

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI  
OXFORD DIVISION**

**MARCO WRIGHT**

**PLAINTIFF**

**v.**

**No. 3:19CV32-DAS**

**MTC, ET AL.**

**DEFENDANTS**

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

This matter comes before the court on the *pro se* prisoner complaint of Marco Wright, who challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. The plaintiff has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of action against “[e]very person” who under color of state authority causes the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to protect him from attack by another inmate. For the reasons set forth below, the instant case will be dismissed on the merits and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

**Factual Allegations**

Marco Wright is an inmate serving a fifteen-year sentence with the Mississippi Department of Corrections after his conviction on charges of sexual battery and statutory rape. Mr. Wright is currently housed in the Marshall County Correctional Facility in Holly Springs, Mississippi, the relevant to his allegations. On October 16, 2018, CO Meeks ordered Mr. Wright to push the Administrative Segregation cart carrying Offender Christopher Hollis’ belongings to Delta Dorm #2, which houses C-custody inmates. Mr. Hollis, a C-custody inmate, walked down the hallway, unrestrained, beside Wright. Once they reached the pod, an officer opened the door for Hollis to enter,

and he attacked Wright, striking him first on the chin, then the jaw – leaving Wright dizzy. Wright fled from D-dorm to A-dorm, and CO Townsend followed to see if he was injured. Other officers apprehended Hollis and escorted him away. Wright then went to medical, where he received Tylenol, Ibuprofen, and muscle rub for his jaw. His right ear and the right side of his jaw hurt, so he received x-rays, which showed no broken bones, though he still has pain in those areas. He filed a grievance, in which he requested over \$500,000 in damages, as well as an order prohibiting prison staff from retaliating against him for filing suit. R. Pennington, Director of the Administrative Remedy Program, rejected Mr. Wright’s grievance, as he sought relief (money damages) beyond the power of the ARP Department to grant. Wright believes Offender Hollis should have been secured before transporting him to another location within the prison, especially since Hollis had been involved in similar incidents in the past.

### **Failure to Protect**

Marco Wright claims that the defendants failed to protect him from the attack of Offender Christopher Hollis. “The Eighth Amendment affords prisoners protection against injury at the hands of other inmates.” *Johnson v. Lucas*, 786 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference “[is] the proper standard to apply in the context of convicted prisoners who claim[] denial of medical care or the failure to protect.” *Grabowski v. Jackson County Public Defenders Office*, 47 F.3d 1386, 1396 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). A prisoner plaintiff cannot show that a prison official showed deliberate indifference unless he can show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;” indeed, the official must have been aware of facts giving rise to an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed – and he must have drawn that inference. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). An inmate pursuing a claim for failure to protect may prove his claim by showing that the defendants knew of a specific threat to him

but failed to take measures to protect from it. *Id.* at 843. However, even in the absence of specific threat, an inmate may prove a claim of failure to protect if he can show that he was placed in a prison environment “where terror reigns.” *Jones v. Diamond*, 636 F.2d 1364 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by *International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO and its Local No. 5-376 v. Champion Intern. Corp.*, 790 F.2d 1174 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986). This situation arises in a jail or prison where officials permit violent offenders to hold sway over part or all of the facility – creating “a pervasive risk of harm and a failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the known risk.” *Stokes v. Delcambre*, 710 F.2d 1120 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983) (sheriff housed college students arrested on a non-violent misdemeanor charge with a dozen inmates charged with violent felonies – leading to the students’ severe beating and rape). Indeed, “it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 843.

In this case, Mr. Wright has not alleged that he and Mr. Hollis had experienced trouble before – or that he otherwise had reason to suspect that Hollis might attack him. Indeed, if he had expected such an attack, he could have told CO Meeks, the guard initiating the escort, to keep them separate. He could also have made use of the Red Tag procedure, which allows inmates to inform prison officials to keep them separate from certain other inmates. Mr. Wright did not do so. Thus, if he had no reason to expect inmate Hollis to attack him, the guards also had no reason to expect such an attack. Based upon Mr. Hollis’ history of violent conduct, Mr. Wright might state a claim of negligence (lack of due care) on the part of the defendants for failing to restrain him during escort; however, negligent conduct by prison officials does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), *Davidson v. Cannon*, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct.

