

1 laws, RCW Chapter 42.17, dealing with “grassroots lobbying”) and RCW 42.17.160 (the section
2 of RCW Chapter 42.17 setting forth certain exemptions from Washington’s lobbying registration
3 and reporting requirements) and regulations issued by the Washington State Public Disclosure
4 Commission (“PDC”) implementing and enforcing those provisions, are unconstitutional on their
5 face and as applied to plaintiffs. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the above statutory provisions
6 and regulations: (1) violate the First Amendment right of anonymous political and free speech,
7 the right of association, the right to petition the government, and the right against prior restraint;
8 (2) that they are overbroad and void for vagueness; and (3) that they violate the Equal Protection
9 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of a declaratory order, as
10 well as both a preliminary and a permanent injunction.

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12 I. Washington’s Public Disclosure Laws

13 Initiative 276 was “overwhelmingly approved” by Washington voters in 1972, receiving
14 72% of the vote. ECF #22, Exhibit 1, *The History and Intent of Initiative 276*, David Cuillier,
15 David Dean and Dr. Susan Dente Ross (issued May 4, 2004, and updated August 24, 2004), pp.
16 1, 4. The Initiative also gathered “a far greater number of signatures than it needed to be placed
17 on the ballot.” ECF #25-2, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Jolene Unsold, p. 4. It “required disclosure
18 of campaign contributions and expenditures, lobbying expenditures, and the personal affairs of
19 various officials.” ECF #25-2, Exhibit 1, p. 2; see also ECF #22, Exhibit 1, p. 1. Initiative 276
20 led to what eventually became RCW Chapter 42.17, Washington’s campaign finance, lobbying
21 and public disclosure laws. See ECF #22, Exhibit 1, p. 1. It also created the PDC to enforce
22 those laws. ECF #25-2, Exhibit 1, p. 2; Voter’s Education Committee v. Washington State Public
23 Disclosure Commission, 161 Wn.2d 470, 479 (2007).

24 “[T]he genesis of Initiative 276 occurred not just because of concerns about disclosure of
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1 money raised and spent on candidate campaigns and public records disclosure, but also a strong
2 interest by the public in the disclosure of money raised and spent on legislative lobbying and
3 ballot measure campaigns to enact legislation.” ECF #25-2, Exhibit 1, p. 3. “The overall thrust”
4 of Initiative 276 “was the people’s right to know, and to enable citizens to ‘follow the money’ in
5 all sorts of campaigns” in Washington. Id. The paragraph that began the statement for Initiative
6 276 read as follows:

8 Our whole concept of democracy is based on an informed and involved
9 citizenry. Trust and confidence in governmental institutions is at an all time
10 low. High on the list of causes of this citizen distrust are secrecy in
11 government and the influence of private money on governmental decision
12 making. Initiative 276 brings all this out into the open for citizens and voters
13 to judge for themselves.

14 ECF #22, Exhibit 1, p. 2.

15 The official declaration of policy contained in RCW Chapter 42.17 expressly states in
16 relevant part as well that it is “the public policy of the State of Washington” that “lobbying
17 contributions and expenditures be fully disclosed to the public and that secrecy is to be avoided,”
18 and that “the public’s right to know of . . . lobbying . . . far outweighs any right that that these
19 matters remain secret and private.” RCW 42.17.010(1), (10). The declaration of policy goes on
20 to state again in relevant part that:

21 The provisions of [RCW Chapter 42.17] shall be liberally construed to
22 promote complete disclosure of all information respecting . . . lobbying . . .
23 and full access to public records as to assure continuing public confidence of
24 fairness of elections and governmental processes, and so as to assure that the
25 public interest will be fully protected. . . .

26 RCW 42.17.010. However, “[i]n promoting such complete disclosure,” the declaration of policy
further provides that RCW Chapter 42.17:

. . . [S]hall be enforced so as to insure that the information disclosed will not
be misused for arbitrary and capricious purposes and to insure that all persons
reporting under [RCW Chapter 42.17] will be protected from harassment and

1 unfounded allegations based on information they have freely disclosed.

2 Id.

3 Specifically with respect to “grass roots lobbying,” RCW 42.17.200 provides in relevant
4 part that:

5 Any person who has made expenditures, not reported by a registered lobbyist
6 . . . or by a candidate or political committee . . . exceeding *five hundred
7 dollars in the aggregate within any three-month period or exceeding *two
8 hundred dollars in the aggregate within any one-month period^[1] in presenting
9 a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which is intended,
10 designed, or calculated primarily to influence legislation shall be required to
11 register and report, as provided in subsection (2) of this section, as a sponsor
12 of a grass roots lobbying campaign.

13 RCW 42.17.200(1). The term “legislation” is defined to mean:

14 . . . [B]ills, resolutions, motions, amendments, nominations, and other matters
15 pending or proposed in either house of the state legislature, and includes any
16 other matter that may be the subject of action by either house or any
17 committee of the legislature and all bills and resolutions that, having passed
18 both houses, are pending approval by the governor.

19 RCW 42.17.020(30). In regard to registration and reporting requirements, RCW 42.17.200(2)

20 ¹These are not the current expenditure amounts. As explained by Doug Ellis, the current Interim Executive Director
21 of the PDC:

22 The legislature amended [RCW 42.17.200] in 1985 and 1990, and recodified it in 2010. . . . The
23 asterisks in the statute refer to the [PDC’s] authority to adjust [the expenditure] amounts for
24 inflation per RCW 42.17.370. The . . . current [expenditure amounts are \$1,000 and \$500
25 respectively, and] were established by the [PDC] and have been confirmed by the [Washington
26 State L]egislature in the [2010] recodification. RCW 42.17.370(11) empowers, but does not
require, the [PDC] to revise at least once every five years but no more often than every two years,
the[se expenditure amounts] . . . The [PDC] itself last adjusted the[se amounts] in 1985. Then, in
2010, the legislature considered [RCW 42.17.200], recodified it at RCW 42.17A.640 effective
January 1, 2012, and retained the current [expenditure amounts] as follows:

(1) Any person who has made expenditures, not reported by a registered lobbyist
under RCW 42.17A.615 or by a candidate or political committee under RCW
42.17A.225 or 42.17A.235, exceeding *one thousand dollars in the aggregate
within any three-month period or exceeding *five hundred dollars in the
aggregate within any one-month period in presenting a program to the public, a
substantial portion of which is intended, designed, or calculated primarily to
influence legislation shall register and report, as provided in subsection (2) of
this section, as a sponsor of a grass roots lobbying campaign.

ECF #25, Declaration of Doug Ellis, ¶ 35.

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1 provides in relevant part:

2 . . . Within thirty days after becoming a sponsor of a grass roots lobbying
3 campaign, the sponsor shall register by filing with the commission a registration
4 statement, in such detail as the commission shall prescribe, showing:

5 (a) The sponsor's name, address, and business or occupation, and, if the sponsor
6 is not an individual, the names, addresses, and titles of the controlling persons
7 responsible for managing the sponsor's affairs;

8 (b) The names, addresses, and business or occupation of all persons organizing
9 and managing the campaign, or hired to assist the campaign, including any public
10 relations or advertising firms participating in the campaign, and the terms of
11 compensation for all such persons;

12 (c) The names and addresses of each person contributing twenty-five dollars or
13 more to the campaign, and the aggregate amount contributed;

14 (d) The purpose of the campaign, including the specific legislation, rules, rates,
15 standards, or proposals that are the subject matter of the campaign;

16 (e) The totals of all expenditures made or incurred to date on behalf of the
17 campaign, which totals shall be segregated according to financial category,
18 including but not limited to the following: Advertising, segregated by media, and
19 in the case of large expenditures (as provided by rule of the [PDC]), by outlet;
20 contributions; entertainment, including food and refreshments; office expenses
21 including rent and the salaries and wages paid for staff and secretarial assistance,
22 or the proportionate amount thereof paid or incurred for lobbying campaign
23 activities; consultants; and printing and mailing expenses.

24 Other reporting requirements apply as well:

25 (3) Every sponsor who has registered under this section shall file monthly reports
26 with the [PDC], which reports shall be filed by the tenth day of the month for the
activity during the preceding month. The reports shall update the information
contained in the sponsor's registration statement and in prior reports and shall
show contributions received and totals of expenditures made during the month, in
the same manner as provided for in the registration statement.

(4) When the campaign has been terminated, the sponsor shall file a notice of
termination with the final monthly report, which notice shall state the totals of all
contributions and expenditures made on behalf of the campaign, in the same
manner as provided for in the registration statement.

RCW 42.17.200. On the other hand, certain persons are made exempt from the registration and

1 reporting requirements of RCW 42.17.200. These persons include – with certain exceptions not
2 relevant here – the following:

3 (1) Persons who limit their lobbying activities to appearing before public
4 sessions of committees of the legislature, or public hearings of state agencies;

5 (2) Activities by lobbyists or other persons whose participation has been
6 solicited by an agency . . . ;

7 (3) News or feature reporting activities and editorial comment by working
8 members of the press, radio, or television and the publication or dissemination
9 thereof by a newspaper, book publisher, regularly published periodical, radio
10 station, or television station;

11 (4) Persons who lobby without compensation or other consideration for acting
12 as a lobbyist: PROVIDED, Such person makes no expenditure for or on
13 behalf of any member of the legislature or elected official or public officer or
14 employee of the state of Washington in connection with such lobbying. . . .^[2];

15 (5) Persons who restrict their lobbying activities to no more than four days or
16 parts thereof during any three-month period and whose total expenditures
17 during such three-month period for or on behalf of any one or more members
18 of the legislature or state elected officials or public officers or employees of
19 the state of Washington in connection with such lobbying do not exceed
20 twenty-five dollars . . .^[3];

21 (6) The governor;

22 (7) The lieutenant governor;

23 (8) . . . members of the legislature;

24 (9) . . . persons employed by the legislature for the purpose of aiding in the
25 preparation or enactment of legislation or the performance of legislative
26 duties;

27 ² This subsection further explains: “The exemption contained in this subsection is intended to permit and encourage
28 citizens of this state to lobby any legislator, public official, or state agency without incurring any registration or
29 reporting obligation provided they do not exceed the limits stated above. Any person exempt under this subsection
30 (4) may at his or her option register and report under [RCW Chapter 42.17].” RCW 42.17.160(4)

31 ³ This subsection continues: “PROVIDED, That the [PDC] shall promulgate regulations to require disclosure by
32 persons exempt under this subsection or their employers or entities which sponsor or coordinate the lobbying
33 activities of such persons if it determines that such regulations are necessary to prevent frustration of the purposes of
34 [RCW Chapter 42.17]. Any person exempt under this subsection (5) may at his or her option register and report
35 under [RCW Chapter 42.17].” RCW 42.17.160(5)

1 (10) Elected officials, and officers and employees of any agency reporting
2 [with respect to legislative and lobbying activities].

3 RCW 42.17.160.

4 RCW Chapter 42.17 also contains penalties for failure to comply with the requisite
5 registration and reporting requirements. For example, RCW 42.17.390 provides in relevant part
6 that:

7
8 (2) If any lobbyist or sponsor of any grass roots lobbying campaign violates
9 any of the provisions of [RCW Chapter 42.17], his or her registration may be
10 revoked or suspended and he or she may be enjoined from receiving
11 compensation or making expenditures for lobbying . . .

12 (3) Any person who violates any of the provisions of [RCW Chapter 42.17]
13 may be subject to a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars for
14 each such violation. . . .

15 (4) Any person who fails to file a properly completed statement or report
16 within the time required by [RCW Chapter 42.17] may be subject to a civil
17 penalty of ten dollars per day for each day each such delinquency continues.

18 (5) Any person who fails to report a contribution or expenditure as required by
19 [RCW Chapter 42.17] may be subject to a civil penalty equivalent to the
20 amount not reported as required.

21 (6) The court may enjoin any person to prevent the doing of any act herein
22 prohibited, or to compel the performance of any act required herein.

23 The PDC itself may issue an order requiring any person who violates RCW Chapter 42.17 “to
24 cease and desist from the activity that constitutes [the] violation and in addition, or alternatively,
25 may impose one or more of the remedies provided in RCW 42.17.390(2) through (5).” RCW
26 42.17.395(4). On the other hand, “[n]o individual penalty assessed by the [PDC] may exceed”
\$1,700, and “in any case where multiple violations are involved in a single complaint . . . , the
maximum aggregate penalty may not exceed” \$4,200. Id.

Washington’s Attorney General and other state “prosecuting authorities” also “may bring

1 civil actions in the name of the state for any appropriate civil remedy, including but not limited
2 to the special remedies provided in RCW 42.17.390.” RCW 42.17.400(1). Under certain
3 circumstances, a citizen of Washington may bring a private cause of action for failure to comply
4 with RCW Chapter 42.17. See RCW 42.17.400(4). Penalties for violations that may be assessed
5 under this statutory provision include the following:

6
7 In any action brought under this section, the court may award to the state all
8 costs of investigation and trial, including a reasonable attorney’s fee to be
9 fixed by the court. If the violation is found to have been intentional, the
amount of the judgment, which shall for this purpose include the costs, may
be trebled as punitive damages. . . .

10 RCW 42.17.400(5).

11 II. The Public Disclosure Commission

12 As noted above, the PDC “was created through the passage of Initiative 276 in 1972,”
13 which was made “effective in 1973” and “codified in RCW Chapter 42.17,” and which “the PDC
14 implements and enforces.” ECF #25, ¶ 5. According to Doug Ellis, the PDC’s current Interim
15 Executive Director, “[p]roviding information to the public is a core mission of the PDC,” as “it
16 enables the public to ‘follow the money’ with respect to campaigns and lobbying.” Id. at ¶ 10.
17 “All reports filed with the PDC disclosing campaign, lobbying and other activities . . . are public
18 records,” and “[t]he PDC makes this information available to the public for inspection and
19 copying.” Id. at ¶¶ at 10-11; see also RCW 42.17.440 (providing that all statements and reports
20 filed under RCW Chapter 42.17 are to be treated as public records, and are to be made available
21 for public inspection and copying). In addition, in regard to such public access:

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24 Before the mid-1990s, all reports were filed on paper. Members of the public,
25 and especially the media, would ask the PDC to provide them copies of the
26 paper reports. Today, thousands of campaign finance and lobbying reports are
filed electronically and made available on the PDC’s website . . . In addition,
paper reports filed by . . . lobbyists are scanned and typically made available
on the website within four hours of receipt by PDC staff and within 15

1 minutes for electronically filed reports. . . .

2 . . . As a result, information from filed reports is quickly available online to
3 the voters and to the public. The public can then use these reports to “follow
4 the money” in campaigns and lobbying and also conduct their own analysis.

5 ECF #25 at ¶¶ at 11-12. Indeed, making such information available to the public electronically
6 was mandated by the Washington State Legislature itself:

7 By February 1, 2000, the [PDC] shall operate a web site or contract for the
8 operation of a web site that allows access to reports, copies of reports, or copies of
9 data and information submitted in reports, filed with the [PDC] under RCW
10 42.17.040, 42.17.065, 42.17.080, 42.17.100, and 42.17.105. By January 1, 2001,
11 the web site shall allow access to reports, copies of reports, or copies of data and
12 information submitted in reports, filed with the [PDC] under RCW 42.17.150,
13 42.17.170, 42.17.175, and 42.17.180. In addition, the [PDC] shall attempt to
14 make available via the web site other public records submitted to or generated by
15 the [PDC] that are required by [RCW Chapter 42.17] to be available for public
16 use or inspection.^[4]

17 RCW 42.17.367; ECF #25, ¶ 15. The legislature also has “directed that filing of reports with the
18 PDC be made available through an electronic means,” and that “the PDC shall make available an
19 electronic copy of . . . reporting forms at no charge.” ECF #25, ¶ 16; see also RCW 42.17.369;
20 RCW 42.17.3691.

21 With further respect to public access, “information in lobbying reports filed with the PDC
22 is available to the public” in the following ways:

- 23 • **By Accessing the PDC Website.** . . . [A] person can view and copy
24 lobbying reports filed with the PDC, including grassroots lobbying

25 ⁴ Further, “[t]he legislative finding from 1994 in the Code Reviser Notes after the codification of [RCW 42.17.367]
26 in the Revised Code of Washington cites to Laws of Washington 1994, Chapter 40, Section 2, . . . states:

27 The legislature finds that government information is a strategic resource and needs to be managed
28 as such and that broad public access to nonrestricted public information and records must be
29 guaranteed. The legislature further finds that reengineering government processes along with
30 capitalizing on advancements made in digital technology can build greater efficiencies in
31 government service delivery. The legislature further finds that providing citizen electronic access
32 to presently available public documents will allow increased citizen involvement in state policies
33 and empower citizens to participate in state policy decision making.

34 ECF #25, ¶ 15.

1 reports. There is no charge for accessing the website, or printing
2 documents from it.

- 3 • **By Contacting the PDC by Telephone or Email.** . . . [A] person can
4 also request copies of lobbying reports to be mailed to them, or emailed to
5 them. Pursuant to [RCW 42.17.362], the PDC operates a toll-free
6 telephone number to assist in providing easier access to the PDC by the
7 public. . . . [The PDC’s] telephone numbers and email address are posted
8 on [its] website.
- 9 • **By Visiting [the PDC’s] Office.** . . . [A] person can visit the PDC’s sole
10 office location in downtown Olympia and ask for a copy of any filed form,
11 and [the PDC] will provide it at [its] front desk. [The PDC’s] street
12 address is posted on [its] website. [The PDC] also make a computer
13 terminal and printer available to the public in [its] front lobby, so a person
14 can search for and print reports or other information available on [its]
15 website. . . .

11 ECF #25, ¶ 21. In addition, the filer of a report who contacts the PDC, can receive both “formal
12 and informal assistance” provided either “by PDC staff[, including via telephone and e-mail,] or,
13 depending upon the question, by” the PDC itself. Id. at ¶ 24. Training provided by the PDC “is
14 also available.” Id. If “PDC staff are unable to answer a question or the answer is not readily
15 available on the [PDC’s] website, and the person inquiring seeks direction from the [PDC],” that
16 person also may submit “an informal advisory opinion request, a formal declaratory order
17 request . . . , a formal request for guidance through issuance of an interpretive statement . . . , or a
18 formal rulemaking petition.” Id. at ¶ 25; see also RCW 34.05.230(1), 34.05.240, 34.05.330;
19 WAC 390-12-250, 390-12-255. The PDC by statute also may “respond on a case-by-case basis
20 to ‘modification requests’” seeking “a modification or suspension of the reporting requirements.”
21 Ellis Declaration, ¶ 26; see also RCW 42.17.370(10).⁵
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25 ⁵ Pursuant to RCW 42.17.370(10), the PDC is authorized to:

26 After hearing, by order approved and ratified by a majority of the membership of
the [PDC], suspend or modify any of the reporting requirements . . . in a particular
case if it finds that literal application of [RCW Chapter 42.17] works a manifestly

1 To register and report as a grassroots lobbying campaign sponsor, a two-page form (the
2 “L6 form”), which is available on the PDC’s website, must be filed with the PDC. See ECF #25,

3 ¶¶ 38-39. The following information is required to be disclosed on that form:

- 4 • The sponsor’s name, address;
- 5 • Topics of legislation about which the campaign is conducted (including
6 bill, rule, rate, standard number if any);
- 7 • Principal officers;
- 8 • Who is organizing or managing the campaign (name, address, and
9 occupation or business, and terms of compensation);
- 10 • Expenditures made or incurred in the campaign (radio, TV, newspapers,
11 magazines, brochures, signs, printing and mailing, consultants, public
relations, office expense, travel, salaries, contributions, entertainment,
other expenses);
- Total expenditures; and
- Contributors giving more than \$25.

12 Id. at ¶ 40. The L6 form also “provides instructions on who should file, the filing deadline,
13 where to file (including [the] PDC address), and the PDC’s telephone numbers[,] including [its]
14 toll-free number.” Id. at ¶ 41. Further, “guidance and instructions on how to file . . . the L6 form
15 . . . is also available on [the PDC’s] website,” as is additional information concerning grass roots
16 lobbying such as:

- 17 • Links to further resources for . . . filing requirements, manuals and
18 brochures, . . . electronic filing options, and training schedules . . . ;
- 19 • Links to lobbying instruction manuals . . . ;
- 20 • A flow chart showing when a grassroots lobbyist is required to file a
disclosure report . . . ;
- 21 • Information on the filing deadlines for grassroots lobbying . . . ; and
- 22 • How to contact the PDC by telephone or email, plus a description of the
agency’s office hours . . .

23 unreasonable hardship and if it also finds that the suspension or modification will
24 not frustrate the purposes of [RCW Chapter 42.17]. . . .

25 However, “[a]ny suspension or modification shall be only to the extent necessary to substantially
26 relieve the hardship,” and the PDC “shall act to suspend or modify any reporting requirements
only if it determines that facts exist that are clear and convincing proof of the findings required
under this section.” Id.

1 Id. at ¶ 48. Links to RCW Chapter 42.17 and WAC Title 390 – which contain the rules issued by
2 the PDC – are provided on the PDC’s website as well, as are “a database of enforcement cases
3 involving various sections of RCW 42.17, . . . a summary of the cases and outcomes” and since
4 the year 2000, “a summary of cases involving alleged violations of RCW 42.17.200.” Id. In
5 addition, the PDC “issues declaratory orders upon request,” copies of which “are available to the
6 public and filers on the PDC’s website,” as are scanned copies of L6 forms that are filed with the
7 PDC. Id. at ¶¶ 51, 55, 58.

9 III. Plaintiffs Many Cultures, One Message and Conservative Enthusiasts

10 Plaintiff Many Cultures, One Message (“MCOM”) describes itself as “an unincorporated,
11 nonprofit volunteer association based in Seattle.” ECF #1, Civil Rights Complaint, ¶ 10.⁶ It has
12 no “bylaws, articles of incorporation, or any other governing documents.” Id. at ¶ 28. MCOM is
13 not a candidate for political office or a political committee, and does not make any expenditures
14 on behalf of such candidates or committees or any registered lobbyist. Id. at ¶ 39. MCOM “does
15 not pay any registered lobbyist to act on its behalf,” nor does it “expend money on behalf of any
16 state officials.” Id. MCOM also does not reimburse its “members” for expenditures made in
17 regard to contacting state officials or legislators, and while MCOM itself is “not . . . compensated
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20 ⁶ Plaintiffs state in their motion that the complaint “was verified by representatives of each party” – Pat Murakami
21 for MCOM and Alfred Petermann for CE – and thus is being used by them “in lieu of affidavits and declarations.”
22 ECF #22, p. 5 n.3; see also ECF #1, #1-2 and #1-3. “[A] verified complaint may serve as an affidavit for purposes
23 of summary judgment *if* [1] it is based on personal knowledge and if [2] it sets forth the requisite facts with
24 specificity.” California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Moran v.
25 Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 760 n.16 (9th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis in original), *abrogation on other grounds recognized by*
26 Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle (“Human Life”), 624 F.3d 990, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010); see also
Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1022 (noting that “[n]ot only” was “the complaint [in that case] devoid of information from
which [the Court of Appeals] could conclude that [RCW Chapter 42.17 was] unconstitutional as applied to [the
plaintiff],” but that it was “not clear from the record that the complaint was verified by a[n] official [of the plaintiff]
with personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein.”); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (to be used as
opposing affidavit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, verified complaint must be based on personal knowledge and set forth
specific facts admissible in evidence). As defendants have not objected on the basis of lack of personal knowledge
or factual specificity, plaintiffs’ complaint shall be treated as a verified complaint for summary judgment purposes.

1 for its efforts,” it reimburses “its unpaid volunteers for expenditures made on MCOM’s behalf.”
2 Id. at ¶¶ 41-42.

3 MCOM is “dedicated to preserving the diverse and vibrant neighborhoods of Southeast
4 Seattle.” Id. at ¶10. More specifically, it was “formed to resist efforts by the City of Seattle to
5 use Washington’s Community Renewal Law (CRL) . . . to declare portions of Southeast Seattle a
6 ‘Community Renewal Area,’” which “would have given the City [of Seattle] the power to take,
7 via eminent domain, private homes and businesses in the area to transfer to private entities.” Id.
8 at ¶ 29. MCOM “successfully mobilized public opposition to [the City of Seattle’s CRL efforts]
9 and the City halted its efforts in 2007.” Id. at ¶ 30. Those efforts included distributing fliers,
10 organizing community meetings, contacting “City agencies,” and “otherwise informing citizens
11 about how to oppose use of the CRL in Southeast Seattle.” Id. at ¶ 31. Since “these efforts were
12 directed largely at City officials regarding a City proposal,” though, MCOM “was not required to
13 register under” RCW 42.17.200. Id. at ¶ 32.

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16 MCOM also states in relevant part as follows in regard to its prior efforts/activities:

17 33. In the 2010 session of the Washington [State] Legislature,
18 legislators introduced bills to reform the CRL and to prohibit eminent domain
19 for economic development.

20 34. Similar bills had been considered in the 2006, 2007, 2008, and
21 2009 sessions of the Legislature. These bills did not pass.

22 35. In 2009, a bill promoting Transit Oriented Development (TOD)
23 was introduced in the Legislature.

24 36. MCOM was concerned that TOD would rely on use of the
25 CRL.

26 37. Prior to the 2010 Legislative session, MCOM anticipated the
need to mobilize local residents and business owners to contact their
legislators and the Governor to (i) urge reform of the CRL and eminent
domain laws, and (ii) to reject any TOD bill that did not foreclose reliance on
the CRL. MCOM anticipated that a successful effort to promote its message
would require expenditures of at least \$1[,]000 in three months if these bills
progressed.

38. The bills about which MCOM intended to mobilize grassroots
activism in the 2010 session of the Washington [State] Legislature died in

1 their respective committees by January 27, 2010.

2 Id. at ¶¶ 33-38. With respect to future activities, MCOM goes on to state in relevant part:

3 40. MCOM anticipates communicating with people who are not its
4 members regarding eminent domain abuse.

5 41. MCOM . . . will not be compensated for its efforts.

6 42. . . . Although MCOM members may also contact state officials
7 and legislators, they . . . will not be reimbursed for any expenditure related
8 thereto.

9 43. MCOM anticipates that [l]egislation reforming the CRL and
10 implementing TOD will be considered by future sessions of the Legislature.

11 . . .

12 45. MCOM will seek to develop support for eminent domain
13 reform and against the implementation of TOD premised on a use of the CRL
14 in the coming months and during the 2011 Legislative session and beyond.

