

1 cable/connections, (3) heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems (“HVAC”) that prevent
2 overheating of the computer equipment, and (4) security measures which prevent unauthorized
3 persons from gaining access to the computer equipment.

4 Switch filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant David Ballard on February 1, 2011.
5 According to the Complaint, Mr. Ballard served as Switch’s chief financial officer for
6 approximately two years until he was terminated in June, 2006. Switch alleges that during his
7 employment, Mr. Ballard became intimately aware of Switch’s trade practices and secrets,
8 including the location of Plaintiffs’ carrier fiber and the structure of the related carrier fiber
9 agreements, the location of Switch’s key clients’ installations, the terms of Switch’s agreements
10 with those key clients, who Switch’s primary contractors and vendors are, the terms of Switch’s
11 arrangements with those contractors and vendors, and the design and operation of Switch’s data
12 center facilities. *Complaint (#1)*, ¶8. Switch alleges that it became aware that Mr. Ballard was
13 planning to build a competing data center on a parcel of land “in the immediate proximity” to
14 Switch’s three data centers on East Sahara Avenue in Las Vegas, Nevada. ¶¶ 11-14. Switch
15 alleges that Mr. Ballard enticed the key contractors and architects for Switch’s data centers to
16 participate in the construction of the competing project, utilizing technical drawings and schematics
17 that were either identical to or materially similar to those owned by Switch and utilized to construct
18 the Switch data centers. ¶15.

19 Switch’s first cause of action, entitled “Misappropriation of Intellectual Property,” alleges
20 that Mr. Ballard could not reasonably build a data center on the subject property without using
21 Switch’s trade agreements and trade secrets. ¶¶17-18. Switch also alleges claims for breach of
22 contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, unfair commercial advantage, unjust
23 enrichment, declaratory relief, and copyright infringement. The complaint seeks an award of
24 damages in excess of \$10,000.00. Switch also requests that Mr. Ballard be prohibited from
25 proceeding with the construction of the data center, and that Defendant and those in concert with
26 him be enjoined from using Switch’s construction plans and diagrams. Switch has not filed a
27 motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

28 . . .

1 Mr. Ballard admits in his answer filed on March 4, 2011, that he was involved in a project
2 to build a data center adjacent to Switch’s data centers on East Sahara Avenue. *Answer (#8)*, ¶8.
3 Mr. Ballard also admits that he had hired the electrical engineer and contractor who participated in
4 the design or construction of some of Switch’s facilities. ¶9. Mr. Ballard contends, however, that
5 the engineer, Harris Engineering, owns the rights to the plans and designs it prepared for the Switch
6 data centers and, therefore, neither Mr. Ballard nor Harris Engineering has infringed upon Switch’s
7 rights. Mr. Ballard also admits that during his employment with Switch he acquired some
8 knowledge about the matters alleged in paragraph eight of Switch’s complaint. Mr. Ballard denies,
9 however, that the information he acquired constitute trade secrets or confidential information
10 protected under Nevada law or the Confidentiality and Assignment of Inventions Agreement that he
11 executed during his employment with Switch. *Answer (#8)*, ¶4.

12 On May 27, 2011, Mr. Ballard filed a motion to compel Switch to provide responses to his
13 interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Mr. Ballard’s Interrogatory No. 1 asked
14 Switch to describe each and every “trade practice,” “trade secret,” item of confidential information,
15 or other item of “intellectual property” it claims Mr. Ballard has misappropriated or is likely to
16 misappropriate.² Although the Court was critical of the form of this interrogatory, it held that it
17 was proper and that Switch was required to answer it. *See Order (#65)*, entered on September 7,
18 2011.

19 Switch’s initial answer to Interrogatory No. 1, which was provided subject to its objections,
20 repeated the allegations in paragraph eight of its complaint, with the additional statement that
21 Ballard had knowledge “of technology and designs unique to Switch’s offerings and to the
22 datacenter industry, including unique Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (“HVAC”) designs,
23 server rack layout and power designs, segregated air designs, among other novelties to the
24 datacenter industry invented by CEO Rob Roy and other Switch employees and contractors,
25 physical security measures unique to Switch, Tri-Redundant Electrical Block Designs assigned to
26

27 ²Early in this litigation, the parties entered into a stipulated protective order regarding the exchange
28 of allegedly confidential or trade secret information, including producing certain documents or information
for “attorney-eyes only” review. *Stipulated Protective Order (#18)*.

1 Switch in the construction of NAP 4 attached to Ballard’s First Set of Requests for Production No.
2 12.” *See Order (#65), pg. 4.* This answer, at most, identified the categories of Switch’s alleged
3 trade secrets, but did not describe the trade secrets themselves. The answer also left open the
4 possibility that Switch had not listed all categories of trade secrets that it accuses Mr. Ballard of
5 having misappropriated or intending to misappropriate.

6 In holding that Switch’s initial answer to Interrogatory No. 1 was insufficient, the Court
7 stated:

8 Ballard is entitled to an answer to Interrogatory No. 1 which
9 identifies the specific trade secrets that Switch alleges Ballard has
10 misappropriated or that it has reason to believe he intends to
11 misappropriate for use in his competing data center. If Switch’s first
12 cause of action is predicated on something other or more than
13 misappropriation of “trade secrets,” then Switch also needs to explain
14 that in its answer to Interrogatory No. 1. Switch is also required to
15 set forth in reasonable detail, the facts which support its claim that
16 the information it seeks to protect qualify as trade secrets under
17 Nevada law. Switch is also required to identify the documents that
18 contain or describe the particular trade secrets or “intellectual
19 property” that it alleges have been or are likely to be misappropriated
20 by Defendant Ballard.

21 *Order (#65), pg. 10.*

22 Switch served its First Supplemental Response to Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories
23 on September 20, 2011. The Supplemental Response included an 18 page supplemental response
24 to Interrogatory No. 1. Switch’s Supplemental Response identifies five categories of trade secrets:

- 25 1. Switch’s NAP 4, NAP 5 and NAP 7 Electrical One Line Designs;
- 26 2. Switch’s NAP 4, NAP 5 and NAP 7 Heating Air Conditioning and Ventilating
27 (“HVAC”) System Designs;
- 28 3. Switch’s NAP 4, NAP 5 and NAP 7 . . . Designs for hot and cold separation of
air in server rack layout;
4. The Location of Switch’s Carrier Fiber entering its various NAPs, specifically
NAP 4 and NAP 7;
5. Switch’s Security Measures and Designs Implemented in NAP 4, NAP 5 and
NAP 7.

In regard to categories 1-3, Switch references the designs described with more particularity
in the patent application previously produced to Defendant Ballard, followed by a brief description
of the elements of the designs. Under category 4, Switch refers to the contracts between fiber optic

1 carriers and Switch. Under category 5, Switch lists several elements that make up its security
2 measures and designs for its data center facilities. In subpart C of its Supplemental Response,
3 Switch identified documents that relate to the trade secrets identified in subpart A.

4 During the June 8, 2012 hearing on Switch's Motion to Compel and Mr. Ballard's Request
5 for a Status Conference, Mr. Ballard's counsel informed the Court that Mr. Ballard is no longer
6 proceeding with the building of the data center on the property adjacent to Switch's data centers on
7 East Sahara Avenue. Mr. Ballard, however, reserves the right to proceed with the project at some
8 unspecified time in the future. Mr. Ballard is instead proceeding with a data center project in the
9 northwest part of Las Vegas. This project reportedly involves the refitting of an existing data
10 center facility and does not use the plans and designs for the proposed data center near Switch's
11 East Sahara Avenue facilities. Switch's counsel also informed the Court that Switch is
12 reconsidering the claims alleged in its complaint and is preparing an amended complaint. Switch
13 nevertheless requests that the Court grant its motion to compel on the grounds that the requested
14 documents and information will be relevant to its new or revised claims.

15 DISCUSSION

16 There are two principal issues concerning Switch's motion to compel. The first issue is
17 whether Mr. Ballard should be required to respond to Switch's discovery requests if Switch has still
18 not described its alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity. The second issue is whether
19 Mr. Ballard is required to supplement his responses to requests for production as to documents that
20 were created after Mr. Ballard served his responses. Additional issues relate to whether certain
21 discovery requests are vague, overbroad and irrelevant.

22 **1. Whether Switch Should be Required to Describe Its Alleged Trade** 23 **Secrets With More Particularity Before Defendant is Required to** 24 **Respond to its Discovery Requests.**

25 Several courts have held that a party alleging a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is
26 required to identify its alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity before it will be allowed to

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27 ...

28 ...

1 compel discovery of its adversary's trade secrets.³ *Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp.*, 505 A.2d 30,
2 12 Del. J. Corp. L 249 (Del. 1986), citing *Xerox Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.*,
3 64 F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); *DeRubeis v. Witten Technologies, Inc.*, 244 F.R.D. 676,
4 680-81 (N.D.Ga. 2007); *Automed Techs., Inc. v. Eller*, 160 F.Supp.2d 915, 925 (N.D.Ill. 2001);
5 *Dura Global Technologies, Inc. v. Magna Donnelly, Corp.*, 2007 WL 4303294 (E.D.Mich. 2007);
6 *Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc.*, 148 F.Supp.2d 1322 (S.D.Fla. 2001); and
7 *Ikon Office Solutions v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions*, 2009 WL 4429156, *4-*5 (W.D.N.C.
8 2009). California has codified this requirement in §2019.210 of the California Civil Procedure
9 Code. See *Computer Economics, Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc.*, 50 F.Supp.2d 980 (S.D.Cal. 1999)
10 and *Gabriel Technologies Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.*, 2012 WL 849167 (S.D.Cal. 2012) (applying
11 §2019.210 pursuant to the *Erie Doctrine*).

12 *DeRubeis v. Witten Technologies, Inc.* identifies “at least four policies” that underlie this
13 requirement: (1) If discovery on defendant's trade secrets were automatically permitted, lawsuits
14 might regularly be filed as “fishing expeditions” to discover the trade secrets of a competitor; (2)
15 until the trade secret plaintiff has identified the trade secrets at issue with some specificity, there is
16 no way to know whether the information sought is relevant; (3) it is difficult for a defendant to
17 mount a defense until it has some indication of the trade secrets allegedly misappropriated, and (4)
18 requiring the plaintiff to state its claimed trade secrets prior to engaging in discovery ensures that it
19 will not mold its cause of action around the discovery it receives. 244 F.R.D. at 680-81. See also
20 Charles Tait Graves and Brian D. Range, *Identification of Trade Secret Claims in Litigation:*
21 *Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute*, Northwest Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property, (Fall
22 2006), 5 NWJTIP 68, 75 (identifying additional policy reasons for the requirement, but also arguing
23

24 ³The Nevada Uniform Trade Secrets Act, NRS 600A.030.5, defines “trade secret” as “information,
25 including a formula, pattern, complication, program, device, method, technique, product, system, process,
26 design, prototype, procedure, computer programming instruction or code, that derives independent
27 economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
28 by proper means by the public or any other persons who can obtain commercial or economic value from its
disclosure or use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.”

1 that the first factor listed in *DeRubeis* is not one upon which courts should rely).

2 *DeRubeis* broadly defined “reasonable particularity” to mean that the plaintiff must provide
3 the defendant with a sufficient description of the trade secrets it believes to be at issue so that (1)
4 defendant is put on notice of the nature of plaintiff’s claims and (2) defendant can discern the
5 relevancy of any requested discovery on its trade secrets. *DeRubeis*, 244 F.R.D. at 681. The
6 defendant/counterclaimant in *DeRubeis* responded to an interrogatory requesting that it describe its
7 alleged trade secrets with particularity by generally listing software, data processing algorithms, and
8 processes that it had developed, owned, and/or licensed for its underground mapping and imaging
9 business. The court stated that “this disclosure does not specify any trade secrets at all, but rather
10 reveals the end results of, or functions performed by, the claimed trade secrets.” *Id* at 679.

11 In *Dura Global Technologies v. Magna Donnelly Corp.*, 2007 WL 4303294 (E.D.Mich.
12 2007), the plaintiffs’ amended complaint described the alleged trade secrets as “valid and
13 subsisting trade secrets relating to our sliding window assemblies for motor vehicles” and also
14 referenced a patent for “Power Sliding Rear Window” and a patent for “Motor Vehicle Window
15 Construction With Pull-Pull Cable System” with respect to their claims for patent infringement.
16 The plaintiffs subsequently responded to an interrogatory asking them to specifically describe the
17 alleged trade secrets. In holding that plaintiffs’ response was insufficient, the court stated:

18 Plaintiffs’ response to Interrogatory No. 11 does not identify the trade
19 secrets at issue with the particularity necessary for Defendant to
20 identify the information which Plaintiffs claim was misappropriated.
21 *See generally Automed Techs.*, 160 F.Supp. at 925 (General
22 allegations of “software, designs and research” and generic references
23 to three research projects by name are insufficient to identify trade
24 secrets in question.). Plaintiffs’ references, even those to control
25 plans, are too general to specify the trade secrets at issue.
26 Furthermore, it is not Defendant’s burden to review over 8500 sheets
27 of paper, among the other information provided, to discern which
28 material constitutes Plaintiffs’ trade secrets and further, which of
those are the subject of Plaintiffs’ claim for misappropriation.

