IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM JACQUES,	;	
Plaintiff,	:	Case No. 3:11-cv-443
VS.	:	JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,	:	
Defendant.	:	

DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DOC. #16) IN THEIR ENTIRETY; DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO SAID JUDICIAL FILING (DOC. #17) OVERRULED; JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER, REVERSING COMMISSIONER'S DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED AND, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, AND REMANDING THE CAPTIONED CAUSE TO THE DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER FOR THE PAYMENT OF BENEFITS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, WITH AN ONSET DATE OF DECEMBER 7, 2007; TERMINATION ENTRY

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a decision of the Defendant Commissioner denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits. On January 9, 2013, the United States Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendations (Doc. #16), recommending that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act be found unsupported by substantial evidence and reversed and that the captioned cause be remanded to the Defendant Commissioner for an immediate payment of benefits, consistent with the Social Security Act, with an onset date of

December 7, 2007. Based upon reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (Doc. #16) and in the Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (Doc. #18), as well as upon a thorough <u>de novo</u> review of this Court's file, including the Administrative Transcript (Doc. #7), and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in their entirety and, in so doing, orders the entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant Commissioner, concluding that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. The Defendant's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #17) are overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was fill was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. The Defendant's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #17) are overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act is reversed, and the captioned cause is remanded to the Defendant Commissioner for the immediate payment of benefits, consistent with the Social Security Act.

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Magistrate Judge's task is to determine if that decision is supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court, upon objections being made to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations, is required to make a <u>de novo</u> review of those recommendations of the report to which objection is made. This <u>de novo</u> review, in turn, requires this Court to re-examine all the relevant evidence, previously reviewed by the Magistrate Judge, to determine whether the findings of the Secretary [now Commissioner] are supported by "substantial evidence." <u>Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services</u>, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983); <u>Gibson v. Secretary of</u>

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Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 678 F.2d 653, 654 (6th Cir. 1982). This Court's sole function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner's findings must be affirmed if they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), citing Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401; Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). To be substantial, the evidence "must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established ... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." LeMaster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1986), guoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, supra.

In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole. <u>Hephner v. Mathews</u>, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978); <u>Ellis</u>, <u>supra</u>; <u>Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services</u>,

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736 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1984); <u>Garner v. Heckler</u>, 745 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the Court may not try the case <u>de novo</u>, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility. <u>Garner</u>, <u>supra</u>. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security and proceedings on Claimant's application for social security disability benefits are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. <u>Buxton v. Halter</u>, <u>Commissioner of Social Security</u>, 246 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2001). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the Court as a trier of fact would have arrived at a different conclusion. <u>Elkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services</u>, 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1981).

In addition to the foregoing, in ruling as aforesaid, this Court makes the following, non-exclusive, observations:

1. This Court agrees that the Defendant Commissioner, through the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), erred by rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrists, Shirlann Knight, M.D., and Mahmood Rahman, M.D., in favor of the opinions of a non-examining, record-reviewing state agency psychologist, Roseann Umana, Ph.D. The ALJ's findings with regard to the opinions of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrists are not supported by substantial evidence.

2. Even if, assuming <u>arguendo</u>, the opinions of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrists were not entitled to controlling weight, the Administrative Law Judge failed to accord those opinions the requisite deference, vis-a-vis the opinions of the non-examining,

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record-reviewing state agency psychologist, the latter opinion being one that, to put it charitably, is based upon an incomplete, non-longitudinal record.

3. In its ruling above, this Court notes, with deference, a recent opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, an opinion which was unavailable to the Magistrate Judge at the time of the his Report and Recommendations, to wit: <u>Charles Gayheart v.</u> <u>Commissioner of Social Security</u>, Court of Appeals Case No. 12-3553, decided March 12, 2013, at 13 <u>et seq.</u>

4. In this Court's opinion, the ALJ simply "cherry-picked" from bits and pieces of the evidence of record to support her opinion. Such an analysis, and the conclusions arrived therefrom, do not constitute substantial evidence of non-disability.

5. A thorough review of this record convinces the Court that the proof of disability herein is strong and opposing evidence is lacking in substance. Accordingly, a remand for the payment of benefits, rather than one for further administrative proceedings, is warranted. <u>Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services</u>, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994).

WHEREFORE, based upon the aforesaid, this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. #16) in their entirety, having concluded that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #17) are overruled. Judgment will be ordered entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant Commissioner, reversing the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that

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Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, and remanding the captioned cause to the Defendant Commissioner, for an immediate award of benefits consistent with the Social Security Act, with an onset date of December 7, 2007.

The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.

March 18, 2013

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WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Copies to:

Counsel of record