ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT – 1

Doc. 85

infections; urinary and fecal incontinence, and related emotional distress and diminished quality of life. ECF No. 37-4 at 4–5. She sued in the Southern District of West Virginia multi-district litigation ("the MDL"). ECF No. 1.

On May 21, 2019, Scott Bailey, M.D., drafted an expert report, opining Defendants' Mesh Product caused Lynch's injuries. *See* ECF No. 41-7. Lynch has presented other evidence, such as the expert opinion of Dionysios Veronikis, M.D. that generally addresses the alleged design defect. *See* ECF No. 41-9. Dr. Veronikis holds board certifications in female pelvic medicine and reconstructive surgery. *Id.* 41-9 at 2. His report discusses the defects of the Mesh Product, including its design, material and properties, and method of surgical placement, and their correlation to symptoms in patients. *See*, *e.g.*, *id.* at 4. Dr. Veronikis discusses an internal Ethicon email in which Ethicon states that "[p]olypropylene creates an intense inflammatory response that results in rapid and dense incorporation into the surrounding tissue." *Id.* at 7.

On May 29, 2020 Judge Goodwin in the Southern District of West Virginia transferred Lynch's case to the Eastern District of Washington under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). ECF No. 53.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." *Id.*

On a summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *See Tolan v. Cotton*, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (quoting *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). Thus, the Court must accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. *See Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court may not assess credibility or weigh evidence. *See id.* Nevertheless, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but must instead set forth specific facts, and point to substantial probative evidence, tending to support its case and showing a genuine issue requires resolution by the finder of fact. *See Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248–49.

DISCUSSION

A. The Court grants summary judgment as to Counts I–IV and VI–XV

Defendants moved for summary judgment on August 13, 2019. ECF No. 37. In the intervening thirteen months, Lynch has had ample opportunity to seek leave from this Court or the MDL court to voluntarily dismiss those claims. Lynch has failed to do so. Lynch has also failed to raise any argument as to why these claims

B. The Court grants summary judgment as to Count V

The parties agree that Washington State substantive law applies in this case. ECF No. 38 at 7–8; ECF No. 42 at 5; see also Martin v. Humbert Constr., Inc., 61 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Wash. App. 2003). Under Washington State law, the Washington Products Liability Act (WPLA) preempts common law causes of action. See Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Wash. 1989). This Court construes Count V, strict liability for design defect, as stating a claim under WPLA. See ECF No. 42 at 5. To prevail in a WPLA claim for design defect, a plaintiff must show that (1) a manufacturer's product (2) not reasonably safe as designed (3) caused harm to the Plaintiff. See Pagnotta v. Beall Trailers of Oregon, Inc., 991 P.2d 728, 732 (Wash. App. 2000); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(1).

1. Lynch has not established a genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause

To establish a prima facie case of strict liability for design defect under the WPLA, a claimant must establish that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(1). "Expert testimony is required to establish causation when," as here, "an injury involves obscure medical factors that would require an ordinary lay person to speculate or conjecture in making a finding."

1

18

19

20

Lynch argues that several experts submitted reports that work in concert to 2 establish proximate cause. ECF No. 42 at 6–7. Dr. Veronikis opined generally on 3 the design defects he observed in the Mesh Products, as described above. ECF No. 4 41-9. And Lynch's case specific expert, Scott Bailey, M.D., opined that the Mesh 5 Product caused Plaintiff's injuries. Using a differential diagnosis, Dr. Bailey ruled 6 out other potential causes of Lynch's injuries. ECF No. 41-7. Yet Defendants argue 7 this is not enough. Because Dr. Bailey did not attribute Lynch's injuries to the 8 asserted defects in the Mesh Product, Defendants argue, Lynch has failed to 9 establish a genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause. Defendants also 10 rightly assert that because Dr. Veronikis's expert report is unsworn, it is 11 inadmissible for the purposes of summary judgment. See ECF No. 41-9; see also 12 Harris v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 829 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1027 (W.D. Wash. 2011); 13 Shuffle Master, Inc. v. MP Games LLC, 553 F. Supp.2d 1202, 1210-11 (D. Nev. 14 2008). Because the Court's disposition here turns on the deficiencies in Dr. Bailey's 15 assertion of causation, Plaintiff fails to show that there is a genuine issue of material 16 fact even if Dr. Veronikis's report were admissible. 17

"[T]he manufacturer is liable for harm proximately caused by the design defect." Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 800 (Wash. 2000) (emphasis in original) (quoting Falk v. Keene Corp., 782 P.2d 974, 978 (Wash.

1989)). A plaintiff "must do more than 'merely suggest the possibility that proximate cause exists." *Paeschke v. General Motors LLC*, No. 4:16-cv-5050-LRS, 2017 WL 5632442 at *4 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2017) (quoting *Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 698 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1982). Lynch's experts have not opined that a *design defect* in Defendants' Mesh Products caused *her* injuries. Dr. Veronikis has opined that the design defects in the Mesh Products *can* cause an "intense inflammatory response." And Dr. Bailey opined that an inflammatory response was responsible for Lynch's pain. But without an expert opinion asserting a causal link between the general *design defects* identified by Dr. Veronikis and Lynch's injuries, Lynch has not established a genuine issue of material fact.

Courts in other circuits have also adopted this reasoning in similar cases involving plaintiffs allegedly harmed by comparable mesh products. In *Abt v*. *Ethicon, Inc.*, No. 1:20-cv-0047 SRC, 2020 WL 4887022 at *3–*4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 20, 2020), the court found that where the case specific expert did not connect plaintiff's injuries to a design defect in the TVT-O mesh product, or build off the general expert's report about the design defects, plaintiff had not established a genuine issue of material fact. And in *Lewis v. Johnson & Johnson*, 601 Fed. App'x 205, 211–212 (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit upheld a directed verdict for defendants where plaintiff's experts did not establish "a causal link between these alleged defects . . . and [plaintiff's] injuries." In *Howard v. Ethicon, Inc.*, ___

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

- 1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 37, is GRANTED.
- Counts I–XV of Lynch's Complaint, ECF No. 1, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
- 3. The Clerk's Office is **DIRECTED** to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Johnson & Johnson, Ethicon, Inc., and Ethicon LLC, and **CLOSE** this file.

 $20 \parallel /$

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT - 8