

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAFEWAY INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; THE
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; and EDWIN M.
LEE, in his official capacity of
Mayor of the City and County of San
Francisco,

Defendants.

No. 11-00761 CW

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS
WITH PREJUDICE

_____ /

This lawsuit arises from the enactment of San Francisco Ordinance No. 194-08 (the original ordinance), as amended by San Francisco Ordinance No. 245-10 (the amended ordinance), San Francisco Health Code § 1009.01, which prohibits the sale of tobacco by any store within the City and County of San Francisco that contains a pharmacy. Defendants City and County of San Francisco, the Board of Supervisors for the City and County of San Francisco and Mayor Edwin M. Lee move to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff filed an opposition. The California Medical Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss and Plaintiff filed an opposition to it.¹ The motion was heard on June 2, 2011. Having heard argument on the motion and considered all the papers filed by the parties, the

¹The amicus brief is based on evidence that the Court cannot consider on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court does not address the arguments presented in it.

1 Court grants the motion to dismiss, with prejudice.

2 BACKGROUND

3 The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint and
4 the documents attached to it and the documents of which the Court
5 has taken judicial notice.²

6 Plaintiff operates fifteen general grocery stores located in
7 San Francisco, ten of which include separate licensed pharmacies.
8 Prior to November 7, 2010, when the amended ordinance became
9 effective, Plaintiff sold tobacco products in the ten stores with
10 pharmacies; after the amended ordinance went into effect, Plaintiff
11 was barred from selling tobacco products in its ten stores with
12 pharmacies.

13 Plaintiff staffs its pharmacies with pharmacists licensed by
14 the State of California. In its pharmacies, Plaintiff fills and
15 sells prescriptions drugs to its customers. The pharmacies are
16 isolated from the rest of the store by side walls, back walls,
17 front counters, and locked doors. Thus, the pharmacies are
18 separate and distinguishable from the retail floor space displaying
19 general groceries, household supplies, non-prescription health and
20 beauty supplies and other products. Plaintiff's pharmacies did not

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22 ²Both parties submit requests for judicial notice of certain
23 documents. Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
24 court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to
25 reasonable dispute because they are either generally known or
26 capable of accurate and ready determination. A court also may
27 properly look beyond the complaint to matters of public record.
28 Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th
Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Federal Sav. and
Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991). The Court takes
judicial notice of the submitted documents because they are matters
of public record.

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1 sell tobacco products. Tobacco products were sold only through the
2 stores' customer service booths and were only available to
3 customers through staff who were not involved in pharmacy
4 operations.

5 The Board enacted the original ordinance on August 5, 2008.
6 It provided that "no person shall sell tobacco products in a
7 pharmacy." The word "pharmacy" was defined as "a retail
8 establishment in which the profession of pharmacy by a pharmacist
9 licensed by the State of California in accordance with the Business
10 and Professions Code is practiced and where prescriptions are
11 offered for sale. A pharmacy may also offer other retail goods in
12 addition to prescription pharmaceuticals." The original ordinance
13 also provided that "the prohibition against tobacco sales at
14 pharmacies . . . shall not apply to (a) General Grocery Stores and
15 (b) Big Box Stores." The original ordinance was based on the
16 findings that: (1) tobacco is the leading cause of preventable
17 death in the United States and the leading risk factor contributing
18 to the burden of disease in the world's high-income countries;
19 (2) through the sale of tobacco products, pharmacies convey tacit
20 approval of the purchase and use of tobacco products, which sends a
21 mixed message to consumers who generally patronize pharmacies for
22 health care services; (3) in 1970, the American Pharmaceutical
23 Association stated that mass display of cigarettes in pharmacies is
24 in direct contradiction to the role of a pharmacy as a public
25 health facility; (4) various professional and health care
26 organizations have called for the adoption of state and local
27 prohibitions of tobacco sales in drugstores and pharmacies; and
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1 (5) prescription drug sales for chain drugstores represent a
2 significantly higher percentage of total sales than for grocery
3 stores and big box stores that contain pharmacies. Comp., Ex. A,
4 Findings 1, 7, 8 9, and 21.

5 In September 2008, Walgreen Co., a retail chain that sells
6 prescription and non-prescription drugs and general merchandise,
7 filed a lawsuit in state court against Defendants alleging that the
8 original ordinance violated its constitutional right to equal
9 protection. It argued that it was arbitrary and capricious to
10 exempt general grocery stores and big box stores that had
11 pharmacies from the ban against selling tobacco products, when the
12 ban was applied to Walgreen and other pharmacies that sold general
13 merchandise, including tobacco products. The superior court
14 sustained a demurrer to Walgreen's complaint without leave to
15 amend. The appellate court reversed, holding that granting an
16 exemption to general grocery and big box stores, but not to
17 Walgreen, was a denial of Walgreen's right to equal protection.
18 See Walgreen Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al., 185
19 Cal. App. 4th 424, 443-44 (2010).

