

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT C. TURNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JENNIFER BARRETTO, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-1539 MCE AC P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested appointment of counsel and leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis, though he has not submitted a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). However, the court will not assess a filing fee at this time. Instead, the undersigned will recommend that the complaint be summarily dismissed.

///
///

1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

7 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
9 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
10 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona,
11 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute
12 on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490
13 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded,
14 has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id.

15 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
16 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
17 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
18 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
19 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more
20 than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual
21 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations
22 omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that
23 merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original)
24 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d
25 ed. 2004)).

26 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
27 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
28 Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

1 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
2 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint
3 under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,
4 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading
5 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v.
6 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

7 III. Complaint

8 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Barretto, Herndon, and Lewis violated his Eighth and
9 Fourteenth Amendment rights when they suspended his visitation with Dolores Johnson, whom
10 some of the attachments identify as plaintiff’s fiancée. ECF No. 1 at 3-4, 16, 39, 41. The
11 complaint alleges that prior to a visit with Ms. Johnson, plaintiff forgot to remove two
12 photographs from his wheelchair and visitation staff mistakenly believed that Ms. Johnson had
13 given plaintiff the photographs during the visit to bring back into the prison. Id. at 3-4. As a
14 result, plaintiff’s visitation with Ms. Johnson was suspended for six months even though plaintiff
15 was never charged with a disciplinary infraction. Id.

16 IV. Failure to State a Claim

17 “In the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and
18 cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Powers v. Ohio, 499
19 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (citing Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990); Singleton v.
20 Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976)).

21 Plaintiff provides documentation that shows that Ms. Johnson was notified that *her*
22 visitation privileges had been suspended and that *she* had the right to appeal the suspension,
23 which she did. ECF No. 1 at 7, 9-13. The documents further show that after the period of
24 suspension expired, Ms. Johnson had to be reapproved to visit plaintiff. Id. at 7, 21-22. The lack
25 of disciplinary charges against plaintiff also demonstrates that Ms. Johnson was the one
26 determined to have violated the rules, not plaintiff. Id. at 3-4. In this instance, it is clear from
27 both the circumstances alleged in the complaint and the documents plaintiff has attached to the
28 complaint that it was Ms. Johnson’s visitation privileges that were suspended, not plaintiff’s

1 visitation privileges. Id. at 3-4, 7, 21-22. Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the
2 suspension of Ms. Johnson’s visitation privileges. Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1433
3 (9th Cir. 1992) (prisoner did not have standing to assert rights of visitor whose visitation
4 privileges had been suspended for bringing contraband into the prison during visit). Because
5 plaintiff lacks standing, the complaint must be dismissed.

6 To the extent plaintiff is making a claim that his right to visit with Ms. Johnson was
7 suspended, “there is no constitutional right to ‘access to a particular visitor.’” Keenan v. Hall, 83
8 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996)” (quoting Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
9 461 (1989)); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (regulations banning visitation
10 privileges entirely for a two-year period for inmates with two substance abuse violations and
11 regulating the conditions of visitation upheld as not affecting constitutional rights that survive
12 incarceration); Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460-61 (no liberty interest in “unfettered visitation” or
13 visits with “a particular visitor”). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim and the complaint must
14 be dismissed without leave to amend.

15 V. No Leave to Amend

16 If the court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court
17 has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-
18 30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the
19 defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see
20 also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given
21 leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely
22 clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v.
23 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear
24 that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss without leave to amend.
25 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1005-06.

26 The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, the complaint fails to state a claim upon
27 which relief may be granted and that amendment would be futile. The complaint should therefore
28 be dismissed without leave to amend.

1 VI. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

2 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require
3 counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490
4 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the
5 voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d
6 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990).

7 “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the
8 likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims
9 pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965,
10 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). The burden
11 of demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id.

12 In light of the undersigned’s recommendation that this case be dismissed without leave to
13 amend, plaintiff’s request for counsel will be denied.

14 VII. Summary

15 The undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend, for
16 two reasons. First, plaintiff cannot sue for suspension of Ms. Johnson’s visiting privileges
17 because those are her privileges and not his. Second, plaintiff does not have any legally-protected
18 right to visit with a specific person.

19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s request for the appointment of
20 counsel (ECF No. 3) is denied.


21 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed without leave to
22 amend and the action be closed.

23 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days
25 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections
26 with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings
27 and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified

28 ///

1 time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153
2 (9th Cir. 1991).

3 DATED: August 8, 2016

4 
5 ALLISON CLAIRE
6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28