15 Id. at ¶¶ 40-43, 45.

16 Plaintiff Red State Politics, d/b/a “Conservative Enthusiasts” (“CE”) describes itself as a
17 “501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation” and/or “volunteer organization” registered “under the Internal
18 Revenue Code,” and is based in Seattle. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 55. It is “run by unpaid volunteers,” has
19 “no employees” and is “dedicated to educating the public about the benefits of lower taxes, less
20 regulation, and smaller government.” Id. In terms of past activities, CE states it “has advanced
21 its political goals by (1) speaking with elected officials; (2) establishing a public website; and (3)
22 hosting monthly meetings and speakers about public policy issues.” Id. at ¶ 58. CE further states
23 it “has not spent \$500 in the aggregate in any one month or \$1,000 in the aggregate in any three
24 months on presenting a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which was
25 intended, designed, or calculated primarily to influence legislation, as those terms are defined in”
26 RCW 42.17.020. Id. at ¶ 56.

CE states it “anticipates . . . that in future sessions of the [Washington State] legislature,
legislators will seek to raise taxes, increase regulation, and grow the size of the State
government,” and “wants to take an active role in opposing these efforts, including urging its

1 supporters to contact state officials about these issues.” Id. at ¶¶ 56-57. Specifically with respect
2 to future activities:

3 59. As it grows, [CE] plans to take the following additional actions
4 to advance its goals: (1) establish an electronic contact system with interested
5 individuals; (2) encourage individuals to send letters and e-mails to state
6 officials; (3) create a database to leverage resources and effectively manage its
7 contacts; (4) mobilize and educate its members and the public about
8 legislation; (5) run advocacy ads in direct response to political activity by
9 opposing groups; (6) hire several staff members to support its efforts; (7)
10 further develop its website to assist with its education and advocacy efforts;
11 and (8) participate in strategic litigation efforts.

12 60. It will solicit contributions and all contributions are and will be
13 placed in a general fund.

14 61. [CE] anticipates that if its ability to engage in advocacy were
15 not affected by operation of [RCW] 42.17.200, it would spend at least \$500 in
16 the aggregate in one month or \$1,000 in aggregate in three months organizing
17 efforts regarding these initiatives.

18 Id. at ¶¶ 59-61. Similar to MCOM:

19 62. [CE] is not a candidate or a political committee and no
20 registered lobbyist, candidate, or political committee has or will report any
21 expenditures made by [CE]. [CE] does not pay any registered lobbyist to act
22 on its behalf and does not endorse political candidates. It does not make any
23 expenditures on behalf of state officials.

24 63. [CE] intends to communicate with people who are not
25 members of [CE] about its legislative initiatives. [CE] reimburses its
26 volunteers for expenditures made on [CE’s] behalf. Although its members
may make contact with state officials concerning speaking engagements and
pending legislation, such volunteers will not be reimbursed for any expenses
incurred. [CE] will not be paid for its political activities.

Id. at ¶¶ 62-63.

IV. Plaintiffs’ Involvement with Washington’s Laws Governing Grassroots Lobbying and the Public Disclosure Commission

Sometime between April and August 2009, “an Institute for Justice⁷ representative met

⁷ The Institute for Justice (“IJ”) describes itself in part both as “a civil liberties law firm” and as the “nation’s only libertarian public interest law firm,” engaged “in cutting-edge litigation and advocacy both in the courts of law and in the court of public opinion on behalf of individuals whose most basic rights are denied by the government.” <http://www.ij.org/about>. IJ states it pursues its mission of advancing “a rule of law under which individuals can control their destinies as free and responsible members of society,” through “strategic litigation, training,

1 with” CE “to discuss Washington State’s grassroots lobbying requirements.” ECF #31-1, Exhibit
2 11, Defendants’ First Set of Requests for Admission, ¶ 20. Included in the agenda for an August
3 5, 2009 meeting between CE and IJ was discussing “[a]ffiliating with a litigation effort that seeks
4 to overturn some State and National legislations that erodes [sic] participation and oversight of
5 our governance.” Id. at ¶ 22. It is not clear whether CE was planning to challenge Washington’s
6 laws governing grassroots lobbying prior to its first contact with IJ, but no evidence in the record
7 indicates it was. See ECF #24, Exhibit 6, Deposition of Mark Sussman at 50.⁸

9 For its part, MCOM was not aware of Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying
10 until informed thereof by the IJ. See ECF #24, Exhibit 11, Declaration of Patricia Murakami at
11 14, 21.⁹ Plaintiffs’ claim in their complaint that they reviewed “the agency materials concerning
12 grassroots lobbying on the PDC’s website, but were unable to determine if the statutes applied to
13 them.” ECF #1, ¶ 74. Neither MCOM or CE, though, requested any of the following from the
14 PDC, although, as noted above, they could have done so:

- 16 • Training on reporting grassroots lobbying;
- 17 • An informal advisory opinion, an interpretive statement or a rulemaking
18 petition;

19 communication, activism and research.” Id. Further, IJ states in addition to training “law students, lawyers and
20 policy activists in the tactics of public interest litigation,” it “litigates to secure economic liberty, school choice,
21 private property rights, freedom of speech and other vital individual liberties, and to restore constitutional limits on
22 the power of government.” Id.

23 ⁸ Mr. Sussman is the founder of CE, maintains the organization’s bank account, is responsible for satisfying all of its
24 reporting requirements, and handles its membership information. See id. at 13, 31-35. As to when CE first decided
25 to challenge Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying, Mr. Sussman stated in relevant part (in response to a
26 question posed at his deposition as to whether it occurred prior to CE’s meeting with IJ) that: “I honestly don’t know
the answer. I don’t know the time sequence of that.” Id. at 50; see also ECF #25, ¶ 72 (noting plaintiff’s posting on
internet indicated that they met with IJ “several months before approaching the [PDC] to seek a declaratory order,”
discussed in greater detail below) (emphasis in original).

⁹ Patricia Murakami – who signed a “verification” for the civil rights complaint on behalf of MCOM, based on her
“personal knowledge of MCOM and its activities” – is “a founder, organizer, and member of” MCOM. ECF #1-2,
Verification of Pat Murakami, p. 2. Ms. Murakami states in her deposition that she did not know Washington’s laws
governing grassroots lobbying existed before she was informed of them by IJ, which “went over” them with her as
to how they operated. ECF #24, Exhibit 11 at 14, 21. Ms. Murakami also states therein that MCOM did not “come
looking for [IJ] for advice on” those laws. Id. at 23.

- A modification or suspension of the grassroots lobbying reporting requirements; or
- A rulemaking petition seeking to increase the monetary threshold reporting amounts.

See ECF #25, ¶¶ 24-26, 35, 49-50, 69. Nor had MCOM or CE prior to the filing of their petition for a declaratory order, discussed in greater detail below, “contacted PDC staff indicating any confusion or uncertainty” on their part regarding their filing under Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying. *Id.* at ¶ 68.

On December 3, 2009, plaintiffs filed a petition for a declaratory order with the PDC. See ECF #1, ¶ 75; ECF #25-3, Exhibit 21. While plaintiffs were given a “draft” of the petition to see “perhaps ahead of time,” and although it was prepared for them and filed on their behalf, the idea for pursuing that course of action “more or less” came on the legal advice IJ provided. ECF #22, Exhibit 6 at 58-59; see also ECF #22, Exhibit 11 at 26. Indeed, the first contact the PDC had with plaintiffs was through the filing of the petition by IJ legal counsel, not plaintiffs themselves. See ECF #25, ¶71; see also ECF #28, Declaration of Lori Anderson, ¶ 10, ECF #29, Declaration of Tony Perkins, ¶ 7. The petition states in relevant part:

Question the Declaratory Order Is To Answer: Assuming [MCOM and CE] engage in the activities described below, are MCOM and CE required to (i) register with the [PDC], and (ii) file monthly statements, pursuant to RCW 42.17.200?

Statement of Facts Which Raise the Question: Our clients hereby state the following facts regarding their organizations and activities.

1. MCOM. MCOM is an unincorporated group dedicated to preserving the diverse and vibrant neighborhoods of Southeast Seattle. MCOM was initially formed to combat efforts by the City of Seattle to use Washington’s [CRL] . . . to declare portions of Southeast Seattle a Community Renewal Area and authorize the taking of private homes and businesses for transfer to private entities. MCOM successfully mobilized public opposition to this and the City halted its efforts to use the CRL in 2007.

In the past, MCOM has not spent \$500 in the aggregate in any one

1 month or \$1,000 in the aggregate in any three months on presenting a program
2 addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which was intended, designed,
3 or calculated to influence legislation, as those terms are defined in RCW
4 42.17.020. However, MCOM anticipates that, in the coming session of the
5 Legislature, a bill will be introduced to substantially reform the CRL. MCOM
6 also anticipates that a bill promoting Transit Oriented Development (TOD)
7 will also be introduced in the coming session and MCOM is concerned that
8 such development may be premised on use of the CRL. For these reasons,
9 MCOM anticipates mobilizing the residents and business owners of Southeast
10 Seattle to contact their legislators and the Governor to urge them to support
11 reform of the CRL and to stop any TOD bill that relies upon the CRL.
12 MCOM anticipates it will spend at least \$500 in the aggregate in one month or
13 \$1,000 in aggregate in three months organizing efforts regarding these
14 Legislative initiatives.

15 MCOM is not a candidate or a political committee and anticipates that
16 no registered lobbyist, candidate, or political committee will report any
17 expenditures made by MCOM on this effort. MCOM does not pay any
18 registered lobbyist to act on its behalf. It anticipates communicating with
19 people who are not members of MCOM regarding these legislative initiatives.
20 MCOM will reimburse volunteers for expenditures made on MCOM's behalf.
21 MCOM anticipates that its volunteers will each spend more than four days or
22 parts thereof during any three month period and that its expenditures will
23 exceed \$25. MCOM will not be paid for its efforts.

24 **2. CE.** CE is a 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to educating the
25 public regarding the benefits of lower taxes, less regulation, smaller
26 government, and strong national defense. In the past, CE has not spent \$500
in the aggregate in any one month or \$1,000 in the aggregate in any three
months on presenting a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion
of which was intended, designed, or calculated primarily to influence
legislation, as those terms are defined in RCW 42.17.020. However, CE
anticipates that, in the coming session of the Legislature, numerous bills will
be introduced to raise taxes, increase regulation, and grow the size of the State
government. CE anticipates changing the nature of its organization to allow it
to take a more active role in opposing these Legislative efforts, including
contacting people on its email list and visitors to its website and urging them
to contact state officials regarding these issues. CE anticipates it will spend at
least \$500 in the aggregate in one month or \$1,000 in aggregate in three
months organizing efforts regarding these Legislative initiatives.

CE is not a candidate or a political committee and anticipates that no
registered lobbyist, candidate, or political committee will report any
expenditures made by CE on this effort. CE does not pay any registered
lobbyist to act on its behalf. It anticipates communicating with people who
are not members of CE regarding these legislative initiatives. CE reimburses

1 volunteers for expenditures made on CE's behalf. CE anticipates that its
2 volunteers will each spend more than four days or parts thereof during any
3 three month period and that its expenditures will exceed \$25. CE will not be
4 paid for its efforts.

5 ***Uncertainty Necessitating Resolution Exists:*** It [sic] unclear whether
6 MCOM or CE must register as sponsors of a grassroots lobbying campaign
7 under RCW 42.17.200. In that regard, each organization is uncertain whether
8 any of the exemptions to registration contained in RCW 42.17.160 would
9 apply to their anticipated activities, specifically the exemption for
10 uncompensated lobbying contained in RCW 42.17.160(4).

11 ***An Actual Controversy Arises from Such Uncertainty:*** MCOM and
12 CE do not wish to register and submit monthly reports as sponsors of a
13 grassroots lobbying campaign. Neither [MCOM nor CE] wishes to report, or
14 otherwise make public, the names, addresses, or titles of the controlling
15 persons responsible for managing their respective . . . affairs or organizing and
16 managing the[ir] respective . . . campaigns. Neither [MCOM nor CE] wishes
17 to report, or otherwise make public, the names and addresses of people or
18 organizations contributing more than \$25 to their efforts. Neither [MCOM
19 nor CE] wishes to report, or otherwise make public, any expenditures made by
20 such organizations in seeking to effectuate political change.

21 ***This Uncertainty Adversely Affects [MCOM and CE]:*** As noted
22 above, neither [MCOM nor CE] wishes to be considered sponsors of
23 grassroots lobbying campaigns. On the other hand, neither wishes to risk
24 violating the registration and reporting requirements contained in RCW
25 42.17.200 and being subject to any attendant fines or penalties. Without a
26 clear resolution, [MCOM and CE] may curtail [their] expressive activity to
avoid having to register and report as the sponsor of a grassroots lobbying
campaign.

ECF #25-3, Exhibit 21, pp. 1-3. The petition was signed by IJ legal counsel. See id. at p. 3.

Subsequent to the filing of the petition, the PDC continued to communicate with IJ legal
counsel regarding the petition process, not plaintiffs. See ECF #25, ¶ 80; ECF #25-3, Exhibit 22.
The petition was scheduled to be considered at the next PDC meeting on January 28, 2010. See
ECF #25, ¶ 80. Prior to that meeting, plaintiffs were sent “a series of questions about their
organizational makeup and activities,” to which they “provided timely responses.” ECF #1, ¶ 77.
Although IJ legal counsel addressed the PDC at that meeting, no representative from MCOM or

1 CE appears to have attended the meeting, nor did any representative therefrom address the PDC
2 or provide any testimony concerning the petition. ECF #25, ¶¶ 86, 94.

3 Following this meeting, a declaratory order was drafted by the PDC and sent to IJ legal
4 counsel for comment. Id. at ¶ 89. That draft declaratory order was scheduled for review at the
5 PDC's February 26, 2010 meeting. See id. A copy of the order and the agenda for the February
6 26, 2010 meeting was posted on the PDC's website. See id. In the order, the PDC "unanimously
7 agreed that based upon the facts presented" in IJ legal counsel's written materials and by IJ legal
8 counsel at the January 28, 2010 meeting, and presented in the PDC staff's written materials and
9 by the PDC staff at that meeting, none of the exceptions contained in RCW 42.17.160 applied
10 "to exempt [MCOM and CE] from registering and reporting under RCW 42.17.200." ECF #25-3,
11 Exhibit 24, p. 1. IJ legal counsel "submitted written comments on the draft declaratory order to
12 the [PDC] in a letter dated February 25, 2010," asking that the PDC amend the order "to fully
13 apply the exemptions listed in RCW 42.17.160." ECF #25, ¶ 89. On February 26, 2010, though,
14 the PDC "determined that it would enter [its final] declaratory order [concerning the petition] as
15 drafted." See ECF #1, ¶ 81; ECF #25, ¶ 91.

18 V. Proceedings in this Court

19 On April 15, 2010, plaintiffs filed their civil rights complaint with this Court. See ECF
20 #1, #1-2, #1-3. As was the case with the proceedings before the PDC, IJ legal counsel continues
21 to represent plaintiffs in this matter. On April 6, 2011, plaintiffs filed their motion for summary
22 judgment. See ECF #22. On May 9, 2011, defendants filed their response to plaintiffs' motion
23 (see ECF #24), and on May 13, 2011, plaintiffs' filed their reply thereto (see ECF #32). On May
24 24, 2011, the Court directed the parties to file additional briefing regarding the issue of plaintiffs'
25 standing in this case. See ECF #33. The parties have filed their briefing in response thereto (see
26

1 ECF #35-#38, #40), and thus plaintiffs’ motion is now ripe for review. Although plaintiffs have
2 requested oral argument in this matter, the Court finds such argument to be unnecessary in order
3 to effectively resolve the issues presented here.

4 DISCUSSION

5 I. Standard of Review

6 Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, exhibits, and affidavits show that
7 there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
8 as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding whether summary judgment should be
9 granted, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,”
10 and draw all inferences “in the light most favorable” to that party. T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v.
11 Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). When a summary
12 judgment motion is supported as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, an adverse party may not rest
13 upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his or her response, by affidavits or as
14 otherwise provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine
15 issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
16

17
18 If the nonmoving party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
19 rendered against that party. See id. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine
20 issue of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). Mere
21 disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists does not preclude
22 summary judgment. See California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics,
23 Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). A “material” fact is one which is “relevant to an
24 element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit,” and the
25 materiality of which is “determined by the substantive law governing the claim.” T.W. Electrical
26

1 Serv., 809 F.2d at 630.

2 Mere “[d]isputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts,” therefore, “will not preclude a
3 grant of summary judgment.” Id. Rather, the nonmoving party “must produce at least some
4 ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477
5 U.S. at 290); see also California Architectural Building Products, Inc., 818 F.2d at 1468 (“No
6 longer can it be argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact precludes the use of
7 summary judgment.”). In other words, the purpose of summary judgment “is not to replace
8 conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”
9 Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).

11 The parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case, and thus
12 that entry of summary judgment is appropriate here. In addition, such judgment may be entered
13 for the non-moving party “[e]ven when there has been no cross-motion for summary judgment,”
14 since “a district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte against a moving party,” if the
15 moving party “has had a ‘full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the matter.’”
16 Gospel Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
17 Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982)). Because “[t]he salient issues” on
18 which summary judgment is being granted for defendants were presented in plaintiffs’ summary
19 judgment motion, and because plaintiffs have had a full and fair opportunity to ventilate those
20 issues, the Court does “not commit reversible error by acting sua sponte” for defendants absent a
21 cross-motion for summary judgment. Id.; Commission on Independent Colleges and Universities
22 v. New York Temporary State Commission on Regulation of Lobbying (“CICU”), 534 F.Supp.
23 489, 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (while defendants had not made cross motion for summary judgment,
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25
26

1 because there were no disputed facts and record was adequate regarding constitutional question
2 presented, summary judgment could be granted for non-moving party).

3 II. Exclusion of Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Evidence and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12

4 Plaintiffs include with their motion for summary judgment the declaration and report of
5 Jeffrey Milyo, Ph.D., a tenured professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, Missouri,
6 who describes his area of “academic expertise” as “American political economy, including the
7 empirical analysis of the effects of political regulations and institutions.” ECF #22, Declaration
8 of Jeffrey Milyo (“Milyo Declaration”), ¶¶ 15-16, Exhibit B. In his declaration, Dr. Milyo states
9 there is “no scientific evidence” that laws governing grassroots lobbying “provide any public
10 benefit” (such as increasing public confidence in government or providing useful information to
11 legislators or the public), that those laws are “redundant or overbroad” given the existence of
12 other laws that deal with lobbying, and that they “impose real costs on ordinary citizens.” Id. at
13 ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 13, 45, 47, 59-60, 66-67.
14

15
16 Dr. Milyo based his conclusions in part on his review of the text of Chapter 42.17 and of
17 the L6 form and instructions, as well as a number of “external sources,” including United States
18 Supreme Court case law and publications concerning such topics as public opinion, lobbying,
19 collective action, campaign disclosure, and political speech and political participation in general.
20 Id. at ¶¶ 26, 34-36, 38, 42-43, 48-58, 61-63, 66, 70, 72-73, Exhibit A, Expert Report of Dr.
21 Jeffrey Milyo (“Milyo Report”), Exhibit C, Source List of Dr. Jeffrey Milyo. Dr. Milyo also
22 based his opinions and report in part on “earlier research” he conducted, which consisted of “an
23 experiment to evaluate the ability of ordinary citizens to comply with the campaign finance
24 disclosure laws of different states,” although it “did not examine” Washington’s laws governing
25 grassroots lobbying. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 73-86, Exhibit A, pp. 14-16.
26

1 In their response to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, defendants have moved to
2 strike the evidence provided by Dr. Milyo, pursuant in part to Federal Rule of Evidence (“Fed. R.
3 Evid.”) 702 and the failure of that evidence to comply with the criteria for relevance or reliability
4 set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See ECF #24, p. 2, n. 1.
5 Defendants also challenge the propriety of Dr. Mylo’s declaration on the basis that it “is replete
6 with legal conclusions, case law and legal arguments.” Id. Defendants, furthermore, object to
7 Exhibit 12 attached to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, asserting that because it is a law
8 review article authored by an employee of IJ – specifically, the “director of strategic research” at
9 IJ – it “does not qualify as evidence.” Id.; see also ECF #22, Exhibit 12, *Mandatory Disclosure*
10 *for Ballot-Initiative Campaigns*, Dick M. Carpenter II, *The Independent Review*, v. 13, n. 4, p.
11 567 (Spring 2009).

13 A. Daubert and the Court’s “Gatekeeping” Role

14 Plaintiffs argue the Court should deny defendants’ motion to strike, complaining that no
15 analysis or explanation for their objection to the evidence from Dr. Milyo, or as to why it fails to
16 comply with the criteria in Daubert, was provided. Plaintiffs argue that “[w]ithout more,” they
17 are not able to respond to defendants’ motion, and that defendants’ assertions “do not amount to
18 a ‘*Daubert*’ challenge for this Court’s consideration.” ECF #32, p. 11 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
19 7(b)(1)). What plaintiffs fail to realize, however, is that “[i]t is the *proponent* of the expert”
20 witness – not the objecting party – “who has the burden of proving admissibility” here, which
21 “must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
22 605 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1154 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (quoting Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89
23 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis added); see also Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 942
24 (9th Cir. 2007); Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (9th Cir. 2001).

1 More specifically, and as discussed in greater detail below, “[t]he party presenting the
2 expert must demonstrate that the expert’s findings are based on sound principles and that they
3 are capable of [some objective,] independent validation.” Henricksen, 605 F. Supp.2d at 1154
4 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (“Daubert II”), 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995));
5 see also Cooper, 510 F.3d at 942. The Court itself, furthermore, has an initial duty to ensure the
6 requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 702 have been met, which are as follows:

8 If scientific, technical, or other knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
9 understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
10 an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
11 thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based
12 upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
13 principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
14 methods reliably to the facts of the case.

15 Thus, far from being “disabled from screening” expert testimony or evidence under Fed. R. Evid.
16 702, the district court “must ensure that any and all [such] testimony or evidence admitted is not
17 only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; see also Henricksen, 605 F.Supp.2d at
18 1153 (“Before a witness may come ‘before the [trier of fact] cloaked with the mantle of an
19 expert[]’ under [Fed. R. Evid.] 702, . . . ‘care must be taken to assure that a proffered witness
20 truly qualifies as an expert, and that such [witness’s] testimony meets the requirements of [that]
21 Rule[.]’”) (quoting Jinro America Inc. v. Secure Investments, Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir.
22 2001)). “[A]s a threshold matter,” therefore, the Court “must determine whether the proffered
23 witness is ‘qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[.]’” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).

24 In other words, the district court at the outset has a “gatekeeping role” to perform with
25 respect to evidence submitted as expert testimony. Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1420
26 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (“[T]he Rules of Evidence – especially Rule

1 702 – . . . assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a
2 reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”); see also Cooper, 510 F.3d at 942 (“The
3 trial court acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude expert testimony that does not meet the relevancy and
4 reliability threshold requirements.”); Elsayed Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward,
5 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002); Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 199 (trial judges act as
6 gatekeepers under Fed. R. Evid. 702 to ensure any and all expert testimony not only is relevant,
7 but reliable). Thus, “[a] trial judge, faced with a proffer of expert . . . testimony, must conduct ‘a
8 preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
9 scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
10 facts in issue.’” Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 199 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93);
11 see also United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010) (district court correct
12 to require showing of foundation for proffered expert testimony).

13
14
15 “[T]his basic gatekeeping obligation” of the district court, furthermore, applies not only
16 to “scientific” testimony, but “to all expert testimony.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526
17 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (noting that language of Fed. R. Evid. 702 “makes no relevant distinction
18 between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge, but instead “[i]t
19 makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony”). Further,
20 “judges are entitled to broad discretion when discharging their gatekeeping function.” Hangarter
21 v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The
22 Ninth Circuit has emphasized the obligatory nature of the initial “gatekeeping” inquiry, by noting
23 the “trial court’s broad latitude to make the reliability determination [regarding expert witness
24 testimony or evidence] does *not* include the discretion to abdicate completely its responsibility to
25
26

1 do so.”¹⁰ Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064 (emphasis in original); see also United States v.
2 Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (“While . . . the trial court is accorded great
3 latitude in determining [admissibility of] expert testimony, *Kumho* and *Daubert* make it clear
4 that the court must, on the record, make *some* kind of [admissibility] determination.”) (emphasis
5 in original).

6 “The trial court’s ‘special obligation’ to determine the relevance and reliability of an
7 expert’s testimony . . . is vital to ensure accurate and unbiased decision-making by the trier of
8 fact.” Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1063 (citing and quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147,
9 152 (“*Daubert*’s gatekeeping requirement . . . make[s] certain that an expert . . . employs in the
10 courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
11 relevant field.”)); see also Cooper, 510 F.3d at 943; Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 200. As
12 the Supreme Court stated in *Daubert*, this is because:
13

14 . . . Unlike an ordinary witness, . . . an expert is permitted wide latitude to
15 offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or
16 observation. . . . Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of
17 firsthand knowledge – a rule which represent “a ‘most pervasive
18 manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources
19 of information,’” . . . is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion
20 will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.

21 509 U.S. at 592 (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R. Evid. 602, 28 U.S.C. App., p.
22 755 (citation omitted)).

23 As indicated above, Fed. R. Evid. 702 embodies “the twin concerns of ‘reliability’ . . .
24 and ‘helpfulness.’” Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007)
25 (citation omitted); see also Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002)

26 ¹⁰ On the other hand, because “the form that the inquiry into relevance and reliability must take” has not been
mandated by the Supreme Court, “a separate, pretrial hearing” regarding that inquiry also “is not required.” Elsayed
Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064 (quoting United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000)).

1 (“Whether testimony is helpful within the meaning of Rule 702 is in essence a relevance
2 inquiry.”); Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1063 n.7 (“Encompassed within the determination of
3 whether expert testimony is relevant is whether it is helpful . . . a ‘central concern’ of Rule 701.”)
4 (citation omitted). Expert testimony that “does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant,
5 and ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; see also Stilwell, 482 F.3d at 1192 (“[R]eliable
6 testimony must nevertheless be helpful.”). To this end, the Court “must determine whether there
7 is ‘a link between the expert’s testimony and the matter to be proved.’” Stilwell, 482 F.3d at
8 1192 (citation omitted); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92 (helpfulness standard requires valid
9 connection to pertinent inquiry as precondition to admissibility). Testimony “that falls short of
10 achieving either” concern may be excluded. Stilwell, 482 F.3d at 1192.

