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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
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10 TRAVON LEON FREEMAN,  
11 Plaintiff,  
12 v.  
13 RALPH DIAZ, et al.,  
14 Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01268-EPG (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,  
RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION  
BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO  
STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 11)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN  
TWENTY-ONE DAYS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN  
DISTRICT JUDGE

19 Travon Freeman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding *pro se* and *in forma*  
20 *pauperis* in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the  
21 complaint commencing this action on September 8, 2020. (ECF No. 1). On November 4,  
22 2020, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to state any cognizable  
23 claims. (ECF No. 11). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to either: “a. File a First Amended  
24 Complaint; or b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on his complaint.” (*Id.* at 9-  
25 10).

26 On November 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 11).  
27 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, and for the reasons described in  
28 this order will recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

1 Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of service of these findings and  
2 recommendations to file his objections.

3 **I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT**

4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a  
5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).  
6 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are  
7 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or  
8 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.  
9 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis* (ECF No. 8), the Court may  
10 also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any  
11 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court  
12 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”  
13 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

14 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing  
15 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are  
16 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere  
17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell  
18 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient  
19 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.  
20 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting  
21 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts  
22 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d  
23 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a  
24 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

25 Pleadings of *pro se* plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal  
26 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that  
27 *pro se* complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).

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1           **II.     SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT**

2           Plaintiff brings this action against defendant Warden Clark, defendant Chief Mental  
3 Health Supervisor Harris, and defendant Secretary of the California Department of Corrections  
4 and Rehabilitation Diaz.

5           Plaintiff alleges as follows:

6           During the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff was suicidal and swallowed over twenty  
7 different medications and had made a noose to hang himself. Plaintiff was taken to Bakersfield  
8 Adventist on June 25, 2020, and stayed until June 26, 2020.

9           Once back at California State Prison, Corcoran, Plaintiff was placed in the crisis  
10 treatment center (“CTC”).

11           Ten days later, defendant Harris’s coconspirators took Plaintiff and placed him in  
12 another cell that had another inmates’ medications still inside the suicide cell. Plaintiff, who  
13 was suicidal, took thirty of those pills to further harm himself. This was July 14, 2020.

14           Then again, on August 13, 2020, CTC mental health personnel gave Plaintiff close to  
15 eighty pills,<sup>1</sup> which were left in his suicide cell while he was in the shower. Plaintiff, who was  
16 suicidal, overdosed on those pills. Defendants Clark and Harris, along with their counterparts,  
17 aided and abetted each other in assisting Plaintiff, who is a suicidal mental health patient, in  
18 trying to kill himself in a supervised secure setting.

19           **III.     ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT**

20           **A.   Section 1983**

21           The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

22           Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or  
23 usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes  
24 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the  
25 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities  
26 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an  
27 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

28           42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely

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<sup>1</sup> The Court notes that in Plaintiff’s previous complaint, which he signed under penalty of perjury, Plaintiff stated that he swallowed forty-eight pills on August 13, 2020, not eighty.

1 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,  
2 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see  
3 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los  
4 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.  
5 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

6 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted  
7 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the  
8 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.  
9 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing  
10 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the  
11 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or  
12 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which  
13 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th  
14 Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite  
15 causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others  
16 which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional  
17 harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of  
18 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”  
19 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City  
20 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

21 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the  
22 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual  
23 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have  
24 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S.  
25 658, 691, 695 (1978).

26 Supervisory personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their  
27 employees under a theory of *respondeat superior* and, therefore, when a named defendant  
28 holds a supervisory position, the causal link between the supervisory defendant and the claimed

1 constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v.  
2 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.  
3 1978). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability,  
4 a plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants  
5 either: were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, Hansen v.  
6 Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); “knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent  
7 them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); or promulgated or “implement[ed]  
8 a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the  
9 moving force of the constitutional violation,” Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (citations and internal  
10 quotation marks omitted).

11 For instance, a supervisor may be liable for his or her “own culpable action or inaction  
12 in the training, supervision, or control of his [or her] subordinates,” “his [or her] acquiescence  
13 in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a  
14 reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d  
15 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

16 **B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs in Violation of the**  
17 **Eighth Amendment**

18 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an  
19 inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d  
20 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires  
21 Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a  
22 prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton  
23 infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately  
24 indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992))  
25 (citation and internal quotations marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX  
26 Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (*en banc*).

