NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

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ALEX ORTEGA, Plaintiff. v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., : Defendants. :

Civil No. 12-4701 (JAP)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Alex Ortega, <u>Pro</u> <u>Se</u> 82651 Somerset County Jail P.O. Box 3000 Somerville, NJ 08876

PISANO, District Judge

Plaintiff, confined at the Somerset County Jail, Somerville, New Jersey brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. He has applied to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the following reasons, the complaint must be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Here, Plaintiff seeks to sue the State of New Jersey, and the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office for prosecutorial misconduct. He argues that the Prosecutor's Office failed to inform the grand jury of certain aspects of his case and that he has been denied a due process hearing. He asks this Court to "step in and take jurisdiction of [his] case matter to overlook the state[']s finding . . . ," and requests dismissal of the indictment and monetary damages. (Complt., ¶¶ 6, 7).

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding <u>in forma pauperis</u> or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to <u>sua sponte</u> dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. <u>See</u> 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This action is subject to <u>sua sponte</u> screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as an indigent and is a prisoner.

In determining the sufficiency of a <u>pro</u> <u>se</u> complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. <u>See Erickson v. Pardus</u>, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (following <u>Estelle v. Gamble</u>, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); <u>see also</u> <u>United States v. Day</u>, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).

The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Citing its opinion in <u>Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</u>, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the proposition that "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, " Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948).

The Supreme Court's ruling in <u>Iqbal</u> emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are plausible. <u>See Iqbal</u>, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. <u>See also</u> <u>Twombly</u>, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; <u>Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc.</u>, 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). "A complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." <u>Fowler</u>, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing <u>Phillips v. County of Allegheny</u>, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)).

2. Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. <u>See West v. Atkins</u>, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); <u>Piecknick v. Pennsylvania</u>, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

B. <u>Plaintiff's Claims</u>

Plaintiff cannot sue the State of New Jersey in this § 1983 suit. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."

As a general proposition, a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in a state treasury is barred from federal court by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the state itself or by federal statute. <u>See, e.g., Edelman v.</u> <u>Jordan</u>, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the type of relief sought. <u>See</u> <u>Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman</u>, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Similarly, absent consent by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal court suits for money damages against state officers in their official capacities. <u>See Kentucky v.</u> <u>Graham</u>, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Section 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. <u>See Quern v. Jordan</u>, 440

U.S. 332 (1979). Thus, Plaintiff's claims against the State of New Jersey must be dismissed.

Furthermore, Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order dismissing the New Jersey State court criminal indictment against him. This claim will be dismissed because federal courts are barred from interfering with a state criminal prosecution. <u>See Younger v. Harris</u>, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) ("[T]he normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions"); <u>Wallace v. Fegan</u>, 455 Fed. App'x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2011).

Finally, in <u>Imbler v. Pachtman</u>, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for acts that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," such as "initiating a prosecution and ... presenting the State's case." <u>Id.</u> at 430-31. Since <u>Imbler</u>, the Supreme Court has held that "absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding, or appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application[,but] absolute immunity does not apply when a prosecutor gives advice to police during a criminal investigation, when the prosecutor makes statements to the press, or when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness in support of a warrant application." <u>Van de Kamp v. Goldstein</u>, 555

U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (citations omitted). Because a prosecutor is absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for presenting or withholding evidence from a grand jury, the damage claims against the Prosecutor's Office in obtaining an indictment against Plaintiff will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

> <u>/s/ Joel A. Pisano</u> JOEL A. PISANO United States District Judge

Dated: October 3, 2012