20 In September 2010, after the remand of Walgreen to the
21 superior court, the Board repealed the provision in the original
22 ordinance that exempted general grocery and big box stores. See
23 Comp., Ex. E, the amended ordinance. In amending the original
24 ordinance, the Board recited that its purpose was to "head off
25 further litigation over the proper remedy in the Walgreen case and
26 remove any cloud over ongoing enforcement of the Article." Comp.,
27 Ex. E, at 1. On October 10, 2010, the amended ordinance became
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1 law.

2 As a result of the amended ordinance, Defendants revoked the
3 permits to sell tobacco products that had been issued to
4 Plaintiff's ten stores in San Francisco that operate pharmacies.
5 Plaintiff competes with other grocery stores in San Francisco that
6 do not contain pharmacies, but that offer products similar to those
7 available in Plaintiff's non-pharmacy operations. Plaintiff's
8 competitors without pharmacies remain eligible for a license to
9 sell tobacco products. The ban on the sale of tobacco products in
10 Plaintiff's ten stores that operate pharmacies has damaged
11 Plaintiff's business.

12 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following
13 causes of action: (1) a request for an order declaring that the
14 sale of tobacco products in the general merchandise area of
15 Plaintiff's stores is not the equivalent of sale in a pharmacy and
16 that Plaintiff is entitled to a permit to sell tobacco products in
17 these areas; (2) violation of Plaintiff's federal and state
18 constitutional right to sell tobacco products in the same stores in
19 which it operates a pharmacy; (3) violation of Plaintiff's federal
20 and state constitutional right to equal protection; (4) violation
21 of Plaintiff's federal and state constitutional right to due
22 process; and (5) preemption by state law.

23 LEGAL STANDARD

24 A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the
25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.
26 Civ. P. 8(a). On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
27 a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not

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1 give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and
2 the grounds on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
3 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering whether the complaint is
4 sufficient to state a claim, the court will take all material
5 allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable
6 to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898
7 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this principle is inapplicable to legal
8 conclusions; "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
9 action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not taken as
10 true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50
11 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

12 When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally
13 required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request
14 to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile.
15 Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911
16 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment
17 would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be
18 amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal "without
19 contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint."
20 Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).

21 Although the court is generally confined to consideration of
22 the allegations in the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied
23 by attached documents, such documents are deemed part of the
24 complaint and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule
25 12(b)(6) motion. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265,
26 1267 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

I. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Construing Amended Ordinance

In this cause of action, Plaintiff asks the Court to construe the amended ordinance to prohibit the sale of tobacco products only "in a pharmacy," and not, as Defendants interpret it, to prohibit the sale of tobacco products in any store in which a pharmacy is located. Plaintiff bases this request on the language of the amended ordinance: "No person shall sell tobacco products in a pharmacy." Plaintiff argues that Defendants are impermissibly expanding this language to regulate entire grocery stores that have pharmacies located in them.

A district court has jurisdiction over a general constitutional challenge to a statute. Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986). However, if a suit does not involve a dispute regarding an application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, federal jurisdiction is lacking. Doby v. Brown, 232 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1956).

Plaintiff asks the Court to construe the amended ordinance in such a way as to avoid the constitutional issues it asserts in its subsequent causes of action. However, as discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state any constitutional claims upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, this claim is dismissed without leave to amend as amendment would be futile.

II. Violation of Right to Operate Lawful Business

Plaintiff alleges that it has a constitutionally protected interest, under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

1 I, § 7 of the California constitution,³ to operate a pharmacy
2 business and a retail grocery business. It continues that the
3 amended ordinance is unconstitutional because it denies Plaintiff
4 permits to sell tobacco products unless it discontinues its
5 pharmacy businesses. Comp. ¶¶ 76-81. Defendants respond that no
6 constitutional right to do business is implicated when the
7 government imposes generally applicable restrictions on business
8 activities pursuant to its police power to promote public health,
9 safety or welfare.

10 "Where a [business] permit has been properly obtained and in
11 reliance thereon the permittee has incurred material expense, he
12 acquires a vested property right to the protection of which he is
13 entitled." O'Hagan v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 19 Cal. App. 3d
14 151, 158 (1971). When a municipal ordinance regulates a useful
15 business enterprise, it is subject to scrutiny by the courts with a
16 view to determining whether the ordinance is a lawful exercise of
17 the police power, or whether it amounts to unwarranted and
18 arbitrary interference with the constitutional rights to carry on a
19 lawful business, to make contracts, or to use and enjoy property.
20 Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 235-36 (1904) (citing Lawton
21 v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (legislature may not
22 arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
23 unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations; citing cases
24 where legislative acts were held invalid as involving unnecessary

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26 ³Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution provides that a
27 person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
28 due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws.