25 In *Hill v. Best Medical International, Inc.*, 2010 WL 2546023, *3-*4 (W.D.Pa. 2010), the
26 court also held that the plaintiff’s description of the trade secrets allegedly misappropriated by the
27 defendants was insufficient. The court stated that “general allegations and generic references to
28 products are insufficient to satisfy Best Medical’s burden of identifying its misappropriated trade

1 secrets with reasonable particularity, especially in light of the extensive discovery that Best Medical
2 has obtained in these consolidated cases.” *Id.* at *4. The court also cited *Struthers Scientific and*
3 *Int’l Corp. v. General Foods Corp.*, 51 F.R.D. 149 (D.Del. 1970) which held that if the plaintiff
4 was relying for its trade secret allegations on a unique combination of known components disclosed
5 to the defendant, then the plaintiff must specifically describe what particular combination of
6 components it has in mind, how the components are combined, and how they operate in unique
7 combination. *Hill*, 2010 WL 2546023, at *4 n. 8.

8 Although Switch’s Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 1 is somewhat more
9 informative than its initial response, it still falls short of describing its alleged trade secrets with
10 reasonable particularity. As discussed above, Switch identifies various concepts, elements or
11 components that make up its Electrical One Line Designs, HVAC designs, designs for hot and cold
12 separation of air in the server rack layout, and its security measures and designs. Switch does not
13 appear to be claiming that the generally identified concepts, elements or components are
14 themselves trade secrets. Rather, Switch appears to claim that its designs involve novel or unique
15 combinations of the various concepts, elements or components. *See* Switch’s initial response to
16 Interrogatory No. 1. In order to meet its burden of describing its alleged trade secrets with
17 reasonable particularity, Switch must specifically describe what particular combination of
18 components renders each of its designs novel or unique, how the components are combined, and
19 how they operate in unique combination. *Struthers Scientific and Int’l Corp. v. General Foods*
20 *Corp.*, 51 F.R.D. 149 (D.Del. 1970). Switch’s Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 1 does
21 not do this. The Court therefore will not require Mr. Ballard to further respond to Switch’s
22 discovery requests relating to Mr. Ballard’s alleged misappropriation of trade secrets until Switch
23 provides a description of its alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity in accordance with
24 *Order* (#65) and this order.

25 Switch’s seventh cause of action (mislabeled as its Sixth Cause of Action) alleges a claim
26 for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §106 and §501. Switch alleges that Mr. Ballard has
27 utilized construction plans and diagrams (the “Works”) belonging to Switch for the benefit of his
28 project. *Complaint* (#1), ¶49. This claim is predicated on the allegation that Harris Engineering

1 provided Mr. Ballard with technical drawings and schematics that are identical to or materially
2 similar to those it prepared for Switch. *Id.* ¶17. Mr. Ballard contends, however, that Harris owns
3 the legal rights to technical drawings and schematics he prepared for Switch. Discovery regarding
4 the copyright infringement claim does not necessarily have to be postponed pending a more
5 complete description of Switch’s alleged trade secrets. Switch’s requests for production of
6 documents, however, broadly encompass, but do not differentiate between, information relevant to
7 the Switch’s copyright infringement claim and its misappropriation of trade secrets claims. The
8 request also potentially sweep in information that is not relevant to any of Switch’s claims. For this
9 reason, the Court will not require Mr. Ballard to further respond to Switch’s discovery requests
10 until Switch describes its alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity.

11 **2. Whether Defendant Is Required to Supplement His Discovery**
12 **Responses in Regard to Documents That Were Created after He Served**
13 **His Responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production of Documents.**

14 Mr. Ballard argues that he has no duty to supplement his responses to request for production
15 in regard to documents that were created after he served his original responses. This dispute
16 particularly relates to e-mail communications that have occurred since Defendant served his initial
17 discovery responses. It also relates to any data center construction plans that have been created
18 since Mr. Ballard served his previous responses. Mr. Ballard states, however, that no new plans
19 have been created because he has postponed the data center project adjacent to Switch’s facilities.

20 Rule 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:

21 A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—or who has
22 responded to an interrogatory, request for production or request for
23 admission—must supplement or correct its disclosure or response:

- 24 (A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material
25 respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect,
26 and if the additional or corrective information has not
27 otherwise been made known to the other parties during the
28 discovery process or in writing; or
- (B) as ordered by the court.

This Court agrees with the construction of Rule 26(e) in *Robbins & Myers, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp.*, 274 F.R.D. 63, 74 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) which provides a detailed examination of the history of the rule from the 1970 version through the amendments to the rule in 1993 and 2007. In

1 holding that the duty to supplement under Rule 26(e) includes information or documents that were
2 created after the party's initial response, the court stated:

3 The 2007 restyling amendment to Rule 26 recognizes the duty
4 to supplement or correct a disclosure or response with
5 information that is thereafter acquired, as well as information
6 that was not originally provided even though it was available
7 at the time of the prior disclosure.

