

1 counsel for Jodi Fonfa the opportunity to file a Motion for a Protective Order that tracked the
2 arguments that should have been made in a (timely) Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3) motion.

3 This Court next turns to Jodi Fonfa’s Motion for a Protective Order.

4 **I. Motion for Protective Order**

5 The issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff should be allowed to ask Defendant Jodi
6 Fonfa about her “current assets” during her deposition. As explained below, this Court denies
7 Jodi Fonfa’s motion and orders her continued deposition where questions relating to any alleged
8 unlawful transfers (as alleged in the complaint) will be allowed.

9 Jodi Fonfa argues such questions are not relevant. She argues that the only allegation of
10 fraudulent conveyance against her is the 2018 Postnuptial Agreement and that none of the claims
11 against her entitle Plaintiff to any damages or to information surrounding her current assets. The
12 essence of the argument is that Plaintiff is improperly seeking post-judgment discovery. This is
13 especially so, she argues, given she has testified she still has the assets from the postnuptial
14 agreement. Lastly, she relies on *Hetter v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State In and For Cnty. Of*
15 *Clark*, 874 P.2d 762 (Nev. 1994) for the proposition that the requesting party must demonstrate
16 some factual basis regarding the need for the requested financial information before a Nevada
17 court will grant the request.

18 Plaintiff argues Jodi Fonfa has failed to establish good cause for the issuance of a
19 protective order. It explains the statutes comprising the claims against Jodi Fonfa allow for
20 several remedies, such as avoidance, attachment, and receivership appointments. It further
21 contends it seeks to unwind the transfers (known and unknown) to Jodi Fonfa and/or attach them.
22 In turn, Plaintiff seeks information about the status, location, and ownership of these assets so that
23 the court can fashion the appropriate equitable relief under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 112.210.² It further
24 contends the questions are limited to those transfers, and not to any other aspects of her current
25 personal finances. As to the *Hetter* case, Plaintiff argues the issue before the court is procedural
26 (making state law inapplicable) and also distinguishes it on substantive grounds.

27 _____
28 ² This statute lists the rights of creditors when seeking relief for fraudulent transfers, and includes avoidance,
attachment, injunction, and appointment of a receiver.

1 Jodi Fonfa’s reply re-asserts many of the same arguments made in her moving papers.

2 **A. Analysis**

3 A party may move for a protective order from discovery to prevent annoyance,
4 embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The Rules also
5 mandate “reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense
6 concept of proportionality” designed to “provide parties with efficient access to what is needed to
7 prove a claim or defense, but eliminate unnecessary or wasteful discovery.” *Roberts v. Clark*
8 *Cnty. Sch. Dist.*, 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).

9 “District courts possess ‘wide discretion to determine what constitutes a showing of good
10 cause and to fashion a protective order that provides the appropriate degree of protection.’”
11 *Swenson v. GEICO Cas. Co.*, 336 F.R.D. 206, 209 (D. Nev. 2020) (quoting *Grano v. Sodexo*
12 *Mgmt., Inc.*, 335 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Cal. 2020)); *see also Hallett v. Morgan*, 296 F.3d 732,
13 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting broad discretion to permit or deny discovery). The party seeking a
14 protective order bears the burden of persuasion. *E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., Inc.*, 237 F.R.D. 428,
15 432 (D. Nev. 2006). That burden is met by demonstrating a particular need for protection
16 supported by specific facts, as opposed to broad allegations of harm. *Swenson*, 336 F.R.D. at 208-
17 09.

18 Jodi Fonfa has not shown good cause for the issuance of a protective order. Jodi Fonfa’s
19 position seems to be that the discovery sought is premature and that Plaintiff should be able to
20 obtain such information only once (and if) it secures a judgment. But that is not what courts in
21 this district (and others) have held.

22 In *Henry v. Rizzolo*, Magistrate Judge Foley came across the same issue and explained
23 that plaintiffs alleging claims under the UFTA “may obtain certain UFTA remedies [such as
24 avoidance] prior to obtaining a judgment on his claim against the debtor.” *Henry v. Rizzolo*, 2009
25 WL 10692952 *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 3, 2009). He went on to state the following:

26 Courts interpreting these provisions have held that the UFTA does not require a creditor to
27 reduce a claim to judgment before seeking to void a debtor’s allegedly fraudulent transfer
28 of property. As the Arizona Supreme Court states in *Farris v. Advantage Capital*
Corporation, 170 P.3d 250, 251 (Ariz. 2007), “[t]he UFTA allows the levy of execution

1 when a creditor has obtained a judgment, but does not require a judgment before a creditor
2 may seek relief from an allegedly fraudulent transfer, including avoidance.” In *Friedman*
3 *v. Heart Institute of Port St. Lucie, Inc.*, 863 So.2d 189, 193 (Fla. 2003), the Florida
4 Supreme Court held that discovery on a UFTA claim should not be automatically stayed
5 until a claimant obtains a judgment on his substantive claim against the debtor. The court
6 noted that if a plaintiff was precluded from conducting discovery or prosecuting his UFTA
7 claim prior to obtaining a judgment, “the goal of protecting creditors from wrongful asset
8 transfers would likely be nearly entirely frustrated.” *Id.* at 193.