1 invasion of the rights of property or inhibition of lawful
2 occupation).

3 Plaintiff alleges that it has obtained permits to engage in
4 the operation of a pharmacy and in the sale of tobacco products and
5 it has incurred material expenses in reliance upon those permits.
6 Thus, Plaintiff alleges a vested property right in those permits
7 that is subject to judicial scrutiny.

8 However, the protection of a vested property right in a
9 business permit generally must yield to the state's concern for the
10 public health and safety and its authority to legislate for the
11 protection of the public. See O'Hagan, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 159
12 (government may revoke use permit for lawful business where conduct
13 of business constitutes a nuisance threatening public safety);
14 Dobbins, 195 U.S. at 235 ("It may be admitted that every intendment
15 is to be made in favor of the lawfulness of the exercise of
16 municipal power, making regulations to promote the public health
17 and safety, and that it is not the province of courts, except in
18 clear cases, to interfere with the exercise of the power reposed by
19 law in municipal corporations for the protection of local rights
20 and the health and welfare of the people in the community"). A
21 substantive due process claim cannot overturn a valid state statute
22 unless it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
23 substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
24 general welfare." Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th
25 Cir. 2005).

26 Although Plaintiff may have property rights in its business
27 permits, it has not alleged facts that would demonstrate that the

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1 amended ordinance is an unwarranted and arbitrary interference with
2 those rights. As illustrated by the cases Plaintiff cites, when
3 courts have found an unconstitutional interference with a permit or
4 right to do business, the government has singled out a particular
5 business owner for arbitrary treatment.⁴

6 In Dobbins, 195 U.S. at 236-37, a local ordinance arbitrarily
7 prevented the plaintiff from constructing a gas line on property
8 she had bought for that very purpose. The Court found that the
9 city council had enacted the ordinance after the plaintiff had
10 begun construction, not in the furtherance of the public health or
11 safety, but to provide an economic advantage to another business.
12 Id. at 239. The Court stated that "the exercise of the police
13 power is subject to judicial review [sic], and property rights
14 cannot be wrongfully destroyed by arbitrary enactment. . . . No
15 reasonable explanation for the arbitrary exercise of power in the
16 case is suggested. . . . [W]here . . . the exercise of the police
17 power [is] in such manner as to oppress or discriminate against a
18 class or an individual, the courts may consider and give weight to
19 such purpose in considering the validity of the ordinance." Id. at
20 239-40. Unlike the ordinance in Dobbins, the amended ordinance was
21 not directed specifically at Plaintiff, and Defendants have a
22 reasonable justification, based on public health and safety, for
23 its enactment.

24 Similarly, in O'Hagen, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 160, the court held

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26 ⁴Two of Plaintiff's cases, Dobbins v. Los Angeles and Nollan
27 v. California Coastal Commission, address the constitutional
28 prohibition against taking property without just compensation, not
the substantive due process right that Plaintiff is asserting.

1 that the zoning board's revocation of a use permit for the
2 operation of a drive-in restaurant without good cause or a
3 compelling public necessity was not constitutional. The zoning
4 board revoked the permit because the manner in which the restaurant
5 was being operated constituted a public nuisance. Id. at 161.
6 However, the court found that the nuisance would be eliminated by
7 delineating conditions under which the restaurant could operate.
8 Id. at 165. There was no compelling necessity for the zoning board
9 to revoke the use permit, which totally prohibited the plaintiff
10 from operating his business. Id. Here, unlike in O'Hagan,
11 Defendants have provided good cause and a compelling public
12 necessity for the amended ordinance.

13 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-
14 32 (1987), the Court held that the defendant had taken private
15 property without just compensation because it would grant a permit
16 to build a house on the plaintiffs' beachfront property only on the
17 condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across
18 their property to the beach. Again, this case is inapplicable
19 because the defendant's requirement for an easement was arbitrarily
20 directed at these particular plaintiffs.

