

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY  
SOUTHERN DIVISION at LONDON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-193-GWU

DONALD G. CROWDER,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,  
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DEFENDANT.

**INTRODUCTION**

Donald Crowder brought this action to obtain judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and for Supplemental Security Income. The case is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

**APPLICABLE LAW**

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set out the steps applicable to judicial review of Social Security disability benefit cases:

1. Is the claimant currently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not disabled. If no, proceed to Step 2. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
2. Does the claimant have any medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s)? If yes, proceed to Step 3. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1508, 416.908.
3. Does the claimant have any severe impairment(s)--i.e., any impairment(s) significantly limiting the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities? If yes, proceed to

Step 4. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c), 404.1521, 416.920(c), 461.921.

4. Can the claimant's severe impairment(s) be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months? If yes, proceed to Step 5. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.920(d), 416.920(d).
5. Does the claimant have any impairment or combination of impairments meeting or equaling in severity an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Listing of Impairments)? If yes, the claimant is disabled. If no, proceed to Step 6. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1526(a), 416.920(d), 416.926(a).
6. Can the claimant, despite his impairment(s), considering his residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work he has done in the past, still perform this kind of past relevant work? If yes, the claimant was not disabled. If no, proceed to Step 7. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
7. Can the claimant, despite his impairment(s), considering his residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience, do other work--i.e., any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy? If yes, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1505(a), 404.1520(f)(1), 416.905(a), 416.920(f)(1).

Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).

Applying this analysis, it must be remembered that the principles pertinent to the judicial review of administrative agency action apply. Review of the Commissioner's decision is limited in scope to determining whether the findings of fact made are supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 945 F.2d 1365, 1368-1369 (6th Cir. 1991). This "substantial

evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind shall accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner, 745 F.2d at 387.

One of the detracting factors in the administrative decision may be the fact that the Commissioner has improperly failed to accord greater weight to a treating physician than to a doctor to whom the plaintiff was sent for the purpose of gathering information against his disability claim. Bowie v. Secretary, 679 F.2d 654, 656 (6th Cir. 1982). This presumes, of course, that the treating physician's opinion is based on objective medical findings. Cf. Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 1984); King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984). Opinions of disability from a treating physician are binding on the trier of fact only if they are not contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary. Hardaway v. Secretary, 823 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1987). These have long been well-settled principles within the Circuit. Jones, 945 F.2d at 1370.

Another issue concerns the effect of proof that an impairment may be remedied by treatment. The Sixth Circuit has held that such an impairment will not serve as a basis for the ultimate finding of disability. Harris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 756 F.2d 431, 436 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the same result does not follow if the record is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiff would

have regained his residual capacity for work if he had followed his doctor's instructions to do something or if the instructions were merely recommendations. Id. Accord, Johnson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 794 F.2d 1106, 1113 (6th Cir. 1986).

In reviewing the record, the court must work with the medical evidence before it, despite the plaintiff's claims that he was unable to afford extensive medical work-ups. Gooch v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). Further, a failure to seek treatment for a period of time may be a factor to be considered against the plaintiff, Hale v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 816 F.2d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1987), unless a claimant simply has no way to afford or obtain treatment to remedy his condition, McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241, 242 (6th Cir. 1990).

Additional information concerning the specific steps in the test is in order.

Step six refers to the ability to return to one's past relevant category of work. Studaway v. Secretary, 815 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff is said to make out a prima facie case by proving that he or she is unable to return to work. Cf. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). However, both 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 provide that an individual with only off-and-on work experience is considered to have had no work experience at all. Thus, jobs held for only a brief tenure may not

form the basis of the Commissioner's decision that the plaintiff has not made out its case. Id. at 1053.

Once the case is made, however, if the Commissioner has failed to properly prove that there is work in the national economy which the plaintiff can perform, then an award of benefits may, under certain circumstances, be had. E.g., Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1994). One of the ways for the Commissioner to perform this task is through the use of the medical vocational guidelines which appear at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 and analyze factors such as residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience.

One of the residual functional capacity levels used in the guidelines, called "light" level work, involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds; a job is listed in this category if it encompasses a great deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls; by definition, a person capable of this level of activity must have the ability to do substantially all these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). "Sedentary work" is defined as having the capacity to lift no more than ten pounds at a time and occasionally lift or carry small articles and an occasional amount of walking and standing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).

However, when a claimant suffers from an impairment "that significantly diminishes his capacity to work, but does not manifest itself as a limitation on strength, for example, where a claimant suffers from a mental illness . . . manipulative restrictions . . . or heightened sensitivity to environmental contaminants . . . rote application of the grid [guidelines] is inappropriate . . ." Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 1990). If this non-exertional impairment is significant, the Commissioner may still use the rules as a framework for decision-making, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 200.00(e); however, merely using the term "framework" in the text of the decision is insufficient, if a fair reading of the record reveals that the agency relied entirely on the grid. Ibid. In such cases, the agency may be required to consult a vocational specialist. Damron v. Secretary, 778 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1985). Even then, substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision may be produced through reliance on this expert testimony only if the hypothetical question given to the expert accurately portrays the plaintiff's physical and mental impairments. Varley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1987).