9 *Id.*³ The dispute in this case involves both known and unknown transfers into Jodi Fonfa’s
10 account(s). Thus, questions that relate to the alleged fraudulent transfers from Andrew Fonfa to
11 Jodi Fonfa are relevant, even if these questions delve into the location and status of those assets.
12 The information sought is not only relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to request the appropriate
13 equitable remedy; it is relevant to its ability to trace the transfers in question. In turn, it follows
14 that such questions are proportional to the needs of the case—indeed, that is what this case is all
15 about.⁴

16 As to *Hetter*, this Court agrees with and adopts Plaintiff’s arguments for its rationale that
17 the case is not binding and not persuasive (given the allegations have shown some factual basis
18 for the need of the requested financial information).

19 In sum, Jodi Fonfa has not met her burden of showing how answers to those questions
20 would result in “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”

21 As a result, her motion is denied. It is further ordered that:⁵

- 22 • Ms. Fonfa’s deposition shall be reconvened at a location upon which the parties may
23 agree.
- 24 • The date of the reconvened deposition should be a mutually convenient date for the

25 ³ Another such case is *GW Grundbesitz AG v. Gunn*, where J. Silva affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s denial of
26 Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order in a case involving the same claims as those here by finding that the bank
27 records that had been subpoenaed by plaintiff were relevant given they related to the fraudulent transfer of money.
28 *GW Grundbesitz AG v. Gunn*, 2023 WL 4546437 *3 (D. Nev. July 14, 2023); *see also Russo v. Lopez*, 2012 WL
29 2576208 *3-4 (D. Nev. July 3, 2012).

⁴ The questions at issue referred to whether Jodi Fonfa still had her interest in 200 W. Sahara, Unit 4001 and accounts
at First Foundation Bank and UBS Investment Account. These assets are listed in Exhibit 2 of the Postnuptial
Agreement (ECF No. 31-2).

⁵ While Plaintiff requests additional directives from this Court, this Court cabins its order to the issues present before
it.

1 parties, provided that, unless Plaintiff elects otherwise, that date shall be set after Plaintiff has
2 received any documents and privilege log counsel for Jodi Fonfa has agreed to produce; and,
3 provided that, Plaintiff has received such other documents allowed to be produced to Plaintiff as
4 determined by the pending rulings on the motions for protective order.

5 • At her reconvened deposition, Ms. Fonfa shall be ordered to completely and candidly
6 answer all questions asked of her regarding the status, condition, and location of any assets
7 consistent with this Order.

8 • Ms. Fonfa's counsel shall not instruct her to refuse to answer any questions based on
9 relevance objections. As to those, he may object, and the examination will proceed subject to that
10 objection.

11 • The recommenced deposition may encompass a full seven hours.

12 **II. Counter-motion to Compel and for Sanctions**

13 Plaintiff's Counter-motion seeks sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3) and Fed. R. Civ.
14 P. 30(d)(3). The other requests are rendered moot by this Court's prior order (denying Jodi
15 Fonfa's motion for protective order and setting forth the parameters for the ensuing deposition of
16 Jodi Fonfa). Jodi Fonfa has not offered much of an argument as it relates to the propriety or
17 impropriety of sanctions.

18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5) provides that it must order the award of expenses, including
19 attorney fees, in connection with a denied motion for protective order unless the conduct was
20 substantially justified or other circumstances make the award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P.
21 26(c)(3).⁶ This Court finds that the conduct here was not substantially justified and that no other
22 circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. As a result, this Court will award Plaintiff the
23 reasonable expenses incurred in preparing and drafting ECF No. 106, including attorney fees. The
24 parties are instructed to meet and confer within 10 days of this Order regarding the reasonable
25 amount due to Plaintiff, which shall be payable within 60 days of this Order. No other sanctions
26 will be imposed.

27 _____
28 ⁶ While sanctions may also be applicable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2), this Court need not analyze the imposition of
sanctions in that context given it will do so under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3).

1 **III. Conclusion**

2 **IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that Jodi Fonfa's Motion for Protective Order (at ECF
3 No. 104) is DENIED.

4 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff's Counter-motion to Compel and for
5 Sanctions (at ECF No. 107) is GRANTED as stated in this Order.

6
7 DATED: August 11, 2023

8
9 
10 _____
11 Brenda Weksler
12 United States Magistrate Judge
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28