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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBY N. JACOBSON,

Plaintiff,

No. CIV S-11-2493 MCE GGH PS

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
BOARD FOR THE CORRECTION
OF MILITARY RECORDS,

Defendant.

ORDER AND
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, proceeding in this action pro se, has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit making the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

The determination that plaintiffs may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required inquiry. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is directed to dismiss the case at any time if it determines the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.

1 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28
3 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
4 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
5 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
6 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
7 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

8 A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
9 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
10 speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
11 “The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a
12 suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
13 Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient
14 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
15 v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127
16 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
17 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
18 alleged.” Id.

19 Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
20 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1972); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
21 Cir. 1988). Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se
22 plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before
23 dismissal. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1230.

24 The court finds that this action should be dismissed under the principles of claim
25 preclusion. Claim preclusion bars litigation in a subsequent action of “any claims that were
26 raised or could have been raised in the prior action...The doctrine is applicable whenever there is

1 “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity between
2 parties.” Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). The
3 Ninth Circuit has identified four factors that should be considered by a court in determining
4 whether successive lawsuits involve the same claims:

5 (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment
6 would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second
7 action;

8 (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two
9 actions;

10 (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right;
11 and

12 (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
13 nucleus of facts.

14 See C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.1987). “The central criterion
15 in determining whether there is an identity of claims between the first and second adjudications is
16 whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Owens, 244 F.3d at
17 714.

18 Here, on August 7, 2008, plaintiff initially filed a complaint against the
19 Department of the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (“Army Board”) seeking
20 an order that the Army Board issue him a “Purple Heart” based on plaintiff’s Army service in the
21 Korean war during which plaintiff allegedly sustained shrapnel wounds while engaged in hostile
22 action. In the course of that litigation, plaintiff also contended that because the Army Board
23 incorrectly ruled that he did not prove that he was wounded in combat, it erroneously denied his
24 application for an upgraded discharge. On September 30, 2009, after considering the evidence
25 submitted by both parties, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army Board. The
26 court found that plaintiff failed to show that the Army Board’s decision was arbitrary or
capricious, not based on substantial evidence, or contrary to law. Plaintiff did not appeal that
judgment. (See CIV S-08-1828 GGH PS.)