8 6-26 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL §26.131 (3d ed.
9 2010). Information thereafter acquired by a party cannot exclude
10 documents subsequently created by a party, as by creating the
11 document the party most certainly has thereby “acquired”
12 information which it reasonably should know, *i.e.*, “learns,” has
13 rendered its prior response materially inaccurate or incomplete.

14 274 F.R.D. at 75.

15 In commenting on the burden that this duty to supplement may impose, the court stated:

16 It is, of course, true that in protracted and complex litigation the
17 generation of new and responsive documents could conceivably
18 impose unfair supplementation burdens on a responding party and its
19 attorneys, as the 1970 Revisers Comment noted, which should not
20 fall within a general duty to supplement absent a specific followup
21 request for supplementation, or if directed by the court. But that
22 potential burden was addressed in the 1970 structure of Rule 26(e)
23 and the 1993 amendment by imposing a requirement upon the
24 responding party covering both knowledge of the new information,
25 whether by subsequent discovery of its prior existence or its later
26 creation, as well as a showing of the materiality of the subject
27 information. Where these two criteria are satisfied, the risk that a
28 party will be burdened or sanctioned unfairly for violation of the duty
 to supplement based on the advent of relevant and material
 information unknown to the party at the time of its initial response or
 because of its later creation is greatly reduced if not eliminated.

Id. at 77.

 In *Arthur v. Atkinson Freight Lines Corp.*, 164 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court held
that pursuant to Rule 26(e) the plaintiff had a duty to supplement prior disclosures and produce
updated medical records where plaintiff's medical treatment for his alleged injuries was ongoing
and materially affected the claim for damages. A party is not required, however, to supplement a
prior discovery response with later acquired or created information or documents that do not render
its previous responses materially incorrect or incomplete. *Schick v. Fragin*, 1997 WL 465271, *7
(Bkrtcy S.D.N.Y.1997).

1 The cases cited by Mr. Ballard in support of the argument that Rule 26(e) does not require
2 supplementation in regard to documents that were created after the party served its initial response
3 do not analyze the language of the rule, the Advisory Committee Notes, or other legal authority.
4 *See High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation*, 2000 WL 33180835 (C.D.Ill. 2000); *Dong Ah*
5 *Tire & Rubber Co. v. Glasforms, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4786671 (N.D.Cal. 2008) and *Kingsway Financial*
6 *Services, Inc. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP*, 2006 WL 1295409 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The decision
7 in *High Fructose* was also based on the fact that the plaintiff had previously agreed to limit its
8 discovery requests to specific cut-off dates, but then sought supplementation of responses through
9 later dates. The court in *Kingsway Financial Services, Inc.*, stated that it is unclear whether Rule
10 26(e) requires supplementation as to later created documents and that the court had been unable to
11 find any precedents addressing the issue. This Court concludes that the interpretation of Rule 26(e)
12 in *Robbins & Myers, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp.* is more soundly based than the cases relied on by
13 Defendant. Assuming that Switch complies with this order and describes its alleged trade secrets
14 with reasonable particularity, then Mr. Ballard will have an obligation to supplement his previous
15 discovery responses pursuant to Rule 26(e), including producing documents that have been
16 generated since his prior discovery responses to the extent they materially affect the completeness
17 or correctness of the previous responses. For example, documents relating to continuing efforts to
18 design or build a data center facility that allegedly incorporates Switch's trade secrets, should be
19 produced in supplemental responses.

20 CONCLUSION

21 Mr. Ballard is not required to further respond to Switch's discovery requests or to
22 supplement his previous responses thereto until Switch supplements its response to Mr. Ballard's
23 Interrogatory No. 1 by describing its alleged trade secrets with reasonable particularity. Once
24 Switch has adequately responded to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1, the parties should further
25 meet and confer regarding Mr. Ballard's responses to Switch's document requests and attempt to
26 resolve those issues without the need for a further motion to compel. As part of that process,
27 Switch should narrow the scope its discovery requests to documents that contain information
28 relevant to the claims or defenses in this action. Accordingly,

1 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel Defendant to Produce
2 Responses and Responsive Documents to Plaintiff's Discovery Requests (#91) is **denied**, without
3 prejudice.

4 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiffs shall further supplement their response to
5 Defendant's Interrogatory No. 1 by describing their alleged trade secrets with reasonable
6 particularity on or before **July 3, 2012**.

7 DATED this 19th day of June, 2012.

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10 _____
11 GEORGE FOLEY, JR.
12 United States Magistrate Judge
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