12 More specifically in regard to relevance, expert testimony sought to be admitted “must
13 logically advance a material aspect of the [proponent] party’s case,” and “must be ‘tied to the
14 facts’” of that case. Cooper, 510 F.3d at 942 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315, and quoting
15 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150); see also Henricksen, 605 F.Supp.2d at 1154 (“The relevance
16 prong under *Daubert* means that the evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand or
17 determine a fact in issue.”). As for reliability, “Rule 702 demands that expert testimony relate to
18 scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, which does not include unsubstantiated
19 speculation and subjective beliefs.” Diviero v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 851, 853
20 (9th Cir. 1997). This twin inquiry into relevance and reliability is succinctly described by the
21 district court in Henricksen:

24 The court need not admit an expert opinion that is connected to the
25 underlying data “only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner*,
26 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). It may exclude
such testimony if it determines “that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.” *Id.* “The trial court’s gate-
keeping function requires more than simply taking the expert’s word for it.”

1 *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir.1995) (“
2 *Daubert II*”). In addition, “any step that renders [the expert’s] analysis
3 unreliable ... renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible. . . .” *In re Silicone*
4 *Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation*, 318 F.Supp.2d 879, 890
5 (D.C.Cal. 2004). Something doesn’t become [expert] knowledge just because
6 it’s uttered by a[n expert]; nor can an expert’s self-serving assertion that his
7 conclusions were derived by the [proper, reliable] method be deemed
8 conclusive. *Daubert II*, at 1315–16. “[T]he expert’s bald assurance of validity
9 is not enough. Rather, the party presenting the expert must show that the
10 expert’s findings [have a sound basis], and this will require some objective,
11 independent validation of the expert’s methodology.” *Id.* at 1316.

12 605 F.Supp.2d at 1153-54; see also *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 590 (“[T]he word ‘knowledge’ connotes
13 more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term ‘applies to any body of known
14 facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.’”)
15 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986)); see also *Redlighting*, 624
16 F.3d at 1112 (“Because [social science expert] did not reasonably point to any evidence in the
17 record or other factors or data reasonably relied on by experts in his field . . . [he] could not
18 provide any relevant testimony to assist the jury.”); *United States v. W.R. Grace*, 504 F.3d 745,
19 761 (9th Cir. 2007) (facts and data relied on by expert must be reasonably relied on by experts in
20 particular field).

21 As noted by the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he Supreme Court in *Daubert* identified several factors
22 that may bear on a judge’s determination of the reliability of an expert’s testimony.” *Smith &*
23 *Nephew, Inc.*, 259 F.3d at 199. They include:

24 . . . (1) whether a theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2)
25 whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication¹¹; (3) whether[,
26 in the case of a scientific technique, the] technique has a high known or
27 potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling its

28 ¹¹ Submission of the particular theory or methodology at issue to “the scrutiny” of the relevant scientific, technical
29 or other specialized knowledge community “increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be
30 detected.” *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 593. “The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will
31 be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the . . . validity of” that theory or methodology “on
32 which an opinion is premised.” *Id.* at 594.

1 operation; and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance
2 within a relevant scientific[, technical or specialized knowledge]
community.^[12]

3 Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94); see also Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064. These
4 factors are “neither definitive, nor exhaustive,” though, and “particular factors may or may not
5 be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular
6 expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d at 199-200. The
7 Daubert inquiry, furthermore, is “a flexible one,” with “[i]ts overarching subject” being the
8 “validity” and, accordingly, the “evidentiary relevance and reliability – of the principles that
9 underlie a proposed submission.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95. The Court’s “focus” thus “must
10 be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595.

11
12 Such focus entails an “assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying”
13 the expert witness testimony is “valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly
14 can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. In addition to the four factors
15 identified by the Supreme Court in Daubert, another “very significant” factor to be considered is
16 whether the proffered expert witness developed his or her opinion “expressly for the purpose of
17 testifying.” Cabrera, 134 F.3d at 1422 (citation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has described it:
18

19
20 One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are
21 proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of
22 research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
23 have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. That an
24 expert testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of
25 his testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary
gesture. But in determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to
good science [or meets the similar standard employed in the area of
specialized knowledge or expertise of the proposed expert], we may not
ignore the fact that a scientist’s [or other technical or specialized expert’s]

26 ¹² “Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and ‘a known [theory or methodology] which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community’ . . . may properly be viewed with skepticism.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (internal citation omitted).

1 normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the courtroom or the lawyer's
2 office.

3 That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted independent of
4 the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research comports
5 with the dictates of good science [or meets the similar standard employed in
6 the area of specialized knowledge or expertise of the expert] For one
7 thing, experts whose findings flow from existing research are less likely to
8 have been biased toward a particular conclusion by the promise of
9 remuneration; when an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired
10 as a witness, that record will limit the degree to which he can tailor his
11 testimony to serve a party's interests. Then, too, independent research carries
12 its own indicia of reliability, as it is conducted, so to speak, in the usual course
13 of business and must normally satisfy a variety of standards to attract funding
14 and institutional support. . . . That the testimony proffered by an expert is
15 based directly on legitimate, preexisting research unrelated to the litigation
16 provides the most persuasive basis for concluding that the opinions he
17 expresses were "derived by the scientific method [or other method generally
18 accepted in the particular area of specialized knowledge or expertise]."

19 Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 (internal footnote and citation omitted).

20 B. Dr. Milyo's Opinions Do Not Satisfy the Relevancy and Reliability Requirements
21 Mandated by *Daubert* and Fed. R. Evid. 702

22 In regard to the opinions provided by Dr. Milyo in his declaration and report, the Court
23 finds they do not meet the relevancy and reliability requirements mandated by Fed. R. Evid. 702
24 and the Supreme Court in Daubert. First, Dr. Milyo himself admits that none of the empirical
25 research he conducted prior to this litigation involved Washington's laws governing grassroots
26 lobbying or RCW Chapter 42.17 in general. See ECF #22, Milyo Declaration, ¶¶ 14, 74, and
Milyo Report, p. 14. Indeed, grassroots lobbying and the impact of public disclosure thereon –
even in a general sense – was not a subject of Dr. Milyo's research, but rather that subject was
the ability of citizen groups to comply with state disclosure forms from other states concerning
the ability to engage in ballot measure campaigns. See id.; ECF #27-2, Deposition of Jeffrey
Milyo ("Milyo Deposition"), pp. 168-69. Dr. Milyo asserts his earlier research is relevant,
because the states in which he conducted his research, as in Washington, require registration,

1 contribution itemization and reporting of expenditures. See ECF #22, Milyo Declaration, ¶¶ 14,
2 74, and Milyo Report, p. 14.

3 The mere fact that other states require registration, itemization and expenditure reporting
4 as well, however, hardly constitutes the type of link to the particular facts of this case required by
5 Daubert. Indeed, Dr. Milyo utterly fails to show that the laws in the other states he researched
6 are the same as the disclosure laws at issue here, let alone that they have been implemented and
7 enforced in the same way as RCW Chapter 42.17 is by the PDC.¹³ The Court thus finds that
8 without more – indeed, anything – in the way of evidence connecting that research to the specific
9 facts of this case, it has no relevance. That is, his research is entirely unhelpful in understanding
10 or determining the pertinent issues currently before the Court, let alone “logically advancing” a
11 material aspect of plaintiffs’ case.
12

13 Reliability is lacking here as well. First, it is not at all clear that Dr. Milyo’s research has
14 been subject to “peer review” as that term is generally understood, but rather it seems not to have
15 undergone that type of academic scrutiny.¹⁴ IJ also paid Dr. Milyo \$2,500 for the report that he
16

17
18 ¹³ Even on the issue of the impact of public disclosure laws on grassroots lobbying without regard to any differences
19 among the various states, for example, Dr. Milyo did not separate out data on such laws from data concerning laws
20 governing public disclosure of campaign finance or lobbying in general. See ECF #27-2, Milyo Deposition, pp. 128,
21 133. Dr. Milyo also did not conduct any research regarding the historical development, legal interpretation,
22 application or implementation of Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying specifically, or of the particular
23 grassroots lobbying registration and reporting forms used in Washington. See id. at pp. 131-35, 156-57, 166, 175-76,
24 179-80, 184, 188. Nor does Dr. Milyo know anything about either plaintiff in this case or their interactions or
25 dealings with the PDC or their obligations under those specific laws. See id. at 135-37. Further, Dr. Milyo admits
26 that in regard to the appropriateness of extrapolating the information he obtained from researching other states to the
specific laws at issue in this case, and that were not themselves the subject of that research, “[t]here is always a
concern of external validity with experiments and the lessons drawn from them.” Id. at 186. Although Dr. Milyo
later testified that it is appropriate to make such extrapolations in the social science context (see id. at 194), it is not
at all clear what level of external validity or lack thereof is deemed acceptable when doing so.

¹⁴ For example, Dr. Milyo distinguishes “peer review” from peer “refereed”, the latter of which is “usually used in
the context of academic articles” and “at some of the most prominent academic journals.” ECF #27-1, Milyo
Deposition, p. 26. “Peer review” as that term is used by Dr. Milyo, is “a process less formal than . . . a double blind
submission to arm’s length reviewers in the profession.” Id. There is no indication in the record that Dr. Milyo has
subjected the research he conducted to the type of peer “refereeing” he distinguishes here, and which appears to be
much more in line with the type of “peer review” the Supreme Court had in mind in Daubert. Indeed, the results of

1 produced for this litigation.¹⁵ See Milyo Declaration, ¶ 2. In addition, on the same day plaintiffs’
2 civil rights complaint was filed with this Court, another “policy report” Dr. Milyo prepared for
3 IJ, titled *Mowing Down the Grassroots: How Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Laws Suppress*
4 *Political Participation*, was “publicly issued” by IJ. ECF #31-1, Defendants’ First Set of
5 Requests for Admission Nos. 47-49. IJ paid Dr. Milyo for preparing that report as well. See *id.*
6 at No. 49. At the time Dr. Milyo was working on that latter report, furthermore, he was aware
7 that IJ was engaged in “what some groups call strategic research,” i.e., research to help “support
8 future litigation.” ECF #27-1, Milyo Deposition, pp. 30-31.

10 Accordingly, it appears not only was Dr. Milyo paid for preparing a non-peer reviewed
11 report for the purpose of aiding this litigation – as well as for the earlier research he conducted
12 underlying that report – but he was involved in preparing, again for payment, similar research of
13 an apparent “strategic” nature issued contemporaneously with the filing of this lawsuit,¹⁶ which
14 clearly does not enhance the reliability of Dr. Milyo’s opinions. It also is far from clear that Dr.
15 Milyo’s opinions enjoy “general acceptance within” his academic discipline. For example, Dr.
16 Milyo uses the term “grass roots issue advocacy” instead of “grass roots lobbying,” claiming the
17 former term is a more accurate description of the type of activity contemplated by the latter term.
18

20 that research were “described in a *Campaign Finance Red Tape: Strangling Free Speech and Political Debate*,
21 which was published by [IJ] in 2007,” and which Mr. Milyo lists as a “policy report” in his curriculum vitae. ECF
22 #22, Milyo Report, p. 14 and Exhibit B. Dr. Milyo himself segregates such policy reports from the type of peer
23 “refereed academic articles” just discussed. ECF #27-1, Milyo Deposition, pp. 27-28.

24 ¹⁵ It seems Dr. Milyo also was paid \$30,000 for the research results that were published by IJ in 2007. See ECF #27-
25 1, Milyo Deposition, pp. 103-06. In addition, Dr. Milyo would have been paid \$250 per hour for “any subsequent
26 testimony” he provided in this case. Milyo Declaration, ¶ 2.

¹⁶ Also sometime in 2010, Dr. Milyo prepared yet another “policy report” titled *Keep Out: How State Campaign
Finance Laws Erect Barriers to Entry for Political Entrepreneurs*, which once more was published by IJ, and with
respect to which again Dr. Milyo appears to have been funded by IJ. See ECF #22, Milyo Report, Exhibit B; ECF
#27-1, pp. 111-12. There is evidence as well that payment for this report instead may have come from The Charles
Koch Foundation, which apparently provided the “seed funding” for IJ. See ECF #27-1, Milyo Deposition, p. 112;
2001: A Freedom Odyssey, Chip Miller and Clint Bolick, available at <http://www.ij.org/component/content/article/42-liberty/1686-2001-a-freedom-odyssey>.

1 See, e.g., ECF #22, Milyo Declaration, ¶¶ 4-6, 27-36, 40-41.

2 Dr. Milyo admits, though, that “grass roots issue advocacy” is a term he himself came up
3 with, and that he has not seen that term used by anyone else. See ECF #27-2, Milyo Deposition,
4 pp. 143-45. In addition, there is some indication in the record that in supporting the opinions
5 contained in his declaration and report, Dr. Milyo may have relied as much on what he terms
6 “common sense,” the “general sense” of a term used or the “logical implication” of regulation of
7 grassroots lobbying by the state, as he may have on scholarly or academic research conducted in
8 a manner generally accepted in his field. See id. at p. 155, 164-65, 178, 187. Dr. Milyo makes
9 other assertions in his report as well, which appear not to be supported either by his own or such
10 other research. See id. at pp. 176-78.

12 Admission of Dr. Milyo’s declaration and report is inappropriate for another important
13 reason. While “expert testimony that is ‘otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
14 embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,’” that witness may not provide an
15 opinion as to a “*legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.*” Mukhtar, 299
16 F.3d at 1065, n.10 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (emphasis in original); see also McHugh v.
17 United Serv Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 454 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d
18 97, 101 (2nd Cir. 1994) (“When an expert undertakes to tell the [trier of fact] what result to
19 reach, this does not *aid* the [trier of fact] in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute
20 the expert’s judgment for the [trier of fact’s].”) (emphasis in original). In other words, such legal
21 conclusions are the province of the Court, not the expert witness.

23 As the Ninth Circuit has noted:

24 It is well settled that the judge instructs the jury in the law. Experts “interpret
25 and analyze factual evidence. They do not testify about the law because the
26 judge’s special legal knowledge is presumed to be sufficient, and it is the
judge’s duty to inform the jury about the law that is relevant to their

1 deliberations.”

2 United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 1999), *as amended* (citations omitted); see
3 also Aguilar v. International Longshoremen’s Union, 966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992) (matters
4 of law are for court’s determination, not that of expert witness); Marx & Co. v. Diners’ Club,
5 Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509-10 (2nd cir. 1977) (expert testimony consisting of legal conclusions is
6 inadmissible); Bonn v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 838 (9th Cir. 1995) (because Fed. R. Evid. 702
7 permits expert testimony if it will assist trier of fact, and because district court is qualified to
8 assess likely responses of jury to evidence and understand legal analysis required in that case,
9 there was no abuse of discretion in district court concluding juror psychology expert would not
10 be helpful). Here, by concluding Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying are vague
11 and overbroad, and thereby chill protected First Amendment speech, Dr. Milyo’s declaration and
12 report impermissibly offers legal conclusions that more appropriately come within the province
13 of this Court. See Milyo Declaration, ¶¶ 52, 91-92, Exhibit A. Thus, for all of the above reasons,
14 the Court finds that Dr. Milyo’s declaration and report should be excluded from consideration in
15 this case, because they fail to meet the relevance and reliability requirements of Daubert and Fed.
16 R. Evid. 702, and because they improperly contain legal conclusions.

17
18
19 C. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 12 Constitutes Neither Relevant Evidence Nor Admissible
20 Expert Witness Testimony

21 As for the article attached to plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion as Exhibit 12, titled
22 *Mandatory Disclosure for Ballot-Initiative Campaigns*, this too the Court finds should be
23 excluded from consideration. Defendants argue this article should be excluded on the basis that
24 it is not evidence. The Court agrees. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining
25 evidence as being “[s]omething . . . that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged
26 fact.”). Certainly, the article is not relevant evidence, as it does not “make the existence of any

1 fact that is of consequence to the determination of th[is] action more probable or less probable
2 than it would be without the evidence,” particularly since it does not concern the subject of this
3 lawsuit, namely Washington’s laws governing grassroots lobbying. Fed. R. Evid. 401; see also
4 Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”).¹⁷

5 III. Plaintiffs Lack Standing

6 A. Article III’s Case and Controversy Requirement

7
8 “[T]he Constitution mandates that prior to [the Court’s] exercise of jurisdiction there
9 exist a constitutional ‘case or controversy,’ that the issues presented [to the Court] are ‘definite
10 and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.’” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Thomas v.
11 Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (*en banc*) (quoting Ry.
12 Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945))); see also Arizona Right to Life Political Action
13 Committee v. Bayless (“ARLPAC”), 320 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Article III [of
14 the United States Constitution], a federal court only has jurisdiction to hear claims that present an
15 actual ‘case or controversy.’”) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). As such,
16 “before reaching the merits of” plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the Court “must determine
17 whether [those claims are] justiciable.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1000; see also American Civil
18 Liberties Union of Nevada v. Lomax, 471 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006) (although neither
19 party raised justiciability issue of standing, court had “an ‘independent obligation’ to consider
20 [it] *sua sponte*.”) (citations omitted).

21
22
23 While standing is determined by the facts in existence at the time the complaint is filed,

24
25 ¹⁷ In addition, while the Court is not treating that article as expert witness evidence or reviewing its admissibility in
26 terms of the Daubert or Fed. R. Evid. 702 requirements, it should be noted that the article suffers from many of the
same infirmities that Dr. Milyo’s declaration and report do. For example, the article was written by an IJ employee
(indeed, IJ’s “Director for Strategic Research”). See ECF #31-1, Defendants’ First Set of Requests for Admissions,
No. 50. Nor is it clear that the article has been subject to appropriate peer review.

1 “Article III’s ‘case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial
2 proceedings,’” and therefore “[i]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit
3 was filed.” Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 461
4 (2007) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)); Lomax, 471 F.3d
5 at 1015. Thus, at the outset, plaintiffs “must establish standing to sue” to satisfy the case or
6 controversy requirement. Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1000. That is, they must show they have
7 “suffered a constitutionally cognizable injury-in-fact,” or, in other words, “some threatened or
8 actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.” California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.
9 Getman (“CPLC-I”), 328 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Human Life, 624 F.3d at
10 1000; 4805 Convoy, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 183 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
11 Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988)); Doucette v. City of
12 Santa Monica, 955 F.Supp. 1192, 1198-99 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (party that fails to meet Article III
13 requirements may not litigate in federal courts) (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
14 Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1982)).

17 “To meet this requirement,” though, “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” 4805 Convoy, Inc.,
18 183 F.3d at 1111. Instead, plaintiffs must show they have sustained or they are “immediately in
19 danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the
20 injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at
21 1111-1112; see also ARLPAC, 320 F.3d at 1006 (there must be “a realistic danger of sustaining
22 a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.”) (quoting Babbitt v. United
23 Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). Further, in the “context of injunctive and
24 declaratory relief,” plaintiffs must show they have suffered or are threatened with “a ‘concrete
25 and particularized’ legal harm, . . . coupled with ‘a sufficient likelihood that [they] will again be
26

1 wronged in a similar way.” Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002)
2 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), and City of Los Angeles v.
3 Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).

4 On the other hand, “[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury
5 to obtain preventive relief.” ARLPAC, 320 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorg. Act Cases,
6 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974)). Instead:

7
8 . . . [I]t is “sufficient for standing purposes that the plaintiff intends to
9 engage in ‘a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest’
and that there is a credible threat that the challenged provision will be invoked
against the plaintiff.”

10
11 Id. (quoting LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Babbitt, 442
12 U.S. at 298); see also Canatella, 304 F.3d at 852. But because the Court’s role is not to “issue
13 advisory opinions” or to “declare rights in hypothetical cases,” the case or controversy
14 requirement also necessitates that constitutional claims “be ripe for review.” Human Life, 624
15 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138).¹⁸ “[A] case is not ripe where the existence of
16 the dispute itself hangs on future contingencies that may or may not occur.” Porter v. Jones, 319
17 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Court, more specifically, is to determine
18 “the ripeness of a [constitutional] claim by asking whether the issues are fit for judicial decision
19

20
21 ¹⁸ In reality, though, ripeness frequently “coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong,” and indeed,
“[s]orting out where standing ends and ripeness begins is not an easy task” (CPLC-I, 328 F.3d 1094 and n.2 (quoting
Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138)):

22 We have noted that “the ripeness inquiry contains both a constitutional and a prudential
23 component,” [Thomas], 220 F.3d at 1138] (quoting Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995
24 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993)), and that the constitutional component of ripeness is
25 synonymous with the injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry. *See id.* Because most of the
26 case law analyzes the constitutional component of ripeness under the “standing” framework,
we analyze justiciability in this case [framed as an issue of ripeness by both the district court
and the parties] as a standing concern. Regardless of how we characterize our discussion, the
inquiry is the same: we ask whether there exists a constitutional “case or controversy” and
whether “the issues presented are ‘definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.’” *Id.* at
1139 (quoting Corsi, 326 U.S. at 93)).

Id.

1 and whether the parties will suffer hardship if [the Court] decline[s] to consider the issues.”
2 Canatella, 304 F.3d at 854. “In the context of pre-enforcement constitutional challenges,”
3 furthermore, where the party making the challenge “has not yet been penalized for violating the
4 challenged statute, . . . ‘neither the mere existence of a prescriptive statute nor a generalized
5 threat of prosecution satisfies’ the case or controversy requirement.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at
6 1000 (quoting Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139).

7
8 Additionally, in general plaintiffs “must assert [their] own legal rights and interests, and
9 cannot rest [their] claim[s] to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” 4805 Convoy,
10 Inc., 183 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
11 U.S. 947, 955 (1984)); see also Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 955 (requirement that only
12 one’s own legal rights and interests may be asserted described as “prudential considerations that
13 limit the challenges courts are willing to hear,” which are “[i]n addition to the limitations on
14 standing imposed by Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement”). Accordingly, “the federal
15 courts have supplemented this requirement of ‘constitutional standing’ [under Article III], with
16 the doctrine of ‘prudential standing,’ which requires [courts] to ask whether [plaintiffs’] claim is
17 sufficiently individualized to ensure effective judicial review.” Get Outdoors II, LLC v. City of
18 San Diego, California (“Get Outdoors II”), 506 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We employ the
19 prudential standing doctrine to avoid usurping the legislature’s role as policymaking body in our
20 separation of powers [framework].”).

21
22
23 Further, in addition to demonstrating “an injury-in-fact,” the “irreducible constitutional
24 minimum of standing” requires plaintiffs to establish both “causation” and “a likelihood that the
25 injury will be redressed by a decision in” their favor. Get Outdoors II, 506 F.3d at 891 (citing
26 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at 1093

1 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61); see also Canatella, 304 F.3d at 852 (plaintiff generally
2 demonstrates standing by showing injury in fact traceable to challenged action and redressable
3 by favorable decision).¹⁹ However, as noted above, “neither the mere existence of a proscriptive
4 statute nor a generalized threat of prosecution” is sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy
5 requirement. CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139). “Rather, a plaintiff
6 must face a ‘genuine threat of imminent prosecution.’” Id. “In evaluating the genuineness of a
7 claimed threat of prosecution,” the following factors are considered: (1) whether plaintiffs “have
8 articulated a ‘concrete plan’ to violate the law in question”; (2) “whether the prosecuting
9 authorities have communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings”; and (3) “the
10 history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute.” Id.

11
12 Lastly, Article III’s case or controversy requirement also may implicate the mootness
13 doctrine. “Whereas standing is evaluated by the facts that existed when the complaint was filed,
14 ‘[m]ootness inquiries . . . require courts to look to changing circumstances that arise after the
15 complaint is filed.’” Lomax, 471 F.3d at 1016 (citations omitted); see also City of Erie v. Pap’s
16 A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (if “live” controversy no longer exists, claim is moot). Thus,
17 “[t]he question of mootness focuses upon whether [the Court] can still grant relief between the
18 parties.” Lomax, 471 F.3d at 1016-17 (quoting Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d
19 990, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). There is a recognized exception to the mootness doctrine,
20 though, where a claim has been found to be “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. at
21 1017 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978)). This exception
22 “applies when (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to allow full litigation before it
23
24

25 ¹⁹ “In determining redressability, courts ‘assume that plaintiff’s claim has merit.’” Lomax, 471 F.3d at 1015 (quoting
26 Bonnischsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The question in deciding whether a plaintiff’s
injury is redressable is not whether a *favorable decision* is likely but whether a favorable decision *likely will redress*
a plaintiff’s injury.”)) (emphasis in original).

1 ceases, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will again be subject to the
2 same action.” Id. (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 774); see also Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551
3 U.S. at 462.

4 As for the first of the above two elements, “a challenged action evades review if it is
5 ‘almost certain to run its course before [the Court] can give the case full consideration.’” Lomax,
6 471 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th cir.
7 1994)). “The second prong of the ‘capable of repetition’ exception” requires that there be a
8 “reasonable expectation” or “demonstrated probability” that “the same controversy will recur
9 involving the same complaining party.” Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 463 (quoting
10 Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (“Our cases find the same controversy sufficiently
11 likely to recur when a party has a reasonable expectation that it ‘will again be subjected to the
12 alleged illegality,’ . . . or ‘will be subject to the threat of prosecution’ under the challenged
13 law.”) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109 and Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 774-775)); see also Lomax, 471
14 F.3d at 1018 (challenging party must show it is reasonable to expect action by challenged party
15 “will once again give rise to the assertedly moot dispute”) (citation omitted).

18 B. Standing in the First Amendment Context

19 “[I]n recognition that that Amendment ‘needs breathing space,’ the Supreme Court has
20 relaxed the prudential requirement of standing in the First Amendment context.” Canatella, 304
21 F.3d at 853 (quoting and citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973), and Joseph
22 H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 947-56). Under the “overbreadth” doctrine, “an overly broad statute
23 or regulation” may be challenged “by showing that it may inhibit the First Amendment rights of
24 individuals who are not before the court.” 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1112. This doctrine
25 “is based on the observation that ‘the very existence of some broadly written laws has the
26

1 potential to chill the expressive activity of others not before the court.” Id. (quoting Forsyth
2 County v. Natioanlist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992)), and citing Lind v. Grimmer, 30
3 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 1994) (doctrine designed to avert potential chilling effect on speech).