27 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant *subjectively* “knows of  
28 and disregards an *excessive risk* to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
2 Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to  
3 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.”  
4 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an  
5 unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known”) is  
6 insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,  
7 836-37 & n.5 (1994) (citations omitted).

8 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between  
9 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to  
10 establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989);  
11 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, “a complaint that a  
12 physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid  
13 claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not  
14 become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at  
15 106. To establish a difference of opinion rising to the level of deliberate indifference, a  
16 “plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable  
17 under the circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

18 Plaintiff appears to be suing only supervisory defendants. There are no factual  
19 allegations suggesting that any defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivations.  
20 Additionally, there are no factual allegations suggesting that any defendant instituted a policy  
21 that caused the deprivations, that any defendant knew of the alleged deprivations but failed to  
22 prevent them, or that any defendant’s failure to train or supervise his subordinates led to the  
23 alleged deprivation. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim for  
24 deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against any defendant.

25 The Court notes that, in its previous screening, it informed Plaintiff that he “may add  
26 claims against prison officials, if he believes that any prison officials violated his right to care.  
27 If Plaintiff does add prison officials as defendants, he should describe what he told each prison  
28 official regarding his need for treatment, how each prison official responded to his request for

1 treatment, and what, if anything, each prison official said or did regarding Plaintiff's care that  
2 makes Plaintiff believe that they acted with deliberate indifference." (ECF No. 10, p. 8).

3 The Court also informed Plaintiff that, if he "does not know the names of certain prison  
4 officials, he may describe them to the best of his ability and name them as 'Doe Defendants,'  
5 such as 'Doe Defendant 1, a psychologist working on July 14, 2020,' to be identified by name  
6 and substituted in as a party with the help of discovery during the litigation." (*Id.* at 8-9).

7 Despite the Court providing Plaintiff with this information, Plaintiff did not add claims  
8 against any defendants who were directly responsible for his care.

### 9 C. Conspiracy

10 To state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, Plaintiff must show the existence of  
11 an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights, Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d  
12 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001), and that an  
13 "actual deprivation of his constitutional rights resulted from the alleged conspiracy," Hart v.  
14 Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County,  
15 Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). "To be liable, each participant in the  
16 conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share  
17 the common objective of the conspiracy." Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United  
18 Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir.1989)).

19 Additionally, Plaintiff must show that Defendants "conspired or acted jointly in concert and  
20 that some overt act [was] done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Sykes v. State of California,  
21 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974). "[M]ore than vague conclusory allegations are required to  
22 state a [conspiracy] claim." Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).

23 It is not entirely clear, but Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants conspired with  
24 medical personnel to violate his constitutional rights. However, there are no factual allegations  
25 suggesting that any defendant conspired with any other defendant to violate Plaintiff's  
26 constitutional rights, or that any defendant conspired with medical personnel to violate  
27 Plaintiff's constitutional rights. At most, Plaintiff has made vague conclusory allegations  
28 regarding the existence of a conspiracy. As vague conclusory allegations are not sufficient to

1 support a conspiracy claim, Plaintiff has failed to state a conspiracy claim against any  
2 defendant.

3 **IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

4 The Court recommends that this action be dismissed without granting Plaintiff further  
5 leave to amend. In the Court's prior screening order, the Court identified the deficiencies in  
6 Plaintiff's complaint, provided Plaintiff with relevant legal standards, and provided Plaintiff  
7 with an opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint with  
8 the benefit of the Court's screening order, but failed to cure all of the deficiencies identified in  
9 the screening order. Thus, it appears that further leave to amend would be futile.

10 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

- 11 1. This action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be  
12 granted; and
- 13 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

14 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district  
15 judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within  
16 twenty-one (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff  
17 may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to  
18 Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Plaintiff is advised that failure to file  
19 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.  
20 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394  
21 (9th Cir. 1991)).

22 Additionally, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district  
23 judge to this case.  
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 Dated: November 23, 2020

26 /s/ Eric P. Grogan  
27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
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