21 The final case on which Plaintiff relies, Frost v. Railroad
22 Commission of the State of California, 271 U.S. 583, 592 (1926),
23 held that a state may not constitutionally force a company that
24 operates as a private carrier, which transports its own goods, also
25 to operate as a common carrier, which must accept transport of
26 other companies' goods, in order to use the public highways. Key
27 to the Court's analysis was the fact that the state did not possess

1 the constitutional authority to compel a private carrier to assume,
2 against its will, the duties and burdens of a common carrier. Id.
3 The Court reasoned that the state could not impose an
4 unconstitutional condition upon the privilege of using the public
5 highways. Id. at 599. Plaintiff argues this case is applicable
6 because Defendants are attempting to convert its retail grocery
7 store into a pharmacy. However, Defendants are doing no such
8 thing. The amended ordinance merely regulates the sale of tobacco
9 products; it does not force Plaintiff to engage in a certain type
10 of business.

11 In sum, although Plaintiff has alleged it has a vested
12 property right in its permits, it cannot overcome the fact that the
13 enactment of the amended ordinance was a reasonable and permissible
14 use of Defendants' police power. See Spoklie, 411 F.3d at 1059
15 ("If the legislature could have concluded rationally that certain
16 facts supporting its decision were true, courts may not question
17 its judgment."). Defendants' motion to dismiss this cause of
18 action is granted. It is granted without leave to amend because no
19 additional allegations could remedy the deficiencies noted above.

20 III. Equal Protection Claim

21 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may "deny to
22 any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
23 laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection
24 provision of the California constitution is substantially the same
25 as the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
26 United States Constitution and, thus, may be analyzed under the
27 same standard. Walgreen, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 434 n.7 (citing

1 Manduley v. Sup. Ct., 27 Cal. 4th 537, 571 (2002)).

2 In addressing a claim that a statute or regulation violates a
3 plaintiff's right to equal protection, the court must first
4 determine whether the plaintiff is similarly situated to other
5 entities not affected by the law at issue. Fraley v. United States
6 Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 2926 (9th Cir. 1993); Cooley v. Sup.
7 Ct., 29 Cal. 4th 226, 253 (2002). In other words, the plaintiff
8 must show that the state has adopted a classification that affects
9 two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.
10 Walgreen, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 434. If the groups are not
11 similarly situated for purposes of the law at issue, an equal
12 protection claim fails. Id. If the plaintiff establishes that the
13 groups are similarly situated, the court then applies the
14 appropriate level of scrutiny. Id. at 435. The rational basis
15 standard of review is applied to claims of discrimination caused by
16 economic and social welfare legislation, such as that attacked
17 here. Id. To pass rational basis scrutiny, the equal protection
18 clause requires only that the classification rationally furthers a
19 legitimate state interest. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10
20 (1992). There is no equal protection violation "so long as there
21 is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the
22 legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based
23 rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental
24 decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its
25 goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
26 irrational." Id. at 11 (citations omitted).

27 Plaintiff's equal protection claim is based on the assertion
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1 that, for the purposes of the amended ordinance, the entities that
2 are similarly situated to it are those businesses that are eligible
3 to obtain a permit to sell tobacco products in San Francisco,
4 including general grocery stores, big box stores and other
5 retailers. Plaintiff argues that Defendants treat these similarly
6 situated entities differently because they revoked the permits to
7 sell tobacco products only for those retailers who have a licensed
8 pharmacy somewhere within their premises. Defendants contend that
9 the presence of a pharmacy is insufficient to justify treating
10 different types of stores differently, and that this different
11 treatment of the similarly situated entities has no rational basis.
12 Defendants respond that the stores with and without pharmacies are
13 not similarly situated because, when a store contains a pharmacy,
14 it is participating in the health care delivery system, and
15 participants in the health care delivery system should not be
16 selling deadly tobacco products. Alternatively, Defendants argue
17 that, even if the stores with pharmacies are similarly situated to
18 stores without pharmacies, Defendants' differential treatment of
19 the two is rationally related to the legitimate purposes of the
20 amended ordinance.

21 Plaintiff points out that in Defendants' brief in the Walgreen
22 case, they made an argument similar to the one Plaintiff makes
23 here. For instance, in their brief in the Walgreen case,
24 Defendants stated that "the Board rationally concluded that society
25 is far more likely to view drug stores as health-promoting
26 institutions, as compared to big box stores or grocery stores. And
27 that is true even if some big box stores and grocery stores happen
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1 to contain pharmacies." Walgreen, 2009 WL 1933273, *1
2 (Respondent's Brief). Defendants also argued that drug stores like
3 Walgreen's are different from grocery stores like Plaintiff's
4 because drug stores are more likely to draw former smokers with
5 illnesses and people who are more tempted by, and vulnerable to,
6 the harmful effects of tobacco and who should not be exposed to it.
7 Id. at *6.