4 As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

5 . . . [S]tanding arises “not because [the plaintiff]’s own rights of free
6 expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that
7 the [challenged statute]’s very existence may cause others not before the court
8 to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” . . .

9 Canatella, 304 F.3d at 853. (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612).

10 The overbreadth doctrine thus “serves to overcome what would otherwise be a plaintiff’s
11 lack of standing.” 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1112 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, in
12 determining whether overbreadth standing exists, the issue of whether the plaintiff “satisfies the
13 requirement of ‘injury-in-fact’” remains “the crucial issue.” Id. (quoting Joseph H. Munson, Co.,
14 467 U.S. at 958). As such, “to demonstrate standing for an overbreadth claim,” a plaintiff must
15 show “he [or she] and others in his [or her] position face *a credible threat* of discipline under the
16 challenged statutes, and may consequently forego their expressive rights under the First
17 Amendment.” Canatella, 304 F.3d at 854 (since plaintiff alleged “*concrete and particularized*
18 *harms* to his First Amendment rights,” and had demonstrated “a sufficient likelihood that he and
19 others may face similar harm in the future,” this showing was deemed to be “enough to satisfy
20 the prudential requirements of standing for a First Amendment overbreadth claim.”) (emphasis
21 added). As the Ninth Circuit has further explained:

22 [The] slender [overbreadth] exception to the prudential limits on standing . . .
23 does not affect the rigid constitutional requirement that plaintiffs must
24 demonstrate an injury in fact to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction. Rather,
25 the exception only allows those who have suffered some cognizable injury,
26 but whose conduct is not protected under the First Amendment, to assert the
constitutional rights of others.

1 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1112 (citation omitted); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
2 809, 816-17 (1975) (plaintiff “must present more than allegations of a subjective chill,” rather
3 “[t]here must be a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm”)
4 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)). Accordingly, the requirement remains that
5 “[t]he potential plaintiff . . . have ‘an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced
6 against [him or her].’” CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at 1095 (quoting American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc.,
7 484 U.S. at 393); see also Get Outdoors II, 506 F.3d at 891 (plaintiff still required to show injury
8 in fact when raising claim of overbreadth); ARLPAC, 320 F.3d at 1006.

9
10 “Without this bare minimum of standing, the overbreadth exception would nullify the
11 notion of standing generally in First Amendment litigation.” Get Outdoors II, 506 F.3d at 891;
12 see also Doucette, 955 F.Supp. at 1199 (even plaintiff bringing facial challenge on First
13 Amendment overbreadth grounds has standing only if he or she is able to establish some actual
14 or threatened injury to himself or herself). As one district court has succinctly described what
15 must be shown here:
16

17 Where a plaintiff argues that he is harmed by the chilling of his speech, he
18 is still “required to show that he is seriously interested in subjecting himself
19 to, and the defendant seriously intent on enforcing, the challenged measure.”
20 NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1351 (9th Cir.1984). As a result,
21 “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim
22 of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.” Laird v.
23 Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2325-26, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972).
24 “Rather, to establish standing in this manner, a plaintiff must proffer some
25 objective evidence to substantiate his claim that the challenged [statutory
26 provision] has deterred him from engaging in protected activity.” Bordell[v.
General Elec. Co.], 922 F.2d [1057,] 1061 [(2nd Cir. 1991)]. The question is
how likely it is that the government will attempt to use the challenged
provisions against the plaintiff, not merely how much the prospect of
enforcement worries the plaintiff. See American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956
F.2d 1178, 1193 (D.C.Cir.1992).

Doucette, 955 F.Supp. at 1199-1200. However, where the plaintiff fails “to allege even a desire

1 to engage in [protected] conduct or speech,” that party “lacks standing even if he [or she] alleges
2 that his [or her] speech has been chilled.” Id. at 1200. Important to determining whether the
3 requisite evidentiary showing has been made, therefore, will be the plaintiff’s “history” with the
4 challenged statute or body charged with enforcing it, as well as his or her “continuing activities.”
5 Canatella, 304 F.3d at 854 n.14.

6
7 On the other hand, in terms of the type of injury needed to be shown, “the Supreme Court
8 has endorsed what might be called a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now’ approach rather than
9 requiring litigants to speak first and take their chances with the consequences.” ARLPAC, 320
10 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). “[W]here a plaintiff
11 has refrained from engaging in expressive activity for fear of prosecution under the challenged
12 statute, such self-censorship is a ‘constitutionally sufficient injury’ as long as it is based on ‘an
13 actual and well-founded fear’ that the challenged statute will be enforced.” Human Life, 624
14 F.3d at 1001 (citations omitted); see also ARLPAC, 320 F.3d at 1006 (“[o]ne does not have to
15 await consumption of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief”) (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorg
16 Cases, 419 U.S. at 143). Still, “[t]he self-censorship door to standing does not open for every
17 plaintiff,” and, as noted above, a challenging party will not succeed merely by “nakedly asserting
18 that his or her speech [has been] chilled.” CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at 1095; see also Canatella, 304 F.3d
19 at 854 n.14 (challenged statute’s mere existence is not enough to give rise to injury sufficient for
20 standing purposes).
21

22
23 C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Allege Concrete and Particularized Harms

24 Plaintiffs argue they “unquestionably have standing to present their claims,” because they
25 have “muted their speech, modified the content of their messages, and altered their behavior all
26 in an attempt to avoid triggering [Washington’s] registration and disclosure requirements.” ECF

1 #35, pp. 1-2. They argue “[a]bsent a decision by this Court striking down” those requirements,
2 they “will continue to silence their speech, modify their intended communications, and alter their
3 behavior.” Id. Specifically, in an attempt to avoid “triggering” Washington’s laws governing
4 grassroots lobbying, plaintiffs assert:

- 5 • CE has: changed “the message it communicates to the public”; “stopped
6 urging the public to contact legislators in support of lowering taxes and
7 shrinking the size of government”; ensured “that invited speakers refrain
8 from making a public ‘call to action’ on these and similar state issues”;
9 “refrained from petitioning and lobbying activity as it had previously
10 planned”; “tailored its message to ‘avoid characterizing certain activities
11 as a campaign’”; “slowed its outreach and development plans”; “brought
12 in fewer participants”; “put its formal fundraising plans on hold”; “created
13 spreadsheets to carefully track expenditures made in support of its state
14 activities”; and avoided “spending more than \$500 in a given month to
15 advance its legislative and policy goals”.
- 16 • MCOM has: “changed the message it communicates to the public”;
17 avoided “urging the public to contact legislators in support of eminent
18 domain reform to avoid triggering the definition of ‘lobbying’”;
19 “deliberately ‘ratchet[ed] down’ its activities”; and “looked for ways to
20 ‘fly under the radar or not fall within – or get caught up within’ the
21 requirements of the law[s governing grassroots lobbying].”

22 Id. at pp. 3-4. Plaintiffs also assert that “[a] corporation that had pledged money in support of
23 CE refused to donate after learning that its name, support of CE, and amount of donation might
24 be disclosed to and made public by the PDC,” and that but for Washington’s laws governing
25 grassroots lobbying:

- 26 • MCOM would: (1) “actively distribute fliers, organize community
meetings, and contact government officials in an effort to support reforms
of Washington’s . . . CRL . . . and eminent domain laws and to oppose . . .
TOD . . .”; (2) “not track expenditures made in support of its activities”;
and (3) “spend more than \$500 in a given month to advance its legislative
and policy goals.”

Id. at p. 4. Plaintiffs further assert that it was reasonable for them to modify their activities and
that they have a well-founded fear of being subject to enforcement action by the PDC, given that

1 the PDC has made clear RCW Chapter 42.17 will be enforced if it or any other organization fails
2 to comply with the requirements thereof. Id. at pp. 4-5.

3 The problem for plaintiffs, however, is that they have not presented sufficient objective
4 evidence of the requisite specificity to establish standing in this case. As discussed above, the
5 factors the Court must consider in determining whether the case and controversy requirement has
6 been met include whether the challenging party has “articulated a ‘concrete plan’ to violate the
7 law in question,” as well as “the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged
8 statute.” CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at 1094. Even under the more relaxed standing requirements in the
9 First Amendment context, “concrete and particularized harms” still must be alleged with the
10 requisite specificity. Canatella, 304 F.3d at 853; see also Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 816-17 (claim of
11 specific present objective or future harm must be made); Doucette, 955 F.Supp. at 1199 (plaintiff
12 “still ‘required to show that he is *seriously interested* in subjecting himself to . . . the challenged
13 measure’”) (quoting NAACP, 743 F.2d at 1351) (emphasis added).

14
15
16 Neither MCOM nor CE, however, have shown through their “history” either with RCW
17 Chapter 42.17 or the PDC itself – such as, for example, being subject to enforcement action or
18 prosecution by the PDC under those statutes – through their “continuing activities” or through
19 the articulation of any “concrete plan” to actually violate RCW Chapter 42.17, the type of actual
20 or threatened injury the case and controversy requirement demands. Also as noted above, RCW
21 42.17.200 is concerned solely with grassroots lobbying aimed at affecting state legislation. But
22 neither MCOM nor CE has provided any evidence they have engaged in any actual past activity,
23 are engaging in any current activity or have an articulated, concrete plan to affect such legislation
24 – or are even seriously interested doing so – in the future.

25
26 For example, MCOM has focused on resisting eminent domain efforts at the local level.

1 See ECF #1, ¶¶ 10, 29, 31. Indeed, MCOM itself admits that in the past it has not been required
2 to register and report under RCW 42.17.200, because of its focus on efforts made by the City of
3 Seattle. See id. at ¶ 32. Further, while plaintiffs point to proposed state legislation introduced in
4 the years 2006 through 2009, regarding eminent domain, CRL and TOD as being areas of
5 concern for MCOM, they have not alleged or pointed to any evidence that MCOM actually was
6 engaged in affecting such legislation during this period. See Id. at ¶¶ 33-36. Plaintiffs also claim
7 MCOM “anticipated the need” for and “intended to mobilize grassroots activism” in regard to
8 similar proposed legislation in 2010 – which failed to be enacted, but apparently not because of
9 any efforts on MCOM’s part – but once more cannot point to any evidence of actual mobilization
10 activities on their part. See id. at ¶¶ 37-38.

12 CE’s past and present activities have been and are even less specifically oriented toward
13 affecting past, current or proposed state legislation than those of MCOM. Thus, for example, CE
14 claims it is “dedicated to educating the public about the benefits of lower taxes, less regulation,
15 and smaller government,” and in the past has spoken with elected officials, established a public
16 website and hosted monthly meetings and speakers about “public policy issues.” Id. at ¶¶ 11, 58.
17 No showing has been made, however, as to the extent, if any, such activities have been or are
18 directed toward state – as opposed to federal or local levels of government – the latter two of
19 which clearly are not governed by RCW 42.17.200. In addition, CE admits it has never met that
20 statute’s monetary thresholds triggering coverage thereunder. See id. at ¶ 56.

23 MCOM’s anticipated future activities are similarly devoid of the necessary specificity to
24 reasonably qualify as an articulated, concrete plan to violate RCW 42.17.200. See id. at ¶¶ 40-45.
25 In particular, while MCOM states it anticipates future legislation to be introduced concerning
26 eminent domain, CRL and TOD – and thus “would like to create fliers, organize and hold public

1 meetings, send email blasts, organize trips to [the Washington State capital], speak to the press,
2 and explicitly urge the public to contact their legislators to support” reform in those areas – again
3 they have not identified any particular legislative proposal they are targeting, any actual efforts
4 they have undertaken so far to do so (even ones that may fly under the radar of RCW 42.17.200)
5 or any “concrete” plan in that regard, other than the mere fact that they “would like” to do so.
6 ECF #35, p. 8. Similarly deficient claims of future desired activities are made by CE concerning
7 anticipated “legislation seeking to raise taxes, grow the size of state government, and increase
8 regulatory burdens.”²⁰ Id. at p. 9.

10 Plaintiffs claim that in early 2011, Washington State’s Office of the Attorney General
11 requested the help of MCOM representatives in mobilizing “community support for legislation
12 reforming” the state’s eminent domain laws. ECF #35-2, ¶ 9. But none of the documentary
13 evidence provided by plaintiffs to support this claim actually does so. See ECF #40, Declaration
14 of Jeanette M. Petersen, Email Correspondence Regarding Testimony in Support of Attorney
15 General Eminent Domain Legislation.²¹ To the extent any MCOM representative did participate
16 in efforts to reform state eminent domain legislation, furthermore, such participation appears to
17 have occurred for the most part in early November 2008, and even then largely in the capacity of
18 witnesses testifying in regard to how eminent domain has affected them both as individual home
19 owners and as residents of Seattle.²² See ECF #38, Declaration of Tim Ford, ¶¶ 2-7, 9, 13-14,

22
23 ²⁰ CE also would like to engage in such activities in regard to anticipated legislation “seeking to implement the
24 provisions of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148 (President Obama’s healthcare
25 law),” but clearly this concerns proposed *federal* legislation, and thus does not implicate RCW 42.17.200 or any of
26 Washington’s other laws governing grassroots lobbying. Id. at p. 9.

25 ²¹ See Lujan, 497 at 888 (purpose of summary judgment “is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or
26 answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”).

26 ²² Plaintiffs state that to the extent there remains “a question” as to whether MCOM has standing in this case, they
will amend their complaint to add the names of these representatives in their individual capacities. See ECF #40, p.
4 and n. 1. At this stage in the proceedings, however, plaintiffs may amend their complaint “only with the opposing
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1 Minutes of November 7, 2008 Meeting of Eminent Domain Task Force, pp. 2-3.

2 Citing American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004),
3 plaintiffs argue the level of specificity this Court finds they must show to establish standing is
4 simply not required. Plaintiffs' reliance on Heller, though, is misplaced. Specifically, the Ninth
5 Circuit found the plaintiff in that case had standing to bring its First Amendment overbreadth
6 claim, as the plaintiff's complaint alleged the challenged statute had "already prohibited and
7 continue[d] to restrict" its protected speech, and provided "examples of such restrictions." Id. at
8 983-84 (noting further plaintiff's complaint identified specific proposed legislation it intended to
9 engage in, and produced evidence that one of its members had been "prosecuted for violations"
10 of statute in question). As discussed above, plaintiffs have made no such showing in this case.

11
12 Plaintiffs have not presented the Court with any other Ninth Circuit – or Supreme Court –
13 case holding that it is sufficient to merely allege a general desire or plan to engage in activities
14 that are likely to implicate the challenged statute, without any history of having previously done
15 so, evidence of actually currently doing so or an articulated, concrete plan to do so in the future.
16 Rather, Ninth Circuit case law – including Heller – appears to require the opposite showing. For
17 example, the plaintiff in Human Life "[o]ver the years . . . ha[d] expended considerable time and
18 resources opposing efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide" – which was the subject of the
19 specific ballot initiative it sought to oppose – and had undertaken "plans to solicit funds for and
20 launch a public education campaign" consisting of "three proposed public communications,"
21
22

23 party's written consent or the [C]ourt's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Defendants have not so consented here, and
24 there is no evidence before the Court that defendants in fact would consent to such an amendment. Further, while it
25 is true that leave should be freely given "when justice so requires" – and ignoring the fact that plaintiffs have not
26 properly moved to amend its complaint – the Court finds justice does not require the granting of leave in this case.
First, plaintiffs fail to explain why the above MCOM representatives could not have been added earlier. Second, it
would not be fair to defendants at this late stage of the proceedings to allow such an amendment. Third, and most
importantly, no showing has been made that either of the above MCOM representatives would be any more entitled
to standing in this case than MCOM itself.

1 including distribution of a “solicitation letter” already drafted, targeting of individual voters by
2 telephone using planned scripts (again already written), and the broadcasting of “four proposed
3 scripts for thirty-second radio spots” (once more already planned). 624 F.3d at 995-96. On this
4 basis, the Ninth Circuit found standing existed. See id. at 1000-02 (noting “[the plaintiff was] a
5 politically active organization that ha[d] been heavily involved in public debates about pro-life
6 issues in the past and intend[ed] to undertake future communications like those it wished to make
7 in conjunction with the [specific ballot initiative it sought to oppose]”).

8
9 In Lomax, standing was found to exist where the plaintiffs, in anticipating the upcoming
10 election, had “circulated a petition to place [an initiative] on the ballot,” which they submitted to
11 the state’s Secretary of State for determination as to whether that initiative qualified to be placed
12 on that ballot (which it did not, because it was found to have failed to comply with a state rule on
13 acquiring signatures). 471 F.3d at 1012. While the election had passed by the time the case came
14 before the Ninth Circuit for consideration, plaintiff’s claim challenging that rule was determined
15 to fall within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine, as
16 it was reasonable to expect the plaintiff would again be subject to the above state rule. See id. at
17 1013. Once more, the demonstrated history of violating the particular state law at issue shown in
18 Lomax has not been established by plaintiffs’ in this case.

19
20 As in Human Life, the plaintiff in CPLC-I – which “frequently” took “a position” on state
21 propositions relating to abortion and assisted suicide – was found to have standing to challenge
22 the state’s campaign disclosure laws. 328 F.3d at 1091-95. “Among its many activities,” it was
23 noted that the plaintiff published “voter guides” that reported “the positions of some federal and
24 most statewide candidates on abortion-related topics,” and urged “readers to vote for or against
25 certain ballot initiatives that concern[ed] abortions or related subjects.” Id. at 1092. The plaintiff
26

1 also “introduced evidence . . . that it planned to spend more than” the threshold spending amount
2 in regard to a state initiative on the ballot during the 2000 general election, which would trigger
3 the state reporting and disclosure requirements. Id. at 1092-93.

4 In ARLPAC, the plaintiff – to further its stated mission of educating the public in regard
5 to issues such as abortion and euthanasia – “often [made] independent expenditures to express its
6 support for or opposition to [political] candidates.” 320 F.3d at 1005. While plaintiff had wanted
7 to “disseminate advertising without providing twenty-four hour notice to candidates” as required
8 by the state statute it was challenging, it “provided the [required] notice and delayed its speech
9 both before the September 2000 primary election and subsequent elections.” Id. at 1006. Thus,
10 the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff faced “actual harm” here, although it did not actually violate
11 the statute and had never been subject to penalties for doing so. Id.

13 In Porter, one of the plaintiffs “in anticipation of the November 2000 national presidential
14 election,” created a website that offered “general information about the electoral college, election
15 predictions, and voting,” and it provided “a forum to allow individuals around the country to
16 contact one another and discuss their political beliefs and strategies for the upcoming election.”
17 319 F.3d at 487. The plaintiff soon learned, though, that California’s Secretary of State had sent
18 the founders of another similar website a cease and desist letter, threatening them with criminal
19 prosecution “for allegedly brokering the exchange of votes” in violation of state law. Id. at 487-
20 88. Although he himself had not received such a letter, because the plaintiff was “deeply afraid”
21 of being similarly prosecuted, he suspended the operation of his own website. Id. at 488. Since
22 the plaintiff had “expressed his intent to create a similar website in future presidential elections,”
23 other plaintiffs were likely to use that website and there was no indication the Secretary of State
24 would not enforce the election laws against him, plaintiffs’ challenge to those laws were ripe, as
25
26

1 well as capable of repetition, yet evading review. Id. at 488-90.

2 Finally, in Canatella, while not involving a campaign or lobbying disclosure challenge, as
3 noted above, the Ninth Circuit expressly noted that it was the plaintiff’s “history” of disciplinary
4 proceedings before the California State Bar and “his continuing activities as a zealous advocate,”
5 as well as the nature of his challenge to the Bar’s statutes and rules of professional conduct, that
6 led it “to conclude the requirements of standing” had been met. 304 F.3d at 854 n. 14. All of the
7 cases just discussed thus make clear that at least some objective showing of having engaged in,
8 of presently engaging in or of an articulated, concrete plan to engage in the type of activity that is
9 the object of the challenged statute is required to establish standing, even under the more relaxed
10 standards for First Amendment claims. As explained above, such a showing is simply absent in
11 this case. Having so determined, the Court nevertheless shall go on to address in the alternative
12 plaintiffs’ constitutional claims on their merits.
13

14
15 IV. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims Are Without Merit

16 A. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Constitutional Harms

17 Plaintiffs allege the registration and reporting requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200
18 burden their free speech, in that they are “expensive, complex, and time-consuming” and as such,
19 “interfere with, and chill [their] ability to . . . engage in [anonymous] political speech.” ECF #1,
20 ¶ 82. Plaintiffs further allege those requirements violate their First Amendment “to associate
21 with, and have individuals contribute to, their causes,” as well as the right of association of “any
22 potential donors or volunteers who wish to support” those causes. Id. at ¶¶ 84, 86. In addition,
23 plaintiffs claim the “dissemination of the information contained in [the reports they are required
24 to file with the PDC], create the reasonable probability that [their] respective members will face
25 threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names, addresses, and occupations were disclosed.” Id. at
26

1 ¶ 85. Plaintiffs also claim the efforts they have made or anticipate having to make to avoid the
2 registration and reporting requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200 – such as limiting their
3 expenditures and changing their communications content – interfere with their right to exercise
4 their “unfettered ability to craft their message.” Id. at ¶ 87; ECF #35, pp. 2-4.

5
6 Plaintiffs, furthermore, allege the exemption of “media entities” and public officials in
7 RCW 42.17.160 from the registration and reporting requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200,
8 “discriminates against those citizens who do not fall into those categories and deprives” plaintiffs
9 and others “of the equal protection of the laws.”²³ ECF #1, ¶ 88. Plaintiffs allege as well those
10 same registration and reporting requirements, and “the interaction” thereof with the exemptions
11 contained in RCW 42.17.160, “result in regulations that are vague, overbroad, and deprive” them
12 “of their right to receive fair notice of what the law requires.” Id. at ¶ 89. They claim the PDC’s
13 “procedures for obtaining a formal declaration of the application of [RCW 42.17.200 and RCW
14 42.17.160] are lengthy and complex and do not allow [them] and others to receive a definitive
15 statement regarding the application of such laws in a timely manner.” Id. at ¶ 90.

16
17 Plaintiffs assert “[t]his lack of clarity also leaves [them] and others at risk of arbitrary and
18 *ad hoc* enforcement of” the above laws. Id. at ¶ 91. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the manuals the
19 PDC publishes to give citizens guidance in complying with Washington’s lobbying registration
20 and reporting requirements are lengthy, and fail to provide definitive answers, thereby requiring
21 further consultation of the applicable state laws and rules themselves (which plaintiffs also claim
22 are overly lengthy) See ECF #22, p. 6. Plaintiffs assert they have struggled with the complexity
23 of RCW Chapter 42.17, and have “serious concerns” regarding their ability to comply with RCW
24

25
26 ²³ As noted by defendants, plaintiffs further allege in their motion for summary judgment that the exemption RCW
42.17.160(5) gives to those “who restrict their lobbying activities to no more than four days or parts thereof during
any three-month period” deprives them and others of the equal protection of the laws as well. ECF #22, pp. 22-23.

1 42.17.200, the biggest of which concerns how “small community groups” such as themselves
2 should “keep track of and report amounts spent in connection with their varied activities.” Id. at
3 pp. 7-8. Lastly, plaintiffs allege they “face a credible threat of prosecution” if, as they intend,
4 they make expenditures in excess of the amounts set forth in RCW 42.17.200, and they do not
5 register with the PDC. Id. at ¶ 92.

6
7 B. Facial Versus As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

8 There are two types of constitutional challenges a party may make regarding a contested
9 statute, and which plaintiffs, as noted above, have presented in this case. First, a statute may be
10 challenged “as applied.” 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1111 n.3. “This type of challenge
11 contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s particular expressive
12 activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application to others.” Id. “[A] successful
13 ‘as-applied’ challenge,” therefore, “does not invalidate the law itself, but only the particular
14 application of that law.” Id. “As-applied” challenges are the norm due to the “general rule” that
15 an individual “who has engaged in activity that is not constitutionally protected cannot complain
16 that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to others.” Doucette, 955 F.Supp. at 1199 n.1 (citing
17 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)).
18

19 By contrast, a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute “does not depend
20 upon whether [the challenging party’s] own activity is shown to be constitutionally privileged.”
21 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 815. Such a challenge thus does not require the party “making the attack”
22 to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her. Id. at 815-16; see also
23 Doucette, 955 F.Supp. at 1199 n.1. However, “a plaintiff whose conduct *is* protected may also
24 bring a facial challenge to a statute that he [or she] contends is unconstitutional, . . . by arguing
25 that the statute could never be applied in a valid manner and would chill the speech of others.”
26

1 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1112 n.4 (emphasis in original). As noted above, “a ‘facial’
2 challenge is generally rejected for prudential reasons,” although the “‘ordinary reluctance to
3 entertain [one] is somewhat diminished in the First Amendment context’ because of the ‘concern
4 that those who desire to engage in legally protected expression may refrain from doing so rather
5 than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared . . . invalid.” Doucette, 955 F.Supp.
6 at 1199 n.1 (quoting Roulett v. City of Seattle, 78 F.3d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1996)).

7
8 “A successful challenge to the facial constitutionality of a law invalidates the law itself.”
9 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1111 (citation omitted). “Thus, facial challenges ‘are allowed
10 not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society – to prevent the statute
11 from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.’” Id. at 1111
12 (quoting Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984)).
13 “Declaring a statute facially unconstitutional,” however, “‘is, manifestly, strong medicine,’ and
14 ‘has been employed by the [Supreme] Court sparingly and only as a last resort.’” Bigelow, 421
15 U.S. at 817 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).

16
17 “A facial challenge to a [statute] is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
18 since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [it] would be
19 valid,” i.e., “that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Washington State Grange
20 v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (facial challenge must fail
21 where statute has “plainly legitimate sweep.”) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
22 739-40 (1997)); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (fact that statute “might
23 operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render
24 it wholly invalid, since [the Supreme Court has] not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside
25 the limited context of the First Amendment.”). This is “a high burden of proof” for a plaintiff to
26

1 meet. S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2001).

2 As the Supreme Court has further explained:

3 . . . In determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be
4 careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about
5 “hypothetical” or “imaginary” cases. *See . . . Raines*, 362 U.S. [at] 22 . . .
6 Exercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge “frees the Court not only
7 from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from
8 premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional
9 application might be cloudy.” *Raines, supra* at 22 . . .

