## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

## DARRIUS TERRELL SAUNDERS,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 3:16CV818

v.

## WESTERN REGIONAL TIDEWATER JAIL,

Defendant.

## **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

Plaintiff, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Courts must liberally construe pro se civil rights complaints in order to address constitutional deprivations. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Neither "inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds" nor collective terms such as "staff" or "agency" are persons amenable to suit under § 1983. Lamb v. Library People Them, No. 3:13-8-CMC-BHH, 2013 WL 526887, at \*2-3 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2013) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (explaining that plaintiff's "use of the collective term 'people them' as a means to name a defendant in a § 1983 claim does not adequately name a 'person'"); see Preval v. Reno, No. 99-6950, 2000 WL 20591, at \*1 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (finding that district court properly determined that Piedmont Regional Jail is not a "person" under § 1983). In his current Complaint, Plaintiff does not identify the particular constitutional right that was violated by the

defendant's conduct. Plaintiff's current allegations also fail to provide the defendant with fair

notice of the facts and legal basis upon which his or her liability rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

Accordingly, by Memorandum Order entered on May 26, 2017 the Court directed Plaintiff to

submit a particularized complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry thereof. The

Court warned Plaintiff that the failure to submit the particularized complaint would result in the

dismissal of the action.

More than fourteen (14) days have elapsed since the entry of the May 26, 2017

Memorandum Order. Plaintiff failed to submit a particularized complaint or otherwise respond

to the May 26, 2017 Memorandum Order. Accordingly, the action will be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

An appropriate order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

United States District Judge

Date:

JUN 2 2 2017. Richmond, Virginia

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