concerning granting or denying discretionary parole and that due process is sufficient to permit the inmate to have an opportunity to be heard and to be given a statement of reasons for the decision made. Id. at 15-16. The decision maker is not required to state the evidence relied upon in coming to the decision. Id.

1 due:

2 They were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them,
3 were afforded access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why
parole was denied...

4 That should have been the beginning and the end of the federal habeas courts' inquiry into
5 whether [the petitioners] received due process.

6 Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, *3. The Court went on to expressly point out that California's "some
7 evidence" rule is not a substantive federal requirement, and correct application of the State's "some
8 evidence" standard is not required by the federal Due Process Clause. Id. at *3. The Supreme Court
9 emphasized that "the responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally adequate procedures
10 governing California's parole system are properly applied rests with California courts, and is no part
11 of the Ninth Circuit's business." Id.

12 Swarthout forecloses any claim premised upon California's "some evidence" rule because
13 this court cannot entertain substantive due process claims related to a state's application of its own
14 laws. Here, the claims in the petition sound in substantive due process and are therefore foreclosed
15 by Swarthout. Review of the record for "some evidence" or whether the BPH relied solely upon the
16 circumstances of the commitment offense to support denial of parole are simply not within the scope
17 of this Court's habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, the petition should be
18 summarily dismissed.

19 Moreover, to the extent that these claims rest solely on state law, they are not cognizable on
20 federal habeas corpus. Federal habeas relief is not available to retry a state issue that does not rise to
21 the level of a federal constitutional violation. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16
22 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991). Alleged errors in the
23 application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schiavo, 289 F.3d 616,
24 623 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law.
25 Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 493 U.S. 942 (1989).

26 B. Procedural Due Process

27 Petitioner has neither claimed nor established a violation of his federal right to procedural
28 due process. Petitioner has included a transcript of the BPH hearing. (Doc. 1, p. 41 et seq.). From

1 that transcript, it is clear that Petitioner was present at the BPH hearing, that he had an opportunity to
2 be heard, and that he was represented by counsel, who also attended the hearing, and argued on
3 Petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner received a statement of the Board’s reasons for denying parole. (Doc.
4 1, pp. 64-104).

5 According to the Supreme Court, this is “the beginning and the end of the federal habeas
6 courts’ inquiry into whether [the prisoner] received due process.” Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627.
7 “The Constitution does not require more [process].” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. Therefore, the
8 instant petition does not present cognizable claims for relief and must be summarily dismissed.

9 **RECOMMENDATION**

10 For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the instant petition for
11 writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), be SUMMARILY DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon
12 which federal habeas relief can be granted.

13 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge
14 assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of
15 the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.
16 Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with
17 the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
18 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and
19 filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections.
20 The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The
21 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
22 appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

23

24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 Dated: February 24, 2011

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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