10 Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial
11 invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of
12 “premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones
13 records.” *Sabri v. United States*, 541 U.S. 600, 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158
14 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Facial
15 challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint
16 that courts should neither “ ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in
17 advance of the necessity of deciding it’ ” nor “ ‘formulate a rule of
18 constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
19 be applied.’ ” *Ashwander v. TVA*, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed.
20 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting *Liverpool, New York &*
21 *Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration*, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5
22 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885)). Finally, facial challenges threaten to short
23 circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the
24 people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
25 We must keep in mind that “ ‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the
26 intent of the elected representatives of the people.’ ” *Ayotte v. Planned*
Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329, 126 S.Ct. 961, 163
L.Ed.2d 812 (2006) (quoting *Regan v. Time, Inc.*, 468 U.S. 641, 652, 104
S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (plurality opinion)). . . .

20 Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449-51; see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
21 625 (rejecting facial challenge because challenging parties’ predictions of unconstitutionality had
22 amounted to “[h]ypothetical borderline situations,” finding “too remote” possibility others will
23 engage in self-censorship); Florida League of Professional Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 460
24 (11th Cir. 1996). “It is with these principles in view that” the Court must consider the facial
25 challenges presented by plaintiffs. Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 451. But as explained
26 in greater detail below, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Washington’s laws governing

1 grassroots lobbying, including RCW 42.17.200 and RCW 42.17.160, are unconstitutional, either
2 as applied to them or on their face.

3 C. The Right to Engage in Anonymous or Political Speech and the Right of
4 Association Have Not Been Unduly Burdened

5 As indicated above, plaintiffs claim RCW 42.17.200 and the PDC’s regulations on their
6 face and as applied to them prohibit – or at least chill and/or severely burden – their ability and
7 that of others to engage in political speech, both anonymous and otherwise, and to associate. See
8 ECF #1, ¶¶ 99-100, 102, 108, 110. Plaintiffs claim RCW 42.17.200 and the PDC’s regulations
9 “create the reasonable probability that [their] respective members, supporters and contributors,
10 and their potential members, supporters and contributors, will face threats, harassment, or
11 reprisals if their names, addresses, and occupations were disclosed.” Id. at 101. In addition,
12 plaintiffs allege RCW 42.17.200 and the PDC’s regulations impose “onerous, expensive, time-
13 consuming, and complex” requirements that are “in excess relative to” and are “not supported”
14 by a “compelling, important, substantial or even legitimate state interest,” and that are “not
15 sufficiently tailored to support any such interest.” Id. at ¶¶ 103, 106, 112.

17 1. The Right to Engage in Political and Anonymous Speech and the Right of
18 Association under the First Amendment

19 “The First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting laws ‘abridging the freedom of
20 speech.’” Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach (“Long Beach”), 574 F.3d
21 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I); see also Speechnow.org v. Federal
22 Election Commission (“Speechnow”), 599 F.3d 686, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2010). That Amendment “is
23 applicable to the States through the Fourteenth [Amendment].” First National Bank of Boston v.
24 Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978); see also Long Beach, 574 F.3d at 1021. In addition, “certain
25 types of speech enjoy special status.” Long Beach, 574 F.3d at 1021. For example, “[p]olitical
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1 speech is core First Amendment speech,” that has been deemed “critical to the functioning of our
2 democratic system.” Id.

3 In terms of free speech and anonymity, the Supreme Court has held in the literary context
4 that the decision of an author “to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech
5 protected by the First Amendment.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 342
6 (1995) (“[A]t least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter
7 the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as
8 a condition of entry.”). Id. “The freedom to publish anonymously,” however, “extends beyond
9 the literary realm.” Id. (noting that “[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout
10 history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at
11 all.”) Id. (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)).

12
13 In addition to protecting “political expression,” the First Amendment protects “political
14 association as well.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); see also Citizens Against Rent
15 Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, California (“Citizens Against Rent
16 Control”), 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Long Beach, 574 F.3d at 1020-21 (“The First Amendment
17 prohibits Congress from enacting laws ‘abridging . . . the right of people peaceably to
18 assemble.’”) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). Indeed, the Supreme Court has found the right of
19 association is “a ‘basic constitutional freedom’ . . . that is ‘closely allied to freedom of speech.’”
20 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see also Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 295 (recognizing
21 importance of freedom of association in guaranteeing right of people to make voice heard on
22 public issues); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama
23 (“NAACP”), 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (noting “close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
24 assembly,” and that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
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1 controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”).

2 “[G]roup association is protected [under the First Amendment,] because it enhances ‘(e)
3 ffective [sic] advocacy.’” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65 (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460). Further,
4 “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may” be an “effective . . .
5 restraint on freedom of association.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462 (“This Court has recognized the
6 vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s association.”). “The right to
7 join together ‘for the advancement of beliefs and ideas,’” furthermore, “is diluted if it does not
8 include the right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’
9 is to be truly or optimally ‘effective.’” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65-66 (internal citation omitted).
10 “Moreover,” the Supreme Court has noted that “the invasion of privacy of belief may be as great
11 when the information sought concerns the giving and spending of money as when it concerns the
12 joining of organizations, for ‘(f)inancial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities,
13 associations, and beliefs.’” Id. at 66 (quoting California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,
14 78-79 (1974)).
15
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17 2. Plaintiffs’ Overbreadth Claim

18 Plaintiffs argue that what RCW 42.17.200 “calls ‘grassroots lobbying’ is more accurately
19 described as ‘grass roots issue advocacy’ or grass roots political speech,” not lobbying “as that
20 term is commonly understood” – i.e., that which involves “direct contact with public officials.”
21 ECF #22, pp. 9-10. Rather, plaintiffs assert the type of activity RCW 42.17.200 governs is core
22 political speech involving individuals or groups communicating with the general public about
23 various issues. See id. at p. 10. Because the “[e]ffective exercise” of the right to communicate
24 with the general public in this manner also “requires [the ability to engage in both] anonymous
25 speech and association,” that law’s reporting and disclosure requirements “impose serious
26

1 impediments to the exercise [all of these protected] rights.” Id. Plaintiffs thus are “essentially
2 contend[ing]” here that RCW 42.17.200 is invalid because it “sweeps too broadly” – both as
3 applied to them and in regard to others – in that its reporting and disclosure requirements burden
4 “more speech than is constitutionally permissible.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1020 n.9; Kimbell
5 v. Hooper, 164 Vt. 80, 83 (1995).

6
7 “A law will be struck down for overbreadth when ‘it does not aim specifically at evils
8 within the allowable area of government control but instead sweeps within its ambit other
9 activities that constitute an exercise’ of protected expressive or associational rights.” CICU, 534
10 F.Supp. at 493 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)). “[V]oiding a law for
11 overbreadth,” however, “is ‘strong medicine’ that” should only be applied “as a last resort.” Id.
12 at 494 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615 (“[O]verbreadth adjudication is an exception to
13 our traditional rules of practice and . . . where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we
14 believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
15 relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”)). Accordingly, “claimed flaws must be of a
16 substantial concern in the context of the statute as a whole before” the statute will be invalidated.
17 Kimbell, 164 Vt. at 85. Further, the protected speech a plaintiff intends to engage in – but has
18 refrained from doing so for fear of prosecution – must “arguably” fall “within the [challenged]
19 statute’s reach” to establish a “constitutionally sufficient injury.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1001
20 (citations omitted); see also CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at 1095.

23 3. Standard of Review: Exacting Scrutiny Applies

24 Since “compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association
25 and belief,” disclosure requirements “burden First Amendment interests.” Spechnow, 599 F.3d
26

1 at 696 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64).²⁴ “[I]n contrast with limiting a person’s ability to
2 spend money on political speech,” however, “disclosure requirements ‘impose no ceiling on
3 campaign-related activities,’” nor do they “prevent anyone from speaking.” Id. (quoting Buckley,
4 424 U.S. at 64, and McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)); see also
5 John Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (noting that “a *disclosure* requirement” is “not a
6 prohibition on speech,” because while such “requirements may burden the ability to speak, . . .
7 they do not prevent anyone from speaking”) (quoting Citizens United v. Federal Election
8 Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (emphasis in original)). As such, disclosure requirements
9 “inhibit speech less than do contribution and expenditure limits,” or than do sanctions on “pure
10 speech.” Speechnow, 599 F.3d at 696 (citing Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914)²⁵; see also
11 CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 494.

12
13 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized disclosure as “a less restrictive alternative to
14 more comprehensive regulations of speech.” Id. (quoting Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915); see
15 also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. Thus, a “basic distinction” exists between “financial limitations”
16 that “‘necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
17 discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached,’ and disclosure
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19
20 ²⁴ As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley:

21 It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties
22 will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may
23 even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not insignificant burdens on
24 individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which Congress has
25 sought to promote by this legislation.

26 424 U.S. at 68.

²⁵ See id. at 692 (noting that because contribution limits “implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,” when
the government “attempts to regulate political campaigns and express advocacy through contribution limits, . . . it
must have a countervailing interest that outweighs the limit’s burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights,”
and “[t]hus a ‘contribution limit involving significant interference with associational rights must be closely drawn to
serve a sufficiently important interest.’”) (quoting Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2772 n.7
(2008); see also Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299 (limits on expenditures operate as direct restraint on
freedom of expression).

1 requirements, which ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities.’” Human Life, 624 F.3d
2 at 1003 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19). Accordingly, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently
3 upheld organizational and reporting requirements against facial challenges.” Speechnow, 599
4 F.3d at 696; see also Taylor, 582 F.3d at 9 (noting Supreme Court, recognizing “lesser burdens”
5 that disclosure imposes on First Amendment interests, “has upheld numerous statutes requiring
6 disclosures by those endeavoring to influence the political system.”).

7
8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has “recognized that significant encroachments on First
9 Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere
10 showing of some legitimate governmental interest.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; see also Davis, 554
11 U.S. at 744. Rather, “the subordinating interests of the State [offered to justify compelled
12 disclosure]” must “survive exacting scrutiny.”²⁶ Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2818; see also Davis, 554
13 U.S. at 744. This means, therefore, that there must “be a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial
14

15 ²⁶ As noted by the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he Supreme Court has established different levels of scrutiny for analyzing
16 alleged First Amendment violations, depending on where the speech takes place.” Long Beach Area Peace Network,
17 574 F.3d at 1022. In addition to the application of “exacting scrutiny” in the case of disclosure requirements, for
18 example, “strict scrutiny” is required where a law favors “some speakers over others” and “the legislature’s speaker
19 preference reflects a content preference.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n
20 (“Turner Broadcasting”), 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994); see also Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 898; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
21 786. A law is “content based . . . if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys.”
22 Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 645. “Laws that burden political speech” also “are ‘subject to strict scrutiny.’”
23 Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 898 (citation omitted). So too are laws that place limitations on campaign
24 contributions and independent political expenditures. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 737, 740 n.7; Randall, 548 U.S. at 246-
25 47; Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1010. In order “[t]o satisfy strict scrutiny,” the following three elements must be
26 established:

 . . . (1) “the interests the government proffers in support” of the statute must be
 “properly characterized as ‘compelling’ ”; (2) the statute must “effectively advance[] those
 interests”; and (3) the statute must be “narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interests
 asserted.” . . .

23 Taylor, 582 F.3d at 11 (citation omitted); see also Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551
24 U.S. 449, 464-65 (2007); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786. The “narrow tailoring” requirement, furthermore, “is satisfied
25 ‘so long as the [statute] promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent’
26 that statute. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799
(1989). The challenged statutory provision thus “need not be the least speech-restrictive [or least intrusive] means of
advancing the Government’s interests.” Id. That is, narrow tailoring requires merely that “the means chosen do not
‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’” Id.; see also
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (government “must employ means ‘closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment.’”)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).

1 relation' between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed."²⁷
2 Davis, 554 U.S. at 744 (citation omitted); see also Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2818 Speechnow, 599 F.3d
3 at 696 (government may point to "sufficiently important" interest that bears "substantial relation"
4 to its disclosure requirement) (citing Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914); Taylor, 582 F.3d at 10.

5 In other words, "the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of
6 the actual burden on First Amendment rights." Davis, 554 U.S. at 744; see also Reed, 130 S.Ct.
7 at 2818. "This type of [exacting] scrutiny is necessary," furthermore, "even if any deterrent
8 effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action,

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10 ²⁷ Citing Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 889, plaintiffs assert strict scrutiny rather than exacting scrutiny should be the
11 standard that is applied here, because the statute they challenge is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally
12 exempts preferred speakers and subjects from its application. But Citizens United does not hold that strict scrutiny
13 is applied in regard to the issue of alleged vagueness itself. Nor do plaintiffs point to any other legal authority that
14 so holds in regard to vagueness or overbreadth challenges. Rather, as just discussed, the distinction between strict
15 scrutiny and exacting scrutiny centers on whether the statute merely mandates the disclosure of financial or other
16 related information, or instead whether it places actual limits on political speech (e.g., by restricting the amount of
17 independent expenditures or campaign finance contributions or the content of speech itself). See Human Life, 624
18 F.3d at 1013 (Citizens United underscored "the fundamental distinction between the burdens imposed by financial
19 regulations . . . and those imposed by disclaimer and disclosure requirements") (citing 130 S.Ct. at 897). Further, as
20 discussed in greater detail below, Washington's laws governing grassroots lobbying fall into the category of laws
21 that merely mandate disclosure, and do not place actual limits on political speech. Lastly, also as discussed in
22 greater detail below, because plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the subjects of the exemptions contained in RCW
23 42.17.160 they are challenging, and because those exemptions are not both speaker-based *and* content-based, strict
24 scrutiny does not apply here as well.

25 Plaintiffs also erroneously assert that to survive exacting scrutiny, the statute must be narrowly tailored to advance
26 the governmental interest being asserted. See ECF #22, p. 11 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347). But in McIntyre,
the Supreme Court found the statute at issue – which banned the distribution of anonymous campaign literature – to
be "a regulation of pure speech." 514 U.S. at 345 ("[E]ven though this provision applies evenhandedly to advocates
of differing viewpoints, it is a direct regulation of the content of speech."). Thus, while the Supreme Court did use
the term "exacting scrutiny," it in effect was applying – and appropriately so – strict scrutiny. See id. at 347 ("When
a law *burdens core political speech*, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an *overriding* state interest.") (emphasis added). Indeed, in setting forth this standard, the Supreme
Court cited its earlier decision in Bellotti, which held that where "a prohibition is *directed at speech itself*, and the
speech is intimately related to the process of governing, 'the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is *compelling*.'" 435 U.S. at 786 (noting further that burden of showing existence of such interest is
on government, which "[e]ven then . . . must employ means '*closely drawn* to avoid unnecessary abridgement.'"")
(emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). In so applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court also pointed
out specifically that although financial disclosures "undeniably" impede "protected First Amendment activity," that
"intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification on all election-related writings" at issue in McIntyre. 514
U.S. at 355. Although plaintiffs – as explained in greater detail below – attempt to frame Washington's grassroots
lobbying disclosure requirements in terms of a prohibition directed at core political speech itself, it is well in line
with the type of disclosure laws the federal courts have found merely require that the asserted governmental interest
be "sufficiently important," or bear "a substantial relation" to, the information to be disclosed.

1 but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring
2 disclosure.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65. The Supreme Court, though, has “acknowledged that there
3 are governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement” of
4 First Amendment rights. Id. at 66. In Buckley, the Supreme Court found three categories of such
5 sufficient governmental interests:

6 . . . First, disclosure provides the electorate with information “as to where
7 political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate” in
8 order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. . . .

9 Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the
10 appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to
11 the light of publicity. . . .

12 . . .

13 Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure
14 requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect
15 violations of [political] contribution limitations . . .

16 Id. at 66-67 (internal footnotes omitted). The government, however, “need not . . . employ the
17 least restrictive means to satisfy its [asserted] interest,” but, as noted above, “it need only ensure
18 that its means are substantially related to that interest.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1013.

19 4. Washington Has a Sufficiently Important Interest in Providing Information
20 to the Public in Regard to Grassroots Lobbying

21 Disclosure requirements consistently have been upheld on the basis of “a governmental
22 interest in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ about the sources of political campaign
23 funds, not just the interest in deterring corruption and enforcing anti-corruption measures,” as is
24 the case regarding limitations on contributions for political speech. Speechnow, 599 F.3d at 692,
25 696 (noting that only interest Supreme Court has recognized as being sufficiently important to
26 outweigh First Amendment interests implicated by contribution limits is preventing corruption or
appearance of corruption) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66; citing Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2773,

1 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196 (upholding similar requirements for same reasons), FEC v. Nat’l
2 Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)); see also Citizens United,
3 130 S.Ct. 913-14 (citing government interest in providing information to electorate in upholding
4 disclaimer and disclosure requirements for electioneering communications); Human Life, 624
5 F.3d at 1005-06 (providing information repeatedly has been recognized as sufficiently important,
6 if not compelling, interest) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67).

8 The courts thus have found “[p]roviding information to the electorate” to be “vital to the
9 efficient functioning of the marketplace of ideas, and thus to advancing the democratic objectives
10 underlying the First Amendment.”²⁸ Human Life, 634 F.3d at 1005; see also CICU, 534 F.Supp.
11 at 495 n.4 (“Exposing [sources of pressure placed on government officials] to public scrutiny is
12 considered beneficial because ‘informed public opinion is the most potent force of all restraints
13 on misgovernment.’”) (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
14 “[B]y revealing information about the contributors to and participants in public discourse and
15 debate, disclosure laws help ensure that voters have the facts they need to evaluate the various
16 messages competing for their attention.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1005. The Ninth Circuit has

18 _____
19 ²⁸ Indeed, it is “well-established . . . that the right to receive information is an inherent corollary of the rights of free
20 speech and press, because the right to distribute information necessarily protects the right to receive it.” Monteiro v.
The Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998). As the Washington State Supreme
21 Court has observed:

21 . . . [T]he right to receive information is the fundamental counterpart of the right of free
22 speech. . . . The constitutional safeguards which shield and protect the communicator,
23 perhaps more importantly also assure the public the right to receive information in an open
society. Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967). Freedom of
speech without the corollary – freedom to receive – would seriously discount the intendment
purpose and effect of the first amendment.

24 Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 296 (1974). Thus, “[t]he right to receive information, or the right of the people to
25 know, has been repeatedly recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a fundamental tenet of the American
political system.” Id. at 296 n.3 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (“(T)he Constitution protects the right
26 to receive information and ideas. ‘This freedom (of speech and press) . . . necessarily protects the right to receive,’”
and “[t]his right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth (citation omitted) is fundamental
to our free society.”); see also Voters Education Committee v. Washington State Public Disclosure Commission,
161 Wn.2d 470, 483 (2007).

1 “frequently reiterated,” therefore, “that in the ‘cacophony of political communications through
2 which . . . voters must pick out meaningful and accurate messages . . . being able to evaluate who
3 is doing the talking is of great importance.” Id. at 1006 (citation omitted).

4 As the Federal Circuit also has noted in the election context:

5 . . . [T]he public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate
6 and who is funding that speech, no matter whether the contributions were
7 made towards administrative expenses or independent expenditures. Further,
8 requiring disclosure of such information deters and helps expose violations of
9 other campaign finance restrictions . . . These are sufficiently important
10 governmental interests to justify [having to organize and report as required].

11 Speechnow, 599 F.3d at 698. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court stated that in such a
12 context, “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate.” 130 S.Ct. at
13 915. It went on to note:

14 . . . With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can
15 provide . . . citizens with the information needed to hold . . . elected officials
16 accountable for their positions and supporters. . . . The First Amendment
17 protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens . . . to react to the
18 speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the
19 electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
20 speakers and messages.

21 Id. at 916; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82 (noting disclosure to be “reasonable and minimally
22 restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our
23 federal election system to public view”).

24 The Supreme Court also “has repeatedly acknowledged the constitutionality of state laws
25 requiring the disclosure of funds spent to pass or defeat ballot measures.” CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at
26 1102 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792, 795 (specifically noting “prophylactic effect” of requiring
source of communication to be disclosed), and quoting Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc. (“ACLF”), 525 U.S. 182, 203, 205 (observing with approval requirement that
ballot initiative sponsors disclose amount and source of payments to petition circulators, because

1 it provided voters with such information); see also Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts
2 Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCL”), 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) (finding to be invalid limitations on
3 independent expenditures made by certain entities, but noting such entities still had to disclose
4 contribution sources that paid for those expenditures); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.32 (noting
5 “[i]dentification of the source of [corporate political] advertising may be required as a means of
6 disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being
7 subjected”); Taylor, 582 F.3d at 9, 13-15; CPLC-I, 328 F.3d at 1104-05 (finding government
8 information interest in regulating express ballot-measure advocacy to be sufficiently compelling,
9 noting that: “[g]iven the complexity of the issues and the unwillingness of much of the electorate
10 to independently study the propriety of individual ballot measures, being able to evaluate who is
11 doing the talking is of great importance”).²⁹ Indeed, the above considerations have been noted to
12
13

14 ²⁹ The Ninth Circuit in CPLC-I explained in greater detail :

15 The Supreme Court has recognized as much. In *Buckley*, the Court noted that disclosure
16 advances the substantial government interest of providing

17 the electorate with information “as to where political campaign money comes from
18 and how it is spent by the candidate” in order to aid the voters in evaluating those
19 who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political
20 spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and
21 campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate’s financial support also alert the
22 voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and
23 facilitate predictions of future performance in office.

24 424 U.S. at 66-67, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal citation omitted).

25 Though the *Buckley* Court discussed the value of disclosure for candidate elections, the
26 same considerations apply just as forcefully, if not more so, for voter-decided ballot measures.
“Even more than candidate elections, initiative campaigns have become a money game, where
average citizens are subjected to advertising blitzes of distortion and half-truths and are left to
figure out for themselves which interest groups pose the greatest threats to their self-interest.”
David S. Broder, *Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money* at 18
(2000). Knowing which interested parties back or oppose a ballot measure is critical,
especially when one considers that ballot-measure language is typically confusing, and the
long-term policy ramifications of the ballot measure are often unknown. At least by knowing
who backs or opposes a given initiative, voters will have a pretty good idea of who stands to
benefit from the legislation.

 Voters act as legislators in the ballot-measure context, and interest groups and individuals
advocating a measure’s defeat or passage act as lobbyists; both groups aim at pressuring the

1 “apply just as forcefully, if not more so, for voter-decided ballot measures,” than in the election
2 context. Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1006 (quoting CPLC-I, 328 at 1105).³⁰

3
4 public to pass or defeat legislation. We think Californians, as lawmakers, have an interest in
5 knowing who is lobbying for their vote, just as members of Congress may require lobbyists to
6 disclose who is paying for the lobbyists’ services and how much. *See United States v. Harriss*,
7 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).

8 In *Harriss*, the Supreme Court upheld the Lobbying Act, which required lobbyists to
9 disclose to Congress any contributions they had received and any expenditures they had made
10 “for the purpose of influencing the passage or defeat of any legislation by Congress.” 347
11 U.S. at 614, 74 S.Ct. 808. In articulating the governmental interest for this restriction on
12 speech, the Court wrote:

13 Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress
14 cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly
15 subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected
16 representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such
17 pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by
18 the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
19 proponents of the public weal. This is the evil which the Lobbying Act was designed
20 to help prevent.

21 Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures. It has
22 merely provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to
23 influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose.

24 *Id.* at 625, 74 S.Ct. 808.

25 If our Congress “cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are
26 regularly subjected,” then certainly neither can the general public. People have jobs, families,
and other distractions. While we would hope that California voters will independently
consider the policy ramifications of their vote, and not render a decision based upon a thirty-
second sound bite they hear the day before the election, we are not that idealistic nor that
naive. By requiring disclosure of the source and amount of funds spent for express ballot-
measure advocacy, California – at a minimum – provides its voters with a useful shorthand
for evaluating the speaker behind the sound bite.

27 *Id.* at 1105-06 (internal footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals further noted that disclosure in this context “also
prevents the wolf from masquerading in sheep’s clothing.” *Id.* at 1106 n.24.

28 ³⁰ As the Ninth Circuit went on to explain:

29 We have observed that these considerations “apply just as forcefully, if not more so, for
30 voter-decided ballot measures.” . . . In the ballot initiative context, where voters are
31 responsible for taking positions on some of the day’s most contentious and technical issues,
32 “[v]oters act as legislators,” while “interest groups and individuals advocating a measure’s
33 defeat or passage act as lobbyists.” . . . As a result of this process, “average citizens are
34 subjected to advertising blitzes of distortion and half-truths and are left to figure out for
35 themselves which interest groups pose the greatest threats to their self-interest.” . . . Thus, the
36 high stakes of the ballot context only amplify the crucial need to inform the electorate that is
well recognized in the context of candidate elections.

Notably, in the lobbying context, the Supreme Court has upheld disclosure requirements
enabling lawmakers “to know who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how

1 In the lobbying context too, the government’s informational interest has been seen as a
2 sufficient basis for requiring disclosure. See Taylor, 582 F.3d at 9 (disclosure requirements serve
3 “vital national interest” in “manner restricted to its appropriate end”; “Congress did not seek “to
4 prohibit [lobbying] pressures,” but “merely provided for a modicum of information”) (quoting
5 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626); Meggs, 87 F.3d at 460-61 (burdens of registration and disclosure on
6 lobbyists do not substantially interfere with ability to raise their voices); CICU, 534 F.Supp. at
7 494-95 (“The lobby[ing disclosure] law serves to apprise the public of the sources of pressure on
8

9
10
11 much.” . . . The Court found these requirements necessary because “legislative complexities
12 are such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad
13 pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of
14 government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly
15 evaluate such pressures.” . . .

16 In a similar manner, citizens, acting “as lawmakers, have an interest in knowing who is
17 lobbying for their vote, just as members of Congress may require lobbyists to disclose who is
18 paying for the lobbyists’ services and how much.” . . . Indeed, the provision of this
19 information is particularly critical in the ballot measure context, “especially when one
20 considers that ballot-measure language is typically confusing, and the long-term policy
21 ramifications of the ballot measure are often unknown.” . . . If nothing else, “knowing who
22 backs or opposes a given initiative” will give voters “a pretty good idea of who stands to
23 benefit from the legislation.” . . .

24 Access to reliable information becomes even more important as more speakers, more
25 speech – and thus more spending – enter the marketplace, which is precisely what has
26 occurred in recent years. Like campaigns for elected office, ballot initiatives are the subject
of intense debate and, accordingly, greater expenditures to ensure that messages reach voters.
...

...