## **DISCUSSION**

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Crowder, a 37-year-old former assembler and heavy equipment operator with a high school equivalent education, suffered from impairments related to chronic lumbar and cervical strains,

carpal tunnel of the right wrist, obesity, and headaches. (Tr. 16, 20). Despite the plaintiff's impairments, the ALJ determined that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of medium level work. (Tr. 17). Since the claimant's past assembler work could still be performed as well as a significant number of other jobs, he could not be considered totally disabled. (Tr. 20-21).

After review of the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff.

In determining that Crowder could return to his past relevant work, the ALJ relied in part upon the testimony of Vocational Expert Bill Ellis. The hypothetical question presented by the ALJ included an exertional restriction to medium level work along with such non-exertional limitations as (1) a need to avoid exposure to vibrations or vibratory tools; (2) an inability to more than frequently handle objects with the right hand; (3) an inability to more than occasionally reach overhead with the right arm; (4) an inability to more than frequently perform overhead reaching with the left arm; (5) an inability to more than frequently climb stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and (6) an inability to more than occasionally climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. (Tr. 212). In response, Ellis testified that Crowder's past work as an assembler could still be performed as generally performed in the economy. (Id.). As an alternative, the expert identified a significant number of other jobs which could

also be performed by such a person. (Tr. 213). Therefore, assuming that the vocational factors considered by Ellis fairly depicted the plaintiff's condition, then a finding of disabled status, within the meaning of the Social Security Act, is precluded.

Dr. Jeff Reichard examined Crowder and diagnosed morbid obesity, neck pain and tobacco abuse. (Tr. 109). Dr. Reichard indicated the plaintiff would be "mildly to moderately" impaired in performing ambulation, standing and stooping. (Tr. 110). He should not lift heavy objects or reach overhead on a repetitive basis. (Id.). The vocational factors considered by Ellis were essentially consistent with this opinion. This opinion provides strong support for the administrative decision.

Dr. Allen Dawson (Tr. 121-129) and Dr. Parandhamulu Saranga (Tr. 130-138), the non-examining medical reviewers, each opined that Crowder could perform medium level work, restricted from a full range by inability to more than occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, a limited ability to reach and handle and a need to avoid concentrated exposure to vibration. The hypothetical factors were also consistent with these opinions. This opinion also supports the ALJ's decision.

No treating and examining source, including Dr. Edward Grimball (Tr. 95-106, 141-151, 155-159), Dr. Steven DeMunbrun (Tr. 111-118), Dr. Andrew Kovacs (Tr. 119-120), or the staff at the Somerset Outpatient Diagnostic Center (Tr. 160-161),



identified the existence of more severe functional limitations than those found by the ALJ. Therefore, the ALJ dealt properly with the evidence of record.

Crowder argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate his subjective pain complaints. Pain complaints are to be evaluated under the standards announced in Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986): there must be evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) there must be objective medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition or (2) the objectively determined medical condition must be of a severity which can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain.

In the present action, Crowder was found to be suffering from a potentially painful condition. However, even if he could be found to have satisfied the first prong of the so-called Duncan test, the claimant does not meet either of the alternative second prongs. Dr. Reichard noted that his physical examination revealed only diminished range of motion in the cervical spine with some spasm and tenderness detected but was otherwise unremarkable. (Tr. 109). The doctor noted no sign of muscle weakness or atrophy and no sensory deficits. (Tr. 110). Dr. DeMunbrun reported diminished grip strength and diminished sensation to light touch on the right. (Tr. 112). The doctor found no muscle wasting. (Id.). An electrodiagnostic study of the right upper extremity was normal. (Id.). An MRI Scan of the cervical spine revealed spurring at C6-C7 with minimal foraminal narrowing

and shallow concentric C5-C6 protrusion. (Tr. 161). Therefore, the medical evidence does not appear sufficient to confirm the severity of the alleged pain and objective medical evidence would not appear to be consistent with the plaintiff's claims of disabling pain. Therefore, the ALJ would appear to have properly evaluated the claimant's pain complaints.

Crowder also asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to consider his impairments in combination. However, the ALJ extensively discussed the plaintiff's problems with neck, back, and right shoulder pain and carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 17-20). No physician of record identified a specific limitation which was not presented to the vocational expert. Therefore, the court finds no error.

The undersigned concludes that the administrative decision should be affirmed. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff. A separate judgment and order will be entered simultaneously consistent with this opinion.

This the 29th day of April, 2009.



**Signed By:**

**G. Wix Unthank** *G.W.U.*

**United States Senior Judge**