8 Defendants explain that their original decision to focus on
9 drug stores was an attempt to take one step at a time, addressing
10 the phase of the problem that was most acute to the legislative
11 mind. When the Walgreen court rejected this approach, they
12 responded by addressing the entire problem, eliminating the
13 differential treatment among types of stores with pharmacies.
14 There is no inconsistency between Defendants' statements in the
15 Walgreen case and their stance here that no stores with pharmacies
16 should be selling tobacco products and that stores with and without
17 pharmacies are situated differently. Even if Defendants' arguments
18 were inconsistent, judicial estoppel does not apply because they
19 lost the Walgreen case, and then conformed to the court's ruling.
20 Defendants cannot be faulted for doing so.

21 Furthermore, even if Plaintiff is similarly situated to other
22 retailers without pharmacies, the amended ordinance easily passes
23 rational basis scrutiny. The purpose of the amended ordinance, to
24 promote the public health by preventing people from becoming
25 addicted to tobacco and by helping those already addicted to stop
26 smoking, is legitimate and even compelling. In prohibiting the
27 sale of tobacco products in pharmacies, the amended ordinance
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1 accomplishes its purpose by ending any inference that tobacco
2 products may not be harmful because they are sold by a major
3 participant in the health care delivery system.

4 Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's equal protection
5 claim is granted. Dismissal is without leave to amend because no
6 additional allegations would cure the deficiency noted above.

7 IV. Substantive Due Process Claim Under Fourteenth Amendment

8 In this cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that: "The
9 arbitrary and capricious classification of these other parts of
10 Safeway's stores as 'pharmacies' is a denial of Safeway's due
11 process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States
12 Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution."
13 Comp. at ¶ 91. In its opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff
14 states that this claim is premised on: (1) the differential
15 treatment of Plaintiff's stores and grocery stores without
16 pharmacies and (2) the substantive due process right to be free
17 from arbitrary, wrongful governmental actions that are not
18 sufficiently linked to any legitimate state interest.

19 Plaintiff's first argument is a restatement of its equal
20 protection claim, addressed above in section III. Plaintiff's
21 second argument is a restatement of its substantive due process
22 claim, addressed above in section II. In those sections, the Court
23 analyzed these claims and dismissed them without leave to amend.
24 Therefore, Plaintiff's fourth cause of action also is dismissed
25 without leave to amend.

26 V. Preemption by State Regulation of Pharmacy Profession

27 In its complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the amended ordinance
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1 is preempted by state laws regulating the pharmacy profession and
2 the sale of tobacco products. As Defendants note, in its
3 opposition, Plaintiff abandons its preemption claim based on the
4 regulation of tobacco products. Therefore, this claim is
5 dismissed.

6 Plaintiff argues that the amended ordinance is preempted by
7 state regulation of the pharmacy profession in three ways:
8 (1) it seeks to regulate pharmacies with another level of
9 administrative control; (2) it is based on the irrational
10 hypothesis that a state pharmacy license assures the public that
11 tobacco products for sale in any store containing a pharmacy are
12 safe; and (3) it creates an actual or potential hazard or confusion
13 in the mind of the public about the meaning of a pharmacist's
14 license. Plaintiff cites cases for the proposition that a
15 municipality may not impose additional or more stringent
16 requirements upon professionals licensed by the state. See e.g.,
17 Verner, Hilby and Dunn v. City of Monte Sereno, 245 Cal. App. 2d
18 29, 33 (1966) (local regulation of civil engineers and land
19 surveyors preempted).

20 The amended ordinance does not regulate the pharmacy
21 profession; it regulates retail stores by prohibiting those stores
22 from selling tobacco if a pharmacy is located within them. This is
23 proper because state law allows local governments to enact
24 ordinances regulating the distribution and sale of tobacco products
25 within their boundaries. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22971.3
26 (nothing in this section regarding the licensing of cigarette and
27 tobacco products preempts or supersedes any local tobacco control

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1 law other than those related to the collection of state taxes);
2 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 118950(e) (ordinances imposing greater
3 restrictions on sale or distribution of tobacco than this section
4 governing the non-sale distribution of tobacco products shall
5 control, if there are any inconsistencies between the two); Cal.
6 Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22960(c), 22961(b) and 22962(e) (same
7 regarding local ordinances restricting sale of cigarettes or
8 tobacco products in vending machines, tobacco advertising on
9 billboards and self-service displays of tobacco products).

10 Therefore, Plaintiff's preemption claim must be dismissed. It
11 is dismissed without leave to amend because amendment would be
12 futile.

13 CONCLUSION

14 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is
15 granted. Dismissal is with prejudice, without leave to amend. The
16 Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants. Each party
17 shall bear its own costs.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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20 Dated: 7/15/2011



CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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