27 Campaign finance disclosure requirements thus advance the important and well-
28 recognized governmental interest of providing the voting public with the information with
29 which to assess the various messages vying for their attention in the marketplace of ideas. An
30 appeal to cast one’s vote a particular way might prove persuasive when made or financed by
31 one source, but the same argument might fall on deaf ears when made or financed by another.
32 The increased “transparency” engendered by disclosure laws “enables the electorate to make
33 informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.” . . . As the
34 Supreme Court has stated: “[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the
35 responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They
36 may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.” . . .

Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1006-07 (internal citations and footnote omitted).

1 government officials, thus better enabling the public to assess their performance.”).³¹ Nor has
2 permitting disclosure based on an informational interest been limited to the realm of “direct”
3 lobbying. In Meggs, for example, the Eleventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court “has made
4 clear” that this “legitimate” government interest applies with the same force to the reporting of
5 indirect lobbying expenses, i.e., to the reporting of “expenses when there is no direct contact
6 with government officials.” 87 F.3d at 460.

8 This is because, the Eleventh Circuit continued, indirect lobbying expenses “implicate the
9 correlative interests of voters (in appraising the integrity and performance of officeholders and
10 candidates, in view of the pressures they face) and legislators (in ‘self-protection’ in the face of
11 coordinated pressure campaigns).” Id. at 460-61 (further noting that “these interests continue to
12 apply when the pressures to be evaluated by voters and government officials are ‘indirect’ rather
13 than ‘direct’”); see also Minnesota State Ethical Practices Board v. National Rifle Ass’n of
14 America (“MSEPB”), 761 F.2d 509, 512-13 (8th Cir. 1985) (recognizing interest in requiring
15 reporting of intra-organization lobbying activity not involving direct contact with state officials,
16 and finding no “constitutionally significant” distinction between such indirect activity and direct
17 lobbying, because “[w]hen persons engage in an extensive letter[]writing campaign for the
18 purpose of influencing specific legislation,” state’s “interest is the same whether or not those
19 persons are members of an association”).³²

22
23 ³¹ The district court in CICU noted further that the particular law at issue in that case did not limit “the amount or
24 kind of lobbying that [could] be undertaken, but [did] provide that lobbyists must register, disclose the identity of
25 their employers, and submit periodic reports of income and expenses.” 534 F.Supp. at 495 n. 7, 498 (noting as well
that Supreme Court in Harriss “emphasized the fact that Congress had not sought to curtail lobbying,” but rather the
lobbying law at issue there “merely provided that a lobbyist give information as to ‘who is putting up the money,
and how much’”) (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625).

26 ³² Indeed, “the government interest in providing the means to evaluate these pressures may in some ways be
stronger when the pressures are indirect, because then they are harder to identify without the aid of disclosure
requirements.” Meggs, 87 F.3d at 461 (noting Supreme Court “appears to have acknowledged as much when, even
reading the [applicable lobbying] statute narrowly to apply only to ‘direct communication,’ it nonetheless defined
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1 Citing Buckley and Citizens United, plaintiffs assert the Supreme Court has limited the
2 application of the governmental interest in providing information to the public “to laws aimed at
3 disclosure of *candidate* contributions and expenditures.” ECF #22, p. 16 (emphasis in original).
4 But while it is true that Buckley and Citizens United concerned application of the informational
5 interest in the candidate context – naturally, given both cases dealt with electoral campaigns –
6 nowhere in those decisions did the Supreme Court expressly limit application of such an interest
7 to that context. Indeed, plaintiffs point to nothing in the language of either case that even implies
8 such a limitation was contemplated by the Supreme Court.³³ Further, their interpretation would
9 go against what, as indicated above, appears to be the consensus among other courts – certainly
10 in this Circuit – that the government’s informational interest is sufficient to uphold reporting and
11 disclosure requirements in other contexts, such as those regarding ballot measures and direct and
12 indirect lobbying. The Supreme Court itself explicitly recognized this with respect to lobbying

13 direct communication to include ‘artificially stimulated letter campaign[s],’) (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 620).

14
15 ³³ See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914-16; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-68, 83-84. In addition, even though occurring
16 in the context of its “campaign finance jurisprudence,” the Supreme Court strongly intimated in Citizens United that
17 the interest had a much broader application:

18 . . . With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide
19 *shareholders* and citizens with the information needed to hold *corporations* and elected
20 officials accountable for their positions and supporters. *Shareholders* can determine whether
21 their *corporation’s* political speech advances the *corporation’s* interest in making profits, and
22 citizens can see whether elected officials are “ ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”
23 . . . The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and
24 *shareholders* to react to the speech of *corporate entities* in a proper way. This transparency
25 enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
26 speakers and messages.

27 130 S.Ct. at 916 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1005-06 (“[B]y revealing
28 information about the contributors to and participants in *public discourse and debate*, disclosure laws help ensure
29 that voters have the facts they need to evaluate the various messages competing for their attention”) (emphasis
30 added); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197 (questioning how “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” speech can
31 occur when organizations hide from scrutiny of voting public) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs also rely on the recent
32 Supreme Court case in Reed, asserting that it had “refused to rely on Washington’s asserted information interest in
33 upholding a law requiring disclosure of referendum petitions” in that case. ECF #22, p. 17; ECF #32, p. 6. This
34 characterization, though, clearly misstates the holding in that case. The Supreme Court did not *refuse* to rely on the
35 state’s information interest to uphold the law, but merely declined to “address” it, because the state’s other asserted
36 interest – “preserving the integrity of the electoral process” – alone was sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs’ argument
37 that the law was unconstitutional. Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2819.

1 and the ballot measure context, including in Citizens United at least in regard to lobbying. See
2 130 S.Ct. at 915; ACLF, 525 U.S. at 203, 205; MCL, 479 U.S. at 262; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792
3 n.32; Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625-26.

4 Plaintiffs assert the Supreme Court has never upheld laws aimed at disclosure of “citizen-
5 to-citizen speech” outside the electoral context based on the government’s informational interest.
6 ECF #22, p. 17. Plaintiffs argue that since they engage in such speech – which, as noted above,
7 they describe as communicating with “fellow citizens” to “urge them to take political action,”
8 and which they equate with “issue advocacy” – an informational interest is insufficient to justify
9 the burdens imposed thereon by grassroots lobbying disclosure laws such as those enacted in
10 Washington. ECF #22, p. 17; ECF #32, p. 2. In other words, plaintiffs would like the Court to
11 treat such disclosure laws the same as those that regulate speech – e.g., laws that are content or
12 speaker based or laws that limit campaign contributions or independent expenditures – which do
13 require more than just a governmental interest in providing information to the public to justify
14 the restrictions placed on such speech.
15

16
17 Plaintiffs, however, have provided no evidence to support their interpretation of the term
18 “grassroots lobbying” contained in RCW 42.17.200, other than the declaration and report of Dr.
19 Milyo, which, as discussed above, are not admissible in this case. The Court notes, furthermore,
20 that the term “grassroots lobbying” – which is expressly employed within the statute to describe
21 the activities governed thereby – itself contains the term “lobbying,” which is defined in relevant
22 part as follows:
23

24 . . . [A]ttempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by the
25 legislature of the state of Washington, or the adoption or rejection of any rule,
26 standard, rate, or other legislative enactment of any state agency under the
state Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW

RCW 42.17.200(31) (emphasis added). In addition, a “sponsor” of grassroots lobbying is any

1 person who spends more than the statutorily specified expenditure amount “in presenting a
2 program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which is intended, designed, or
3 calculated *primarily to influence legislation.*” RCW 42.17.200(1) (emphasis added).

4 The above statutory language thus is “quite clear” in aiming the reporting and disclosure
5 requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200 at lobbying – and, in particular, “grassroots lobbying”
6 – not grassroots “issue advocacy.” Taylor, 582 F.3d at 12. As noted by the Federal Circuit in
7 Taylor, “the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that courts should” not reach beyond the
8 plain meaning of a statute – such as by “resort[ing] to legislative history” – “to cloud a statutory
9 text that is clear.” 582 F.3d at 12 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48
10 (1994)); see also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (noting source
11 material outside statutory provision “cannot [be used to] amend the clear and unambiguous
12 language” thereof). In addition, as noted above, the official declaration of policy contained in
13 Washington’s campaign finance, lobbying and public disclosure laws, expressly provides in
14 relevant part that “*lobbying* contributions and expenditures be fully disclosed” to the public.
15 RCW 42.17.010(1), (10) (emphasis added).

16 Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt plaintiffs’ use of the term “issue advocacy” here
17 or to find the reporting and disclosure requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200 impose a direct
18 limit on core speech or any related associational rights. Plaintiffs further seem to argue that the
19 term “legislation” is defined so broadly that “there appears to be no political activity that the law
20 does not reach,” and thus that RCW 42.17.200 governs more than just lobbying activity designed
21 to influence governmental decision-making. ECF #22, p. 3. The Court, however, finds plaintiffs’
22 argument is supported neither by the statutory definition of that term nor case law interpreting it.
23 That argument thus is rejected.

1 As noted above, the term “legislation” is statutorily defined to mean:

2 . . . [B]ills, resolutions, motions, amendments, nominations, and other matters
3 pending or proposed in either house of the state legislature, and includes any
4 other matter that may be the subject of action by either house or any
5 committee of the legislature and all bills and resolutions that, having passed
6 both houses, are pending approval by the governor.

7 RCW 42.17.020(30). Specifically, plaintiffs take issue with the phrase “any other matter that
8 may be the subject of action by . . . the legislature” contained in the above definition, which also
9 as noted above, they assert indicates there is “no political activity” the reporting and disclosure
10 requirements set forth in RCW 42.17.200 do not reach. The “primary objective in interpreting a
11 statute,” however, “is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent as manifested in the
12 statute’s express language.” Peacock v. Public Disclosure Commission, 84 Wn.App. 282, 286,
13 289 (1996) (citing American Legion Post No. 32 v. City of Walla Walla, 116 Wn.2d 1, 8 (1991)
14 (in construing statute, statutory definitions generally control)). “Legislative intent,” furthermore,
15 “is derived” not just from the specific provision being challenged, but “from the statutory context
16 as a whole.” Id. at 286-87.

17 Accordingly, the Court must interpret RCW 42.17.200 in light of the purpose of RCW
18 Chapter 42.17, which is, as noted above “to inform the public and its elected representatives
19 about ‘sponsors of campaigns and lobbying efforts which seek to affect, directly or indirectly,
20 governmental decision making.’” Id. at 287 (noting also court’s duty to consider official public
21 policy declaration contained in RCW Chapter 42.17, which requires liberal construction of that
22 chapter “to promote complete disclosure of all information *respecting the financing of . . .*
23 *lobbying* and . . . assure continuing public confidence in fairness of . . . governmental processes”)
24 (quoting Young Americans For Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton (“YAF”), 83 Wn.2d 728, 733 (1974),
25 and RCW 42.17.010(11) (emphasis in original)).
26

1 In Peacock, the Washington State Court of Appeals was tasked with interpreting the term
2 “legislation” used in RCW 42.17.200(1) and defined in RCW 42.17.020(30). In so doing, it first
3 observed the term’s “full statutory meaning as set forth by the Legislature” must be considered.
4 84 Wn.App. at 288. The court of appeals then focused on the phrase “and includes any other
5 matter that may be the subject of action by . . . the legislature,” to find the petition-drive begun
6 by the plaintiff was “directed at legislation,” because its hope was that “its signed petitions
7 [would] force the Legislature to create a new county,” which would “have to create and pass
8 legislation” to do so. Id. at 289. The court of appeals went on to state that “[b]ecause the matter
9 of creating a new county *will be the subject of future legislative action* if the [plaintiff] is
10 successful, the petition drive *is directed at legislation.*” Id. (emphasis added). In so holding, the
11 court of appeals gave no indication any activities other than those that are designed to be the
12 subject of legislative action, would fall within that portion of the above statutory definition that
13 reads “any other matter that may be the subject” thereof.

14
15
16 In YAF, upon which as noted above the court in Peacock relied in part, the Washington
17 State Supreme Court was even more specific in its analysis of the relation between the reporting
18 and disclosure requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200 and the term “legislation”:

19 The clear and basic intent of [RCW 42.17.200] is to require disclosure of
20 (1) those individuals and organizations who, directly or indirectly, attempt to
21 influence governmental decision making, and (2) the sums expended in such
22 efforts. In our opinion, [RCW 42.17.200] does not mandate the reporting of
23 every . . . expenditure [made by the plaintiff] nor does it require the disclosure
24 of the [plaintiff’s] entire membership list. [RCW 42.17.200] was designed not
25 to inhibit the free expression of ideas, but to inform the electorate of the
26 source and sponsorship of persuasional influences which are designed to sway
and procure their political interest, allegiance, and support. As we interpret
[RCW 42.17.200], it requires a grass roots organization to report expenditures
exceeding the *de minimis* amounts which are spent in furtherance of a *specific*
campaign. *See* [RCW 42.17.200(1)]. By way of illustration, [RCW
42.17.200] would require a grass roots organization to report qualifying
expenditures incurred in a campaign which urged the support or defeat of an

1 initiative measure directed to the legislature. Reporting would not be required
2 when the subject campaign does not have as its objective the support or
3 rejection of specific legislation.^[34] Thus, no reporting is required of the
4 [plaintiff] unless it seeks to affect the disposition of *specific* pending or
5 proposed legislation.

6 Specificity is likewise the key to [RCW 42.17.200] which mandates the
7 disclosure of campaign contributors and their donations. Contrary to the
8 assertions of the [plaintiff], this section *does not* require the disclosure of its
9 membership lists. If a member or non-member contributes to a past, present
10 or future campaign [of the plaintiff] which has as its objective the passage or
11 failure of *specific* legislation, then the reporting of the contribution and its
12 donor is required. If, however, the [plaintiff] does not receive funds
13 earmarked for a specific campaign, but expends reportable amounts from its
14 general funds, then there is no need to divulge the names and addresses of the
15 membership. In this instance, the members have only contributed dues to the
16 organization, but not to a *specific* campaign. In instances where the [plaintiff]
17 receives funds identified or earmarked for expenditure in a campaign which is
18 directed at specific pending or proposed legislation, it is required to report the
19 contributions in accordance with [RCW 42.17.200]. Hence by definition,
20 [RCW 42.17.200] requires the disclosure of *contributors*, as distinguished
21 from members, and therefore, does not violate the rule of *N.A.A.C.P. v.*
22 *Alabama*, as an impermissible impingement upon constitutional rights.^[35] *See*
23 *United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment*, 469 F.2d 1135 (2nd Cir.
24 1972); *American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Jennings*, 366 F.Supp. 1041
25 (D.C.D.C.1973) (three judge panel upheld the constitutionality of the Federal
26 Elections Campaign Act). *See also Pichler v. Jennings*, 347 F.Supp. 1061,
1068 (S.D.N.Y.1972).

[RCW 42.17.200] must be viewed with the other sections of [RCW
Chapter 42.17] as a part of a matrix or program designed to ensure that public
officials and the electorate are informed of the sponsors of campaigns and
lobbying efforts which seek to affect, directly or indirectly, governmental

³⁴ In a footnote, the Washington State Supreme Court stated it was using “the term ‘legislation’” here “generically to also include pending or proposed rules, rates, standards or proposals.” 83 Wn.2d at 732 n.2.

³⁵ In *NAACP*, the question presented was whether the state could compel the plaintiff “to reveal . . . the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents, without regard to their positions or functions” within the plaintiff. 357 U.S. at 451. The Supreme Court held the state’s “production order” seeking those names and addresses entailed “a substantial restraint upon the exercise by [the plaintiff’s] members of their right to freedom of association.” *Id.* at 462. The Supreme Court found this to be the case, since the state had failed to show a sufficient justification for or a compelling interest in “obtaining names of ordinary members.” *Id.* at 464-65. Specifically, the Supreme Court held the state’s request had no “substantial bearing” on the “exclusive purpose” of the production order, which was to determine whether the plaintiff was “conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama foreign corporation registration statute,” given that the plaintiff had: (1) admitted its presence and activities in the state; (2) offered to comply with the registration statute; and (3) “apparently complied satisfactorily with the production order, except for the [ordinary] membership lists.” *Id.* at 464-65.

1 decision making. In *Fritz v. Gorton*, 83 Wash.2d 275, 302-311, 517 P.2d 911
2 (1974), we upheld the initiative sections which require reporting and
3 disclosure of *direct* lobbying activities by lobbyists and their employers. The
4 [plaintiff] concedes that it is required to file appropriate reports under those
5 sections, but contends that its *indirect* lobbying activities may not be subjected
6 to the requirements of [RCW 42.17.200]. To strike down this portion of
7 [RCW Chapter 42.17] would leave a loophole for indirect lobbying without
8 allowing or providing the public with information and knowledge re the
9 sponsorship of the lobbying and its financial magnitude. In affirming the
10 constitutionality of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, 2 U.S.C.
11 ss 261-270 (1970), in *United States v. Harriss*, 347 U.S. 612, 620, 74 S.Ct.
12 808, 813, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954), the United States Supreme Court noted,

13 (t)he legislative history of the Act makes clear that, at the very least,
14 Congress sought disclosure of such direct pressures, exerted by the
15 lobbyists themselves *or through their hirelings or through an artificially*
16 *stimulated letter campaign.*

17 (Italics ours). *See also United States v. Harriss, supra*, 347 U.S. at 620 n. 10.
18 Thus, it seems abundantly clear, and we are convinced, that the right of the
19 public to be informed is paramount to any inconvenience that reporting under
20 [RCW 42.17.200] may cause respondent.

21 83 Wn.2d at 732-34 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, it is clear that only those activities and
22 issues, which are designed to be the subject of pending or proposed legislative action, fall within
23 the statutory definition of the term “legislation”.³⁶

24 The interpretation of the term “legislation” adopted by the Washington state courts also is
25 well in line with the long-held rule of statutory construction that “[l]aws are to be interpreted in a
26 reasonable way to avoid constitutional overreaching.” *Kimball*, 164 Vt. at 49. If a provision of a
statute therefore “is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that will remedy [an alleged]
constitutional infirmity” – as it is in this case – that provision then “will be upheld.” *Citizens for*
Responsible Government State Political Action Committee v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1194
(10th Cir. 2000) (it is well-settled that statute must be upheld if it is “readily susceptible” to

³⁶ Thus, RCW 42.17.200 does not require “disclosure of information from ordinary citizens who have done nothing more than spend \$500 to speak to their fellow citizens about issues” as plaintiffs claim. ECF #22, p. 17.

1 narrowing construction that makes it constitutional) (quoting American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc.,
2 484 U.S. at 397); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77-78 (court has duty to construe statute in way
3 that avoids creating unconstitutionality if it can be done consistent with legislative purpose);
4 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 618 (if statutory language can be made constitutionally permissible by
5 “reasonable construction” thereof, courts are under duty to give it that construction); CICU, 534
6 F.Supp. at 497 (courts are not “roving” commissions “charged with invalidating laws by
7 straining to find unconstitutional applications”) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-11); YAF,
8 83 Wn.2d at 732 (“The court is under no obligation to construe a statute to unnecessarily render
9 it unconstitutional.”).

11 Plaintiffs next argue no sufficiently important governmental interest is advanced by the
12 reporting and disclosure requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200. As discussed above, the
13 promotion of complete disclosure of all information in regard to lobbying to assure continuing
14 public confidence in fairness of governmental processes has been advanced as the primary policy
15 behind Washington’s laws governing lobbying in general. This has been upheld as a sufficiently
16 important governmental interest, and valid basis for requiring disclosure of financial information
17 under RCW Chapter 42.17, by several Washington courts. See Voters Education Committee, 161
18 Wn.2d at 479-80, 498; YAF, 83 Wn.2d at 732-34 (upholding the validity of RCW 42.17.200);
19 Fritz, 83 Wn.2d at 298, 306-10³⁷; Peacock, 84 Wn.App. at 287-89. So too have both the Ninth
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23 ³⁷ Plaintiffs assert any reliance on Fritz and YAF is misplaced, as they were decided before Buckley, and, as such,
24 those cases “analyzed the law under an entirely different constitutional framework and failed to apply any level of
25 scrutiny.” ECF #32, p. 6. Instead, plaintiffs argue, this case is controlled by the holding in McIntyre. But McIntyre,
26 as discussed herein, is entirely inapplicable, given that the issue there was the direct regulation of speech itself,
whereas, also as discussed herein, this case involves the disclosure of financial information, which the courts have
upheld on the basis of the government’s informational interest. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself in McIntyre noted
that while “mandatory reporting” of expenditures “in excess of a threshold level . . . undeniably impedes protected
First Amendment activity, [such an] intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification on all election-related
writings,” as was required by the statute at issue in that case. 514 U.S. at 355. The Supreme Court went on to state:

1 Circuit and this Court. See Human Life, 624 F.3d at 996-97, 1005-08; Family PAC v. Reed, *et*
2 *al.*, Case No. 3:09-cv-05662-RBL (W.D. Wash. 2009), ECF #88, Transcript of Proceedings, pp.
3 46-47). As further discussed above, the government interest in providing information to the
4 public has been upheld by federal courts in other lobbying contexts, including other *indirect*
5 lobbying contexts. See, e.g., Meggs, 87 F.3d at 461 (recognizing indirect lobbying activity
6 implicates information interest just as much, or even more so, than direct lobbying); MSEPB,
7 761 F.2d at 512-13 (concluding there exists governmental interest in requiring reporting of intra-
8 organization lobbying activity).

10 Plaintiffs assert that accepting the government’s information interest as justification for
11 its grassroots lobbying disclosure laws would lead to “breathhtaking” implications. ECF #22, p.
12 17 (quoting Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2824 (Alito, J., concurring), and citing United States v. Rumely,
13 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953)). But, as discussed above, neither the Supreme Court nor any of the other
14 many federal courts that have upheld this interest in a number of contexts have found it to be so.
15 Rather, they have found it to be sufficiently important to outweigh the constitutional burdens
16 imposed by reporting and disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs cite Rumely for the uncontroversial
17 proposition that statutes that give the government “the power to inquire into all efforts of private
18 individuals to influence public opinion[,] . . . raises doubts of constitutionality.” 345 U.S. at 46.
19 But this is not what reporting and disclosure statutes such as RCW 42.17.200 do, again as many
20
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22 . . . [I]dentification of the author against her will is particularly intrusive; it reveals
23 unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a controversial issue. Disclosure of an
24 expenditure and its use, without more, reveals far less information. It may be information that
25 a person prefers to keep secret, and undoubtedly it often gives away something about the
spender’s political views. Nonetheless, even though money may “talk,” its speech is less
specific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill – and as a result, when money
supports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation.

26 514 U.S. at 535. Nor, again as discussed herein, are the holdings in Fritz and YAF inconsistent with those decided
subsequent to Buckley – including Human Life, Voters Education Committee, Peacock, and Family PAC – which
did apply the proper framework and level of scrutiny.

1 courts, including this one, have recognized.³⁸

2 Plaintiffs also rely on California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph (“CPLC-II”), 507
3 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007), arguing the Ninth Circuit there held the interest in informing voters
4 did not justify requiring those engaging in ballot issue advocacy to create formal committees and
5 regularly report all contributions and expenditures. But the statute at issue in that case imposed
6 “political action committee-like requirements” on groups such as the plaintiff, requirements that
7 clearly are not required by RCW 42.17.200. Id. at 1187-88. Earlier in CPLC-II, furthermore, the
8 Ninth Circuit expressly stated that “*in the context of disclosure requirements*, the government’s
9 interest in providing the electorate with information [on contributions made to groups seeking to
10 influence voters in the context of] election and ballot issues *is well-established.*” Id. at 1179 n.8
11 (emphasis added). The relevance of the holding in CPLC-II is even more suspect, given that the
12 Ninth Circuit itself subsequently recognized intervening Supreme Court precedent has resulted in
13 that opinion’s abrogation. See Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1013.

14
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16 As the Ninth Circuit explained:

17 We reject Human Life’s contention that CLPC-II governs the issue of
18 whether Washington State’s political committee disclosure requirements are
19 unconstitutionally onerous because we apply a different standard of review
20 than that applied in CLPC-II. Though we are bound to follow circuit
21 precedent, an exception to this rule exists: “[I]n the face of intervening
22 Supreme Court and en banc opinions, ‘a three-judge panel of this court and
23 district courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher
24 authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively
25 overruled.’ ” United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.2010)
26 (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc)).

24 ³⁸ It should be pointed out, furthermore, that Rumely concerned a conviction for refusing to disclose to Congress the
25 names of those to whom the plaintiff sold “books of a particular political tendentiousness,” and not application of a
26 governmental information interest in imposing reporting and disclosure requirements. See 345 U.S. at 42. Indeed,
the quotation from Rumely from which plaintiffs take their proposition reads in its entirety as follows: “Surely it
cannot be denied that giving the scope to the resolution for which the Government contends, that is, deriving from it
the power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion *through books and periodicals*,
however remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative process, raises doubts
of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment.” (emphasis added).

1 Since *CLPC-II* was decided, the Supreme Court has made clear that exacting
2 scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, is applicable to campaign finance disclosure
3 requirements. *See Reed*, 130 S.Ct. at 2818; *Citizens United*, 130 S.Ct. at 914.
4 In light of this intervening Supreme Court authority, it is clear that CLPC-II
5 set the bar too high in applying strict scrutiny. The government need not, as
6 we suggested in *CLPC-II*, employ the least restrictive means to satisfy its
7 interest in providing the electorate with information; it need only ensure that
8 its means are substantially related to that interest. Washington State’s
9 disclosure scheme passes that test.

10 Indeed, it is the Supreme Court’s decision in *Citizens United*, rather
11 than the panel decision in *CLPC-II*, that provides the best guidance regarding
12 the constitutionality of [RCW Chapter 42.17’s] requirements. The *Citizens
13 United* Court underscored the fundamental distinction between the burdens
14 imposed by financial regulations, *see Citizens United*, 130 S.Ct. at 897, and
15 those imposed by disclaimer and disclosure requirements, *see id.* at 915-16.
16 Recounting the series of Supreme Court cases that had upheld disclosure
17 requirements while simultaneously striking down other regulations on
18 campaign speech, the Court affirmed and reiterated the importance of
19 disclosure requirements—even requirements that apply to issue advocacy—to the
20 government’s interest in informing the electorate. *Id.*

21 Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1013. Plaintiffs argue Human Life does not control here, because that
22 case dealt with the ballot initiative context, and thus, as with Buckley and Citizens United, it is
23 limited to the electoral situation. This argument, however, fails for the same reasons plaintiffs’
24 argument regarding Buckley and Citizens United fails, and thus the Court finds it to be without
25 merit.

26 Plaintiffs further attempt to distinguish Human Life by making much of the Ninth
Circuit’s statement in that case that “[r]eporting requirements do not extend indiscriminately to
all issue advocacy conducted at any time, for example . . . at a time when no related ballot
measure is pending,” but “[r]ather, by definition,” they “do not apply absent a pending election
or ballot initiative campaign.” 624 F.3d at 1018. But plaintiff takes this statement out of context.
The Ninth Circuit there was making the point that disclosure requirements in the ballot measure
context pose far fewer potential constitutional issues than those in the electoral campaign
context, stating in relevant part:

1 Before analyzing the relationship between the particular burdens
2 imposed by [RCW Chapter 42.17] and the government interests it furthers, we
3 note that there is less danger of a regulation sweeping too broadly in the
4 context of a ballot measure than in a candidate election. As the district court
5 noted, where a disclosure requirement regulates issue advocacy, the scope of
6 that regulation is naturally “more targeted and limited” when the relevant vote
7 involves a ballot initiative. . . . “Ballot initiatives present a single *issue* for
8 public referendum,” and thus the only relevant campaign speech that a
9 disclosure requirement could reach is “speech intended to influence the
10 voter’s opinion as to the merits of this single issue—in other words, it is ‘issue
11 advocacy,’ plain and simple.” . . . Whereas the broadly defined regulation of
12 campaign speech in the candidate election context “threatens to burden debate
13 on a *broad range* of issues – indeed, any issue that is arguably ‘pertinent’ to
14 the election,” broadly defined speech regulation in the ballot measure context
15 poses a much less significant burden; in the ballot context, the only issue
16 advocacy that could potentially be regulated is advocacy regarding “the *single*
17 issue put before the public.” . . . Thus, the potential of [RCW Chapter 42.17]
18 to incidentally regulate issue advocacy, to which [the plaintiff] objects, would
19 engender far more concern if the relevant election involved a candidate. In
20 the ballot initiative context, on the other hand, where express and issue
21 advocacy are arguably “one and the same,” any incidental regulation of issue
22 advocacy imposes more limited burdens that are more likely to be
23 substantially related to the government’s interests. Because regulation of
24 issue advocacy in the ballot context is virtually indistinguishable from
25 regulation of express advocacy (an admittedly appropriate enterprise), such
26 regulation is more closely related to the government’s interest in informing
the electorate. We agree with the district court’s reasoning that “[f]rom the
perspective of the state’s compelling interest,” it makes little difference
whether speech urges the public to vote for or against a ballot measure
implicating a particular issue or whether it advocates or attacks that particular
issue while the ballot measure is pending.

The particular requirements of [RCW Chapter 42.17] are substantially
related to the government’s informational interest in that they target only
those expenditures and advertisements made in conjunction with an ongoing
election or vote. Reporting requirements do not extend indiscriminately to all
issue advocacy conducted at any time – regulating, for example, an
advertisement about physician – assisted suicide placed at a time when no
related ballot measure is pending. Rather, by definition, disclosure
obligations do not apply absent a pending election or ballot initiative
campaign. . . .

24 Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ crabbed reading of Human Life
25 ignores the general acknowledgment by courts discussed elsewhere herein, that the government
26 has an important interest in providing information to the public in contexts other than those

1 dealing with campaign elections or ballot measures, including direct and indirect lobbying.
2 Further, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit here applies equally to grassroots lobbying, since in
3 that context – as in the case of ballot measures – RCW Chapter 42.17 targets only those
4 expenditures and contributions “made in conjunction” with proposed or pending legislation, and
5 therefore do not pose the potential overbreadth dangers that similar disclosure requirements in
6 the candidate election context do. See id. at 1018 n.7 (contrasting vote on ballot measure with “a
7 candidate election, where there is a greater distance between speech urging a vote for or against a
8 particular candidate and advocating or attacking one of a ‘broad range of issues’ on which the
9 candidate may have a particular view”).

11 Plaintiffs also look to Tenth Circuit case law for help. They note the Court of Appeals in
12 Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (2010), declined to find a government interest in providing
13 information regarding disclosure of activities of grassroots groups in the “ballot issue” context.
14 625 F.3d at 1249. The Court, however, finds Sampson to be both distinguishable on its facts and
15 unpersuasive in terms of its legal reasoning, particularly in light of the Ninth Circuit’s own
16 precedent – which is binding on this Court – and the other court decisions discussed above. In
17 Sampson, a statute requiring “any group of two or more persons that has accepted or made
18 contributions or expenditures exceeding \$200 to support or oppose a ballot issue must register as
19 an issue committee and report the names and addresses who contributes \$20 or more.” Id. at
20 1249. In striking down that statute, the Tenth Circuit noted that it was at odds with the language
21 of Colorado’s Constitution, which reads in relevant part:
22

24 The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare . . . that *large*
25 *campaign contributions* made to influence election outcomes *allow wealthy*
26 *individuals, corporations, and special interest groups to exercise a*
disproportionate level of influence over the political process; . . . that political
contributions from corporate treasuries are not an indication of popular
support for the corporation’s political ideas *and can unfairly influence the*

1 *outcome of Colorado elections*; and that the interests of the public are best
2 served by . . . providing for full and timely disclosure of campaign
3 contributions, independent expenditures, and funding of electioneering
4 communications, and strong enforcement of campaign finance requirements.

5 Id. at 1254 (quoting Colo. Const. art XXVIII, § 1) (emphasis added by court of appeals). “It
6 would take a mighty effort to characterize the [plaintiffs’] expenditure of \$782.02,” the Tenth
7 Circuit continued, “as an exercise of a ‘disproportionate level of influence over the political
8 process’ by a wealthy group that could ‘unfairly influence the outcome’ of an election.” Id. “The
9 disconnect between the avowed purpose of [Colorado’s] constitutional disclosure requirements
10 and their effect in this case,” the Court of Appeals went on to note, “should in itself provoke
11 doubt about whether the burden on the First Amendment associational rights of the members of
12 the [plaintiffs] could be justified.” Id. at 1254, 1261.

13 Accordingly, Sampson is wholly inapplicable to the case at hand, where the citizens of
14 Washington – through the initiative process – overwhelmingly supported a law that requires the
15 reporting and full disclosure of campaign finance and lobbying information, without distinction
16 between wealthy and less wealthy actors. See id. at 1254 (“It is unlikely that the Colorado voters
17 who approved the disclosure requirements of Article XXVIII of the state’s Constitution were
18 thinking of [groups such as the plaintiff].”). The Tenth Circuit in Sampson also found “the
19 public interest in knowing who is spending and receiving money” – at least in the context of that
20 case – was “not obvious.” Id. at 1256. This, though, is directly contrary to the holdings of the
21 majority of other courts that have considered this issue, again including the Ninth Circuit.
22 Finally, the Tenth Circuit found the difficulty of complying with the law’s reporting disclosure
23 requirements was not outweighed by the state’s interest in requiring disclosure at the above
24 threshold levels. See id. at 1259-61. But as the Court discusses in greater detail below, such is
25 not the case here.
26

1 Despite earlier arguing that the Supreme Court has not found the government information
2 interest to be sufficient outside the electoral campaign context, plaintiffs now admit that interest
3 has been applied in the lobbying context, but only in the *direct* lobbying context. See ECF #22,
4 p. 18 (citing Harriss, at 620-21). But, as discussed above, at least two circuit courts have found a
5 sufficient government information interest in the *indirect* lobbying context. See Meggs, 87 F.3d
6 at 461; MSEPB, 761 F.2d at 512-13. Indeed, the informational interest “may in some ways be
7 stronger when the [lobbying] pressures [on government officials] are indirect,” and the Supreme
8 Court in Harriss, as noted by the Eleventh Circuit, “appears to have acknowledged as much
9 when, even reading the [lobbying] statute [at issue in that case] narrowly to apply only to ‘direct
10 communication,’ it nonetheless defined direct communications to include ‘artificially stimulated
11 letter campaign[s].’” Meggs, 87 F.3d at 461 (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 620).³⁹
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15 ³⁹ In Harriss, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the lobbying statute at issue applied “chiefly to three distinct
16 classes of so-called lobbyists,” including “[t]hose who do not visit the Capital but initiate propaganda from all over
17 the country, in the form of letters and telegrams, many of which have been based entirely upon misinformation as to
18 facts.” 347 U.S. at 620 n.10. Plaintiffs emphasize that the Supreme Court in Harriss stated it believed the purposes
19 of the specific reporting and disclosure provisions of the lobbying statute at issue there “should be construed to refer
20 only to ‘lobbying in its commonly accepted sense’ – to direct communication with members of Congress on pending
21 or proposed federal legislation.” Id. at 620. But the Supreme Court said this in the context of rejecting the position
22 of the government that those provisions should be applied even to those who do not by themselves, “*or through any
23 agent or employee or other persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives
24 money or any thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to aid in*” the
25 “passage or defeat of any legislation” or to “influence, directly *or indirectly*, the passage or defeat” thereof. Id. at
26 618-20 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it seems quite clear that the Supreme Court had intended
to include indirect as well as direct lobbying in its definition of the term “lobbying”. Further, the statement made
by the Supreme Court that “[i]t is likewise clear that Congress would have intended the [lobbying law] to operate on
this narrower basis, *even if a broader application to organizations seeking to propagandize the general public were
not permissible*,” refers to the Supreme Court’s decision to reject the government’s position and “narrow” the
definition of “lobbying” to include direct and *indirect* lobbying as noted above. Id. at 620-21 (emphasis added).

23 The reliance plaintiffs place on Sampson here is misplaced as well. See 625 F.3d at 1256 n.4 (distinguishing Harriss
24 on basis that it dealt with issue of preventing appearance of corruption in direct lobbying context, and thus it taught
25 “little” about disclosure requirements in ballot issue campaigns to influence public opinion). For the reasons
26 discussed above, furthermore, the Court finds unpersuasive the Tenth Circuit’s intimation that Harriss is limited only
to prevention of the appearance of corruption in the direct lobbying context. Finally, plaintiffs cite a Montana State
Supreme Court case, arguing that court narrowly construed Harriss as applying only to direct communication with
legislators. See Montana Automobile Ass’n v. Greely (“MAA”), 193 Mont. 378, 390-91 (1981). But in that case,
the court was tasked with having to construe a vague statutory provision, which required disclosure from people and
entities that appeared not to fall within the definition of the term “lobbying” adopted by the Supreme Court in

1 Plaintiffs go on to argue, though, that there is no evidence that disclosure of information
2 related to grassroots lobbying in Washington is necessary. In other words, plaintiffs assert that
3 because the state “has failed to identify any problem that prompted its” reporting and disclosure
4 requirements, the state “can do no more than simply ‘posit the existence of the disease sought to
5 be cured.’” ECF #22, p. 20 (quoting Davidson, 236 F.3d at 1198). But plaintiffs misapprehend
6 the level of empirical evidence the state is required to show to justify its reporting and disclosure
7 requirements. It is true that the state “must demonstrate that the recited harms [it seeks to protect
8 against] are real, not merely conjectural,” that the law at issue “will in fact alleviate these harms
9 in a direct and material way” and that “mere conjecture” is inadequate “to carry a First
10 Amendment burden.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) (citations
11 omitted); Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 664.

12
13 In Nixon, the Supreme Court found it sufficient that the state had presented an affidavit
14 from a State Senator intimately involved in working on the contribution limits law at issue in that
15 case, and that the district court had cited “newspaper accounts of large contributions supporting
16 inferences of impropriety.” Id. at 393; see also Taylor, 582 F.3d at 15 (noting that although
17 legislative record was limited, it was “no less substantial” than record Supreme Court regarded
18 as sufficient in Nixon). The Supreme Court further noted that an “overwhelming 74 percent of
19 the [state’s voters] determined that contribution limits [were] necessary to combat corruption and
20 the appearance thereof.” Id. at 394. Significantly, the Supreme Court went on to posit in relevant
21 part as follows:
22

23
24 There might, of course, be need for a more extensive evidentiary
25 documentation if [the plaintiffs] had made any showing of their own to cast

26 Harriss, and which the Montana State Supreme Court itself noted included attempts to “influence, directly *or*
indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation.” MAA, 193 Mont. at 390-91 (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 620)
(emphasis added).

1 doubt on the apparent implications of . . . the record here, but the closest [the
2 plaintiffs] come to challenging these conclusions is their invocation of
3 academic studies said to indicate that large contributions to public officials or
4 candidates do not actually result in changes in candidates' positions. . . .

4 Id. "The First Amendment," furthermore, "does not require" the government, for example, "to
5 conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated," as long as
6 "whatever evidence the [government] relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the
7 problem that the [law at issue] addresses." Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52
8 (1986); see also Taylor, 582 F.3d at 15 (rejecting plaintiff's contention that Congress's findings
9 set forth in Lobbying Disclosure Act were insufficient to support informational interest, and that
10 there must be studies, statistics or empirical evidence explaining why organizations like plaintiff
11 should be required to file disclosure statements).

13 Thus, although the government "must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence,"
14 "'substantiality is to be measured' by a 'deferential' standard," and "deference must be accorded
15 to [the government's] findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial measures
16 adopted for that end," if the courts are not to "infringe on traditional legislative authority to make
17 predictive judgments." Taylor, 582 F.3d at 15 (quoting Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 195-
18 96); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210
19 (1982) (observing that legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where
20 corruption is evil feared will not be second-guessed). Further, "while '[i]t is true that in some
21 First Amendment cases the Supreme Court has demanded an evidentiary showing in support of a
22 state's law,'" as the Federal Circuit has noted:

24 . . . '[i]t is also true that in other First Amendment cases the Supreme
25 Court has found 'various unprovable assumptions' sufficient to support the
26 constitutionality of state and federal laws,' [Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 1000 (D.C.Cir. 2009)] (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973)). At bottom,

1 this is not a case like *Turner Broadcasting*, where Congress’ justification for a
2 statute rested on ‘economic’ analysis that was susceptible to empirical
3 evidence. 520 U.S. at 199, 117 S.Ct. 1174. What we have instead is simply a
4 claim that good government requires greater transparency. That is a value
5 judgment based on the common sense of the people’s representatives, and
6 repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court as sufficient to justify disclosure
7 statutes. *See Harriss*, 347 U.S. at 625-26, 74 S.Ct. 808; *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at
8 66-67, 96 S.Ct. 612; *McConnell*, 540 U.S. at 196, 124 S.Ct. 619. ‘The fact
9 that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is
good for the people . . . is not a sufficient reason to find that statute
unconstitutional.’ *Paris Adult Theatre*, 413 U.S. at 62, 93 S.Ct. 2628. It
certainly was not a sufficient reason in *Harriss*, in which the Court made no
inquiry into whether the legislative record supported the determination that
disclosure of who was endeavoring to influence Congress was ‘a vital national
interest.’ 347 U.S. at 626, 74 S.Ct. 808.”

10 Talyor, 582 F.3d at 15 (also quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 555 F.3d at 1000 (citing
11 Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 195).

12 As the Federal Circuit found in Taylor, the Court here too finds the record in this case is
13 “no less substantial” than the record the Supreme Court regarded as sufficient in Nixon. First, as
14 noted above, as in Nixon, an overwhelming percentage of Washington voters – 72% and thus
15 almost nearly identical to that in Nixon as well – approved Initiative 276, which became RCW
16 Chapter 42.17. Also as noted above, defendants have provided the declaration of Jolene Unsold,
17 a former State Senator and member of Congress from Washington, who was “an early participant
18 in the effort that led to the passage of Initiative 276, and who described the “strong” public
19 interest in and “overall thrust” of that Initiative being “the people’s right to know, and to enable
20 citizens to ‘follow the money,’” not only in electoral campaigns, but in ballot measure campaigns
21 and with respect to “legislative lobbying” as well. ECF #25-2, Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 2, 4-5.

22 Also similar to Nixon, defendants have provided newspaper editorials from the time of
23 the Initiative 276 campaign, noting the emphasis on open disclosure in regard to both campaigns
24 and lobbying, and endorsing that effort. See id. at Exhibits A-1-A-4. In addition, the Court notes
25
26

1 the strong open disclosure language contained in the public policy declaration set forth in RCW
2 Chapter 42.17, which emphasizes the importance of full disclosure in the campaign and lobbying
3 contexts – and recognized, also as discussed above, by both Washington State and federal courts
4 – and views this in mind of the “deferential” standard with which the legislature’s findings are to
5 be accorded. As succinctly put by the Washington State Supreme Court:

6
7 The electorate, we believe, has the right to know of the sources and
8 magnitude of financial and persuasional influences upon government. The
9 voting public should be able to evaluate the performance of their elected
10 officials in terms of representation of the electors' interest in contradistinction
11 to those interests represented by lobbyists. . . . [T]he mosaic of [RCW Chapter
12 42.17] is designed to reveal the flow of expenditures incurred in efforts to
13 guide and direct government. The removal of any one element[, such as the
14 provisions thereof governing grassroots lobbying] would conceivably leave a
15 loop-hole area for exploitation by self-serving special interests. . . .

16 Fritz, 83 Wn.2d at 309-10. Given the widely recognized interest the state has in informing the
17 public as to the potential influences on the electoral and legislative processes – and the fact that
18 doing so in regard to grassroots lobbying is an integral aspect of that interest – the Court rejects
19 plaintiffs’ assertion that the state “has failed to identify any problem that prompted its regulation
20 of” grassroots lobbying. ECF #22, p. 20. To the contrary, that burden has been met.

21
22 5. Washington’s Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Requirements Are
23 Substantially Related to Its Asserted Informational Interest

24 Plaintiffs argue the reporting and disclosure requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200
25 are not narrowly tailored to the state’s informational interest. Specifically, plaintiffs argue the
26 expenditure reporting amounts contained in RCW 42.17.200 are so low, that the value of having
that information disclosed to the public is negligible. As noted above, the current amounts are
\$500 in any one-month period and \$1,000 in any three-month period. See ECF #25, ¶ 35; RCW
42.17.200(1). In addition, the names and addresses of each person contributing \$25 or more to a
grassroots lobbying campaign, along with the “aggregate amount contributed,” must be reported

1 as well. RCW 42.17.200(2)(c). These numbers, though, are not out of line with those that both
2 the Supreme Court and other federal courts have upheld.

3 For example, in Buckley, the law at issue there required records to be “kept by political
4 committees of the names and addresses of those who make contributions in excess of \$10,” and
5 of those whose contributions “aggregate more than \$100.” 424 U.S. at 82. In upholding those
6 thresholds, the Supreme Court stated in relevant part:

7
8 The \$10 and \$100 thresholds are indeed low. Contributors of relatively small
9 amounts are likely to be especially sensitive to recording or disclosure of their
10 political preferences. These strict requirements may well discourage
11 participation by some citizens in the political process, a result that Congress
12 hardly could have intended. Indeed, there is little in the legislative history to
13 indicate that Congress focused carefully on the appropriate level at which to
14 require recording and disclosure. Rather, it seems merely to have adopted the
15 thresholds existing in similar disclosure laws since 1910. *But we cannot
16 require Congress to establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable
17 threshold. The line is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left in the
18 context of this complex legislation to congressional discretion. We cannot
19 say, on this bare record, that the limits designated are wholly without
20 rationality.*^[40]

21 Id. at 83 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Canyon Ferry Road Baptist
22 Church of East Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth (“Canyon Ferry”), 556 F.3d 1021, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009);
23 CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 499 (“This Court . . . will not substitute its judgment as to what constitutes
24 the proper threshold amount for lobbying disclosure.”).

25 In support of their argument here, plaintiffs cite Canyon Ferry for the proposition that

26 ⁴⁰ The Supreme Court went on to further state:

“Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary.
It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. *But when it is seen
that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it
precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very
wide of any reasonable mark.*”

Id. at 83 n.11(citation omitted) (emphasis added). But because there was “no warrant” in Buckley “for assuming
that public disclosure of contributions between \$10 and \$100 [was] authorized by the [statute at issue],” the
Supreme Court did “not reach the question [of] whether information concerning gifts of this size [could] be made
available to the public without trespassing impermissibly on First Amendment rights.” Id. at 84.

1 “[a]s a matter of common sense, the value of [the] *financial* information to the voters declines
2 drastically as the value of the expenditure or contribution sinks to a negligible level.” 556 F.3d at
3 1033 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs, however, take this quote completely out of context. The
4 Ninth Circuit in Canyon Ferry declined to apply the disclosure provisions at issue in that case to
5 the plaintiff church’s “*de minimis in-kind* expenditures.” Id. at 1034 (emphasis in original). As
6 the Court of Appeals went on to explain:

7
8 . . . Expending a few moments of a pastor’s time, or a marginal additional
9 space in the Church for petitions, is so lacking in economic substance that we
10 have already held that requiring their reporting creates fatal problems of
11 unconstitutionality vagueness. Similarly, the value of public knowledge that the
12 Church permitted a single likeminded person to use its copy machine on a
single occasion to make a few dozen copies on her own paper – as the Church
did in this case – does not justify the burden imposed by Montana’s disclosure
requirements.

13 Id. Indeed, the “question” for the Ninth Circuit in Canyon Ferry was whether the state’s “‘zero
14 dollar’ threshold for disclosure was ‘wholly without rationality.’” Id. at 1033 (quoting Buckley,
15 424 U.S. at 83). The Court of Appeals explained in further relevant part:

16 . . . On the one hand, we recognize the principle that “signals are
17 transmitted ... not only by a contribution’s size but also by the contributor's
18 identity.” *Vote Choice v. DiStefano*, 4 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir.1993). On the
19 other hand, we cannot say that the informational value derived by the citizenry
20 is the same across expenditures of all sizes. As we have explained, in the
21 ballot issue context, the relevant informational goal is to inform voters as to
22 “who backs or opposes a given initiative” financially, so that the voters “will
23 have a pretty good idea of who stands to benefit from the legislation.” [CPCL-
24 I], 328 F.3d at 1106. As a matter of common sense, the value of this *financial*
25 information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the expenditure or
26 contribution sinks to a negligible level. As the monetary value of an
expenditure . . . approaches zero, financial sponsorship fades into support and
then into mere sympathy. In the present case, the voters could learn little
about the *financial* backing . . . by gaining access to information about the
Church’s activities of minimal economic effect.

Meanwhile, the burden of reporting remains constant even though the size
of the in-kind expenditure decreases to a negligible level. . . . While not
exceedingly onerous, such requirements undoubtedly constitute a burden,

1 even in the case of one-time expenditures, which may be reported in a
2 combined initial and closing report.

3 We conclude that, if the Supreme Court’s “rationality” test for threshold
4 disclosure levels has any force at all, there must be a level below which
5 mandatory disclosure of campaign expenditures . . . runs afoul of the First
6 Amendment. It may very well be that such a level is not susceptible to dollar
7 estimation or that all monetary contributions convey sufficiently valuable
8 information about the supporters of an initiative to justify the burden of
9 disclosure. But if we are to give *any* effect to *Buckley’s* “rationality” test, at
10 some point enough must be enough. . . .

11 Id. at 1033-34 (finding, as noted above, that the above *de minimis* in-kind expenditures made by
12 plaintiff lay beyond this point) (emphasis in original).

13 The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that “by applying its disclosure provisions” as it
14 did to the plaintiff’s “*de minimis* in-kind contributions,” the state violated the plaintiff’s First
15 Amendment rights. Id. at 1034. But the Court of Appeals expressly limited its holding “to this
16 formulation.” Id. It went on to note that it was “not concerned with – and express[ed] no view
17 about – the constitutionality of [the state’s] disclosure requirements . . . *as applied to monetary*
18 *contributions of any size.*” Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit also did “not purport to
19 establish a level above *de minimis* at which a disclosure requirement for in-kind expenditures . . .
20 passes constitutional muster.” Id. Rather, the Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he fixing of any such
21 level” was for the state “authorities in the first instance.” Id.

22 Plaintiffs point as well to the decision in Sampson, wherein the Tenth Circuit stated there
23 was “virtually no proper governmental interest in imposing disclosure requirements on” groups
24 such as the plaintiff, which had raised “so little money” in that case, namely “less than \$1,000 in
25 monetary and in-kind contributions.” 625 F.3d at 1249. As noted above, the disclosure statute at
26 issue in Sampson required any group “that ha[d] accepted or made contributions or expenditures
exceeding \$200” to register, and to “report the names and addresses of anyone” who contributed

1 “\$20 or more.” Id. The Tenth Circuit held the expenditures at issue to be “sufficiently small that
2 they [said] little about the contributors’ views of their financial interest.” Id. at 1261.

3 In so holding, though, the Tenth Circuit explicitly relied on the Ninth Circuit’s language
4 in Canyon Ferry that the value of such financial information to voters declined “drastically as the
5 value of the expenditure or contribution [sank] to a negligible level.” Id. at 1260-61 (quoting 625
6 F.3d at 1033). As just discussed, the focus of the Ninth Circuit’s inquiry in Canyon Ferry was *de*
7 *minimis* in-kind expenditures that essentially approached “zero” value. Indeed, also as discussed
8 above, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to set a minimum threshold level for expenditures or
9 contributions, leaving that to the state “in the first instance.” 625 F.3d at 1034. Nor should can
10 the Court ignore, again as discussed above, the fact that the public policy animating Colorado’s
11 disclosure requirements concerned primarily large expenditures and contributions, which played
12 an important part in the Tenth Circuit holding in that case.