668 (1986). As such, the plaintiff's claim regarding failure to protect him must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

### **Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies**

Based upon the plaintiff's allegations and the documentation he has provided, it is clear that he did not exhaust the prison's grievance process before filing the instant suit. Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, normally to be pled by a defendant, the court may dismiss a *pro se* prisoner case if failure to exhaust is apparent on the face of the complaint. *Carbe v. Lappin*, 492 F.3d 325 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007). Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. §1997e *et seq.* – including its requirement that inmates exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit – in an effort to address the large number of prisoner complaints filed in federal courts. *See Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). Congress meant for the exhaustion requirement to be an effective tool to help weed out the frivolous claims from the colorable ones:

Prisoner litigation continues to 'account for an outsized share of filings' in federal district courts. *Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81, 94, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006) (slip op., at 12, n.4). In 2005, nearly 10 percent of all civil cases filed in federal courts nationwide were prisoner complaints challenging prison conditions or claiming civil rights violations. Most of these cases have no merit; many are frivolous. Our legal system, however, remains committed to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of illegal conduct by their custodians are fairly handled according to law. The challenge lies in ensuring that the flood of non-meritorious claims does not submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit. *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Congress addressed that challenge in the PLRA. What this country needs, Congress decided, is fewer and better prisoner suits. *See Porter v. Nussle*, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (PLRA intended to "reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits"). To that end, Congress enacted a variety of reforms designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good. Key among these was the requirement that inmates complaining about prison conditions exhaust prison grievance remedies before initiating a lawsuit.

*Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a), requires prisoners to exhaust any available administrative remedies before filing suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The exhaustion requirement protects administrative agency authority, promotes efficiency, and produces “a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.” *Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S.81, 89 (2006). A prisoner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement “by filing an untimely *or otherwise procedurally defective* administrative grievance or appeal” because “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.” *Woodford v. Ngo*, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006) (emphasis added); see also *Johnson v. Ford*, 261 F. App’x 752, 755 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008)( the Fifth Circuit takes “a strict approach” to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement)(*citing Days v. Johnson*, 322 F.3d 863, 866 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003)); *Lane v. Harris Cty.Med.Dep’t*, No. 06-20935, 2008 WL 116333, at \*1 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. Jan.11,2008)( under the PLRA, “the prisoner must not only pursue all available avenues of relief; he must also comply with all administrative deadlines and procedural rules”). Indeed, “a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies even where the relief sought – monetary damages – cannot be granted by the administrative process.” *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001).

The requirement that claims be exhausted prior to the filing of a lawsuit is mandatory and non-discretionary. *Gonzalez v. Seal*, 702 F.3d 785 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.2012). “Whether a prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies is a mixed question of law and fact.” *Dillon v. Rogers*, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010). As “exhaustion is a threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time, . . . judges may resolve factual disputes concerning exhaustion without the participation of a jury.” *Id.* at

272. The Supreme Court has also recognized the need for a prisoner to face a significant consequence for deviating from the prison grievance procedural rules:

The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not have such an opportunity unless the grievance complies with the system's critical procedural rules. A prisoner who does not want to participate in the prison grievance system will have little incentive to comply with the system's procedural rules unless noncompliance carries a sanction . . . .

*Woodford* at 95.

Mississippi Code Annotated § 47-5-801 grants the Mississippi Department of Corrections the authority to adopt an administrative review procedure at each of its correctional facilities. Under this statutory authority, the Mississippi Department of Corrections has set up an Administrative Remedy Program (“ARP”) through which an inmate may seek formal review of a complaint or grievance relating to any aspect of his incarceration. This court approved the ARP Program in *Gates v. Collier*, GC 71-6-S-D (N.D. Miss. Feb. 15, 1994). *See also Marshall v. Price*, 239 F.3d 365, 2000 WL 1741549, at \*1 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. Nov. 6, 2000). On September 19, 2010, the ARP process was changed from three steps to two. *See Gates v. Barbour*, No. 4:71CV6-JAD, Doc. 1242 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 2010); *Threadgill v. Moore*, No. 3:10CV378-TSL-MTP, 2011 WL 4388832, at \*3 n.6 (S.D. Miss. July 25, 2011).

The two-step ARP process begins when an inmate first submits his grievance in writing to the prison's legal claims adjudicator within thirty days of the incident. *Howard v. Epps*, No. 5:12CV61-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 2367880, at \*2 (S.D. Miss. May 29, 2013). The adjudicator screens the grievance and determines whether to accept it into the ARP process. *Id.* If accepted, the grievance is forwarded to the appropriate official who then issues a First Step Response to the complaining inmate. *Id.* If the inmate is unsatisfied with the first response, he may continue

to the Second Step by completing an appropriate ARP form and sending it to the legal claims adjudicator. *Id.* The Superintendent, Warden or Community Corrections Director will then issue a final ruling, or Second Step Response – which completes the ARP process. *Id.* If the inmate is unsatisfied with that response, he may file suit in state or federal court. *Id.*

In this case, Mr. Wright’s grievance was rejected because he sought relief (money damages) beyond the power of the Administrative Remedy Program to provide. His failure to request appropriate relief during the grievance process rendered the process defective. *See Woodford, supra.* Thus, he did not complete the grievance process through the Second Step, and his claims have not been exhausted. The instant case will be dismissed for that reason, as well.

### **Conclusion**

For the reasons set forth above, the instant case will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and, in the alternative, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion will issue today.

**SO ORDERED**, this, the 29th day of March, 2019.

/s/ David A. Sanders  
DAVID A. SANDERS  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE