



plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari*, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); *see also Martin*, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." *Id.* at 555 (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," *id.* (citation omitted), stating a claim that is "plausible on its face," *id.* at 570, rather than merely "conceivable." *Id.* "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing *Bell Atl. Corp.*, 550 U.S. at 556). Therefore, in order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." *Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.*, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing *Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.*, 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); *Iodice v. United States*, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).

Lastly, while the Court liberally construes *pro se* complaints, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, *sua sponte* developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. *See Brock v. Carroll*, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

### **Summary of Allegations and Analysis**

In his petition for a writ of mandamus Hatcher names the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections as the respondent. Hatcher contends that the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections is improperly detaining him in the Virginia Department of Corrections. Hatcher "request[s] that a hearing can be held and that the Courts show cause why the defendant is still in custody with the Virginia Department of Corrections and not released pending a new hearing in The State Courts." (Pet. Writ Mandamus 2.)

This Court lacks jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief against state officials or other non-federal employees.<sup>1</sup> See *Davis v. Lansing*, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1988); *Gurley v. Super. Ct. of Mecklenburg Cnty.*, 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969). It is therefore RECOMMENDED that this petition for a writ of mandamus be DENIED and the action be DISMISSED as legally frivolous.

(April 24, 2012 Report and Recommendation (alteration in original).) The Court advised Hatcher that he could file objections or an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Report and Recommendation. Hatcher has not responded.

## II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court.” *Estrada v. Witkowski*, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993) (citing *Mathews v. Weber*, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976)). This Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “The filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). In the absence of a specific written objection, this Court may adopt a magistrate judge’s recommendation without conducting a de novo review. See *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).


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<sup>1</sup> By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on January 10, 2011, the Court denied a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition by Hatcher challenging his Virginia rape conviction. See *Hatcher v. Johnson*, No. 3:10CV008-HEH, 2011 WL 102718, at \*3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011).

### III. CONCLUSION

There being no objections, the Report and Recommendation will be accepted and adopted. Hatcher's claims and the action will be dismissed. The Clerk will be directed to note the disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An appropriate order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

 /s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
HENRY E. HUDSON  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: June 28, 2012  
Richmond, Virginia