13
14
15 The Court further notes that although the threshold amounts at issue here may be low, it
16 is important to keep in mind – as did the Honorable Ronald B. Leighton in a recent case dealing
17 with a similar challenge to the reporting and disclosure requirements contained in RCW Chapter
18 42.17 – that “even low dollar disclosure thresholds have a palliative purpose.” Family PAC v.
19 Reed, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-05662-RBL, ECF #88, Transcript of Proceedings, p. 9. This is
20 because “*in the aggregate* those [amounts] can make a profound difference in an election” or the
21 legislative decision-making process, “if they are being orchestrated by some group.” Id.
22 (emphasis added). Washington thus “has an interest in making sure that” its citizens “know
23 that,” and “that they can follow the money.” Id. at pp. 9, 11 (specifically finding this to be true in
24 regard to lower \$25 and \$100 thresholds at issue in that case).
25
26

1 “reporting provisions [contained in RCW 42.17.200] limit the fundraising ability” of those who
2 are regulated thereby. Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1014 (quoting Arizona Right to Life Committee
3 v. Miles (“ARTLC”), 441 F.3d 773, 791 (9th Cir. 2006)). In ARTLC, the Ninth Circuit found
4 the burdens imposed by the state’s financial reporting requirements were “not particularly
5 onerous,” in part because they required only the “reporting” of contributions and expenditures,
6 and “*in no way* limit[ed] the amount that may be” contributed or spent. 441 F.3d at 791
7 (emphasis added). Second, the Court of Appeals noted the requirements did not result in an
8 ability to “hardly raise any funds at all to engage in political speech[.]” Id.; see also Federal
9 Election Com'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”), 479 U.S. 238, 260 (1986).
10 So too, here, the reporting and disclosure requirements in RCW 42.17.200 themselves pose no
11 such limitation on plaintiffs’ ability to raise or spend funds to advance their political speech.
12

13 As for having to undergo major, unwarranted structural changes, plaintiffs have not been
14 “forced” by RCW 42.17.200 to make the kind of changes the Ninth Circuit noted in Human Life.
15 There, the disclosure law at issue required political committees to “appoint a treasurer and open a
16 bank account in the state of Washington,” in addition to having to comply with certain reporting
17 requirements. 624 F.3d at 998 (citing RCW 42.17.050(1)). The Ninth Circuit found that because
18 these requirements were “somewhat modest” and were “substantially related to the government’s
19 interest in informing the electorate,” they survived exacting scrutiny. Id. at 1014. In ARTLC, the
20 Ninth Circuit also upheld the challenged disclosure provisions in part on the basis that they were
21 “not ‘broad prophylactic rule[s]’ that require[d] structural changes,” such as requiring funds to be
22 “segregated”. 441 F.3d at 791; compare MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254 (finding statutory provision that
23 required incorporated entities to establish “separate segregated fund” in order “to engage in any
24 independent spending whatsoever, and to “appoint a treasurer” to, among other duties, keep “an
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1 account of every contribution regardless of amount” and “the name and address of any person to
2 whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount,” along with other reporting and disclosure
3 requirements, to be unduly burdensome).⁴¹

4 In this case, plaintiffs assert that because of the reporting and disclosure requirements in
5 RCW 42.17.200, they have had to “substantially modify their operations to properly comply with
6 the demands” thereof. ECF #22, p. 12. In support of this assertion, they point to the declaration
7 of Alfred R. Petermann, a representative of CE, who states therein that “it was obvious to [them]
8 that [they] could not, under the terms and conditions that [they] were operating,” do so under the
9 requirements imposed by RCW 42.17.200. ECF #22, Exhibit 9, p. 26. That is, complying with
10 the law simply “was not a workable thing.” *Id.*⁴² Plaintiffs, however, provide no specifics as to
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12

13 ⁴¹ As the Supreme Court in MCFL further explained in finding the particular statutory provision at issue in that case
14 to be unduly burdensome:

15 It is evident . . . that [the plaintiff] is subject to more extensive requirements and more
16 stringent restrictions than it would be if it were not incorporated. These additional regulations
17 may create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech. Detailed
18 recordkeeping and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint a treasurer and
19 custodian of the records, impose administrative costs that many small entities may be unable
20 to bear. Furthermore, such duties require a far more complex and formalized organization
21 than many small groups could manage. Restriction of solicitation of contributions to
22 “members” vastly reduces the sources of funding for organizations with either few or no
23 formal members, directly limiting the ability of such organizations to engage in core political
speech. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, as in this case, an incorporated group of like-
minded persons might seek donations to support the dissemination of their political ideas and
their occasional endorsement of political candidates, by means of garage sales, bake sales, and
raffles. Such persons might well be turned away by the prospect of complying with all the
requirements imposed by the [law at issue]. Faced with the need to assume a more
sophisticated organizational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file periodic
detailed reports, and to monitor garage sales lest nonmembers take a fancy to the merchandise
on display, it would not be surprising if at least some groups decided that the contemplated
political activity was simply not worth it.

24 479 U.S. at 254-55 (internal footnote omitted); but see Speechnow, 599 F.3d at 698 (stating “organizational
25 requirements . . . such as designating a treasurer and retaining records” do not “impose much of an additional
burden,” especially if targeted entity “intends to operate” with “relative simplicity”).

26 ⁴² Plaintiffs also point to the declaration of Ray Akers, a representative of MCOM, in which, they assert, he explains
how MCOM has “no method of tracking various contributions or expenditures.” ECF #22, pp. 12-13. But the
particular section of that declaration they cite does not actually contain such an explanation. See *id.*, Exhibit 5, pp.
62-68. In addition, even if one could be implied therefrom, neither Mr. Akers nor plaintiffs explain why MCOM has

1 why the way that CE – or MCOM for that matter – operates will not work if they were to comply
2 with RCW 42.17.200. That is, it is entirely insufficient to claim they will suffer undue burdens
3 merely on the stated basis that it is not “workable”. More importantly, though, again the statute
4 itself makes no actual demands on how plaintiffs or other similar organizations should structure
5 their operations, let alone ones that reach the level of those addressed in MCFL.

6
7 Plaintiffs do argue that the mandatory reporting and disclosure requirements contained in
8 RCW 42.17.200, have prevented – or will prevent – others from contributing to them, thus
9 chilling their First Amendment rights. Mr. Akers states in his declaration that “it’s hard to get
10 people . . . to sign anything in [his] neighborhood,” because “[t]hey come from cultures where
11 government cannot be trusted” and “has a real history of abuse,” and therefore “you cannot get
12 them to sign their names to things.” ECF #22, Exhibit 5, p. 46. Mr. Akers also voiced having
13 both “a fear” and “an experience” of being “pigeonholed by State elected leaders” as “an
14 archconservative,” if MCOM had “to document” themselves and make themselves “official”. Id.
15 at p. 48. He further stated that in his community, people would not sign any forms, because, he
16 believed, they do not “want to be associated with membership in a lot of groups,” i.e., they “like
17 to fly under the radar.” Id. at p. 77. Mr. Akers points as well to “a tremendous language barrier,”
18 so that it would make it “difficult enough to get a signature and even more difficult to tell them
19 they need to tell [him] how much they spent” on MCOM-related activities. Id. Ms. Murakami,
20 another representative of MCOM, also states in relevant part in her declaration that:
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24 not adopted one or why it would be unduly burdensome for it to do so. Further, as the holdings in MCFL, Human
25 Life and ARTL make clear, not just any structural change will be found to be unduly burdensome. In addition,
26 while Mr. Akers, similar to Mr. Peterman, states that “keep[ing] track of [contributions and expenditures] is onerous,
and . . . unreasonable,” as MCOM is “very, very grass roots” (see ECF #22, Exhibit 5, p. 47), as with Mr. Peterman,
this statement is completely lacking in specifics, such that the Court is unable to determine therefrom if MCOM
actually faces any undue burdens on its operations. See also ECF #22, Exhibit 11, Declaration of Patricia Murakami
(stating that because MCOM does not “have any paid staff,” it would be “time-consuming to report”).

1 . . . [W]e've got so many people that were part of our group when we were
2 fighting eminent domain and community renewal that are from other
3 countries, they're immigrants to this country, so they're afraid -- there is no
4 way that they would have exposed their name out publicly. They're afraid of
5 authority. They're afraid to go to a meeting and speak up. I mean, it was like
6 pulling teeth to get some of them to speak and say, no, I don't want you to
7 take my property. Because they -- like one gentleman came from Communist
8 China, and you can get killed for doing things like that.

9 So we had all kinds of barriers to overcome in getting that together to
10 keep people's homes and businesses intact. And there's no way that they
11 would want their names on a public record.

12 Id., Exhibit 11, p. 15.

13 Mr. Sussman, a founder of CE, states in his declaration that Washington's reporting and
14 disclosure requirements are "intimidating [them] from doing the kinds of political things" either
15 they should be or could be doing. ECF #22, Exhibit 6, p. 40. Mr. Sussman further states CE does
16 not want to report the names and addresses of "people who might be willing to donate to [CE] in
17 the future but now have become afraid because of the invasion of their own privacy." Id. at pp.
18 40-41. In terms of anyone actually not donating to CE because of this fear, though, Mr. Sussman
19 can only point to one instance as reported to him by Mr. Peterman, of a Ford dealership declining
20 to donate after being informed of the possible disclosure requirements. Id. at pp. 89-90. Indeed,
21 Mr. Sussman states he himself has no direct knowledge of this incident. See id.

22 Mr. Peterman for his part, states that CE is "deeply concerned," not because the PDC will
23 "come after" it, but because of the belief that there are "some aggressive groups in Seattle," and
24 that if CE was "to be lucky enough to influence legislation" or if it was "mentioned as [being]
25 supporters of something," then "someone might use the [PDC] as a tool to harm [it] financially
26 or legally." Id., Exhibit 9, p. 19. In regard to whether he knew of anyone who had been subject
to any threats or harassment as a result of having to comply with RCW 42.17.200, however, Mr.
Peterman could only state that from talking to people about contributing to CE "for educational

1 advocacy,” they did have a “concern” that “they would suffer some type of harassment or some
2 type of reaction to supporting a conservative group.” Id. at p. 55-56.

3 These statements do not rise to the requisite level of evidentiary proof plaintiffs have the
4 burden of showing to establish constitutional harm in this case. To satisfy that burden, plaintiffs
5 must establish ““a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure . . . will subject them to
6 threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.” Reed, 130
7 S.Ct. at 2820 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74). Plaintiffs can do so by demonstrating that “on
8 past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members
9 to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations
10 of public hostility.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.⁴³

12 As in this case, the plaintiff in Citizens United argued “disclosure requirements can chill
13 donations to an organization by exposing donors to retaliation,” and as evidence of such, pointed
14 “to recent events in which donors to certain causes were blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise
15 targeted for retaliation.” 130 S.Ct. at 916; see also ECF #22, Exhibit 9, p. 55 (pointing out in
16 context of petition for gay marriage, as example of harassment, calls by activists in Seattle for
17 names of petition signers, so their bosses and neighbors would know what they are thinking). As
18 the Supreme Court noted, though, while “[t]he examples cited” were “cause for concern,” the
19 plaintiff itself had “offered no evidence that *its* members may face similar threats or reprisals.”
20 Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 876 (recognizing statute “would be unconstitutional as applied to an
21 organization if there were a *reasonable probability* that the group’s members would face threats,
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25 ⁴³ “Under these circumstances,” the Supreme Court continued, “we think it apparent that compelled disclosure . . . is
26 likely to affect adversely the ability of [the plaintiff] and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs
which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the [plaintiff] and
dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of
the consequences of this exposure.” Id. at 462-63.

1 harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed.”) (emphasis added).

2 As the Supreme Court explained in greater detail in Buckley in regard to an overbreadth
3 challenge to the application of disclosure requirements to minor parties and independents, which
4 are in a not dissimilar position to groups such as plaintiffs in this case:

5 In *NAACP v. Alabama* the organization had “made an uncontroverted
6 showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file
7 members (had) exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
8 employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
9 hostility,” 357 U.S., at 462, 78 S.Ct., at 1172, and the State was unable to
10 show that the disclosure it sought had a ‘substantial bearing’ on the issue it
11 sought to clarify, *id.*, at 464, 78 S.Ct. at 1172. Under those circumstances,
the Court held that “whatever interest the State may have in (disclosure) has
not been shown to be sufficient to overcome [the plaintiff’s] constitutional
objections.” *Id.*, at 465, 78 S.Ct., at 1173.

12 . . . No record of harassment on a similar scale was found in this case. . . .
13 *NAACP v. Alabama* is inapposite where, as here, any serious infringement
14 on First Amendment rights brought about by the compelled disclosure of
15 contributors is highly speculative.

16 . . .

17 We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the
18 associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to
19 supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less
20 likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs
in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions
to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also
suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the
free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena.

21 There could well be a case, similar to those before the Court in *NAACP*
22 *v. Alabama* . . . where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is
23 so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that
the [disclosure statute’s] requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.
24 *But no appellant in this case has tendered record evidence of the sort*
25 *proffered in NAACP v. Alabama. Instead, [the plaintiffs] primarily rely on*
26 *“the clearly articulated fears of individuals, well experienced in the political*
process.” . . . At best they offer the testimony of several minor-party officials
that one or two persons refused to make contributions because of the
possibility of disclosure. On this record, the substantial public interest in

1 *disclosure identified by the legislative history of [the disclosure statute]*
2 *outweighs the harm generally alleged.*

3 . . .

4 We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a
5 heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor
6 parties is necessary. Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in
7 the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. *The evidence*
8 *offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled*
9 *disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats,*
10 *harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.*
11 *The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present*
12 *harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment*
13 *directed against the organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific*
14 *manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no*
15 *history upon which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and*
16 *threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views.*

17 *Where it exists the type of chill and harassment identified in NAACP v.*
18 *Alabama can be shown. . . .*

19 424 U.S. at 69-72, 74. (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The evidence, or rather the
20 lack thereof, presented by plaintiffs in this case, is substantially similar to that the Supreme Court
21 found lacking in Buckley. For the same reasons, this Court so concludes as well. See Reed, 130
22 S.Ct. at 2821 (“Plaintiffs . . . have provided . . . scant evidence or argument beyond the burdens
23 they assert disclosure would impose.”)⁴⁴

24 ⁴⁴ Other federal courts are in agreement. For example, in the lobbying context, the district court in CICU noted the
25 plaintiffs in that case had argued that “since their public policy advocacy is labeled lobbying, and lobbying has a
26 pejorative connotation in the public’s perception, they [were] forced to curtail their activities,” which the district
27 court noted fell “largely into the category of self-censorship.” 534 F.Supp. at 498. The district court rejected that
28 argument, though, because there was “no factual record of economic reprisals, loss of employment, threats, or other
29 manifestations of hostility . . . as in NAACP v. Alabama.” Id. In Taylor, again in the lobbying context, the Federal
30 Circuit found as follows:

31 This, then, is a case like Buckley, not NAACP. As in Buckley, the plaintiff has tendered
32 no “record evidence of the sort proffered in NAACP v. Alabama.” 424 U.S. at 71, 96 S.Ct.
33 612. *Instead, it primarily relies on “clearly articulated fears” and a few examples of*
34 *harassment unconnected to lobbying disclosures by [the plaintiff] or any other entity.*
35 Moreover, the risks that [the plaintiff] claims its members would suffer if their participation in
36 controversial lobbying were revealed are no different from those suffered by any organization
37 that employs or hires lobbyists itself, and little different from those suffered by any individual
38 who contributes to a candidate or political party. If that kind of risk rendered [the challenged

1 D. There Is No Constitutional Violation Due to Vagueness

2 “[A] vague regulation of speech infringes on First Amendment rights.” Voters Education
3 Committee, 161 Wn.2d at 484 (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72
4 (1997) (“The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of
5 its obvious chilling effect on free speech.”). A statute “is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to
6 provide a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, or is so indefinite as to
7 allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1019 (citation
8 omitted); see also Canyon Ferry, 556 F.3d at 1028, 1030 (vagueness found where statute “‘fails
9 to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand’ whether their
10 activities require disclosure under the statute”; law unconstitutionally vague where entity “had *no*
11 *way of knowing ex ante*” its conduct would be covered thereby) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530
12 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)) (emphasis added); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967) (law void
13 for vagueness when it “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague [persons]
14 of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”)
15 (citation omitted).

16 “[P]erfect clarity,” though, “is not required even when a law regulates protected speech.”
17 Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1019 (quoting California Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. Of Educ., 271
18 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Taylor, 582 F.3d at 23 (noting “perfect clarity and
19 precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity”)
20 (quoting United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008)). As the Ninth Circuit has
21

22 statute] unconstitutional, it would invalidate most compelled lobbying disclosures in
23 contravention of *Harriss*, and most compelled campaign finance disclosures in contravention
24 of *Buckley*. Accordingly, we reject both [the plaintiff’s] facial and as-applied First
25 Amendment challenges.
26

582 F.3d at 22 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

1 noted, “we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” Id. (quoting Grayned v.
2 City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)); see also CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 502 (noting “some
3 weighing” of whether particular activities may come within purview of disclosure statute “is true
4 of all types of disclosure laws,” given that such statutes need not “cover every conceivable set of
5 circumstances that may arise under” them); Kimbell, 164 Vt. at 89 (“[A] statute need not detail
6 every circumstance that would amount to a violation.”) (citing CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 502, and
7 quoting State v. Hoebel, 41 N.W.2d 865, 867 (1950) (“It is not required that a statute be so
8 elaborate in its detailed specifications as to meet every possible state of circumstances that may
9 arise under it.”)). Thus, “[e]ven when a law implicates First Amendment rights, the constitution
10 must tolerate a certain amount of vagueness.” California Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1151.

12 But “[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
13 may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1020 (quoting
14 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). “A statute’s vagueness exceeds constitutional
15 limits if its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial, and if the statute
16 is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at
17 1020 n.9 (quoting California Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1151); see also Buckley, 4224 U.S. at
18 77 (“Where First Amendment rights are involved, an even “greater degree of specificity’ is
19 required”) (citation omitted). “On the other hand, if the general class of offenses to which the
20 statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague even
21 though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.” Harriss, 347 U.S. at 618.

24 In addition, “speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before
25 the Court will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is surely valid ‘in the vast majority
26 of its intended applications.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1021 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.

1 703, 733 (2000)). Thus, “the belief that the mere fact that close cases can be envisioned renders
2 a statute vague’ is a ‘basic mistake.’” Taylor, 583 F.3d at 23 (quoting Williams, 128 S.Ct. at
3 1845 (2008)) (noting further that while “the statute [in Taylor] may not be a paragon of clarity, it
4 is not so vague as to violate the Constitution, even applying the heightened standard applicable to
5 regulation of speech”); see also CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 502 (declining to accept argument made
6 by plaintiffs concerning vagueness, because it was based on too “expansive” reading of statute);
7 Kimbell, 164 Vt. at 88-89 (“[F]ears of prosecution must be based on reasonable interpretations of
8 the statute in question.”) (citing CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 502).

10 “Where the constitutional requirement of definiteness is at stake,” furthermore, the Court
11 must “construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature’s purpose, to avoid
12 the shoals of vagueness.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77-78; see also Harriss, 347 U.S. at 618 (stating
13 that if “general class of offenses” addressed by statute “can be made constitutionally definite by
14 a reasonable construction” thereof, courts have duty to give it that construction). “Moreover,
15 ‘otherwise imprecise terms may avoid vagueness problems when used in combination with terms
16 that provide sufficient clarity.’” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1021 (“[V]agueness challenges will be
17 rejected when it is ‘clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits.’”) (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at
18 110).

20 Plaintiffs argue “Washington’s law” is unconstitutionally vague, because “[e]ven after a
21 review of the *relevant statutory language and agency materials* posted on the PDC website,”
22 they “were unable to determine whether *the law or its exemptions* applied to their activities.”
23 ECF #22, p. 13 (emphasis added). “As a result,” plaintiffs assert, “they were forced to seek
24 official guidance in the form of a petition for a declaratory order.” Id. Plaintiffs go on to argue
25 that their position here is bolstered by the fact that only “[a]fter *three months* of correspondence,
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1 information gathering, analysis, and internal deliberation, the PDC finally ruled that . . . the
2 grassroots lobbying law would apply to their activities if they exceeded the applicable financial
3 thresholds.” Id. (emphasis in original).

4 The Court agrees with defendants, however, that plaintiffs fail to specifically identify any
5 term contained in RCW 42.17.200 or RCW 42.17.160 they allege to be unconstitutionally vague.
6 Indeed, they point to no particular language in either statutory provision – or elsewhere in RCW
7 Chapter 42.17 for that matter – the lack of specificity of which implicates their First Amendment
8 rights. Rather, as indicated above, they merely refer to the “relevant” statutory language, agency
9 materials or the law or its exemptions in general. Without more, the Court is unable to determine
10 with any precision what constitutional infirmity they are claiming, nor will it speculate for them.
11 In addition, the Court finds nothing in the statutory language contained in RCW 42.17.200 or in
12 RCW 42.17.160 fails to provide “a reasonable opportunity” to those who may come within its
13 purview “to know what conduct is prohibited.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1019.

14 Indeed, that language is quite clear as to the persons, entities and activities covered and to
15 the threshold levels at which such coverage comes into play, as discussed previously herein. As
16 such, this is not the type of case where plaintiffs “had *no way* of knowing *ex ante*” that what they
17 may have wanted to do would be covered by Washington’s grassroots lobbying disclosure laws.
18 California Teachers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). As recognized by many courts, a
19 statute need not “cover every conceivable set of circumstances that may arise under it” to pass
20 constitutional muster, and mere “speculation” or “belief” about “possible vagueness . . . will not
21 support a facial attack . . . when” – as in this case – “it surely is valid ‘in the vast majority of its
22 intended applications.’” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1021 (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 733); Taylor,
23 583 F.3d at 23 (quoting Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1845); CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 503.

1 More precisely, plaintiffs have not shown either through their own experience or that of
2 any other similar group that either RCW 42.17.200 or RCW 42.17.160 “‘fails to provide people
3 of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand’ whether their activities require
4 disclosure.” Canyon Ferry, 556 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 732). While it is true that
5 one representative of CE did state in his declaration that at least with respect to events in which
6 CE spends money, “it gets foggy as to exactly who you’re going to include” in terms of reporting
7 who participated in those events (ECF #22, Exhibit 6, p. 42), again “perfect clarity” in a statute’s
8 language is not required (see Taylor, 582 F.3d at 23 (quoting Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1845). Nor
9 is it even clear that plaintiffs have made a real, let alone reasonable, effort to comply with the
10 disclosure requirements contained in RCW 42.17.200. See ECF #22, Exhibit 5, p. 48 (“Honestly,
11 I don’t know the extent to which reporting is required.”); see also ECF #22, Exhibit 11, ¶¶ 14,
12 21; ECF #25, ¶¶ 24-26, 35, 49-50, 68-69.

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14
15 Indeed, while plaintiffs assert they were “forced” to seek official guidance in the form of
16 a declaratory order, the record shows they did not take advantage of the many other avenues for
17 seeking such guidance that are available to the public short of petitioning for a declaratory order.
18 See ECF #24, Exhibit 11, ¶¶ 14, 21; ECF #25, ¶¶ 24-26, 35, 49-50, 68-69. In addition, although
19 as noted above, plaintiffs make much of the fact that it took three months for the PDC to rule on
20 their petition – which was submitted on December 3, 2009 – this was because consideration of
21 the petition took place at the PDC’s next regularly scheduled hearing, which did not occur until
22 January 28, 2010. See ECF #1, ¶¶ 75-76; ECF #25, ¶¶ 80, 83, 88; ECF #25-3, Exhibit 22.
23 Consideration of the draft declaratory order took place on February 26, 2010, the very next
24 scheduled hearing. ECF #25, ¶¶ 89-91 As such, there is no indication the PDC did not act in a
25 reasonably timely manner here, or was delayed in the action it took due to any difficulty or
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1 confusion in applying the relevant law. To the contrary, the declaratory order is quite clear as to
2 the applicability thereof. See ECF #25-3, Exhibit 23.

3 E. There Has Been No Prior Restraint on Free Speech or Association Rights

4 “Prior restraints on speech are disfavored and carry a ‘heavy presumption’ of invalidity.”
5 Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach (“Long Beach”), 574 F.3d 1011, 1023
6 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992)).

7 This is because such restraints “are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
8 Amendment rights.” Id. (citation omitted). Those that have been “found invalid” have all given
9 “public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression.” Id. (quoting
10 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n.5 (1989)).

11 While “[a] prior restraint need not actually result in suppression of speech in order to be
12 constitutionally invalid,” the “relevant question [in determining whether something is a prior
13 restraint] is whether the challenged regulation *authorizes* suppression of speech in advance of its
14 expression.” Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 795 n.5) (emphasis in original). “‘Reasonable time,
15 place, [and] manner restrictions’ on speech are permissible.” Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. For
16 Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). As the Ninth Circuit has noted:

17 . . . “[R]estrictions of this kind are valid provided [1] that they are justified
18 without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [2] that they are
19 narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and [3] that they
20 leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”

21 Id. (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).

22 Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that RCW 42.17.200 and the regulations promulgated
23 by the PDC require them “and others to register . . . and file monthly reports *in order to engage*
24 *in constitutionally protected speech and association*,” and therefore that they “constitute a prior
25 restraint.” ECF #1, ¶¶ 142-43 (emphasis added). However, plaintiffs provide absolutely no
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1 argument, or point to any evidence, in support of these allegations. As such, the Court finds
2 plaintiffs have not properly presented them for summary judgment purposes. See Carmicle v.
3 Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (issue not argued
4 with specificity in briefing will not be addressed); Paladin Associates., Inc. v. Montana Power
5 Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003) (by failing to make argument in opening brief,
6 objection to grant of summary judgment was waived); Kim v. Kang, 154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th
7 Cir.1998) (matters not specifically and distinctly argued in opening brief ordinarily will not be
8 considered).

9
10 In addition, the Court notes that even if plaintiffs had properly presented this claim for
11 consideration, they would not succeed in establishing the existence of a constitutionally invalid
12 prior restraint here. First, as discussed previously, the reporting and disclosure requirements in
13 RCW 42.17.200 do not “authorize” the suppression of speech or association, and therefore it
14 does not *require* plaintiffs to register and file monthly reports *in order to engage* in free speech
15 or to exercise their right of association. Accordingly, because Washington’s grassroots lobbying
16 disclosure laws do not actually restrict speech, they also are not content-based, and thus do not
17 constitute a prior restraint on plaintiffs’ asserted rights. It also should be noted here as discussed
18 above, that those laws are sufficiently tailored to an important governmental interest, namely the
19 state’s interest in informing the public.
20

21 F. There Is No Violation of the Right to Petition the Government

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23 Plaintiffs allege as well in their complaint as follows: (1) that the ability to exercise the
24 First Amendment to petition the government for redress of grievances “depends on their freedom
25 from unreasonable regulations that would substantially burden their activities,” (2) that RCW
26 42.17.200 “is not sufficiently tailored to serve any compelling, important, substantial or even

1 legitimate state interest”; and (3) that the application of RCW 42.17.200 and the regulations the
2 PDC has promulgated, on their face and as applied, “severely burden” the right to petition the
3 government for redress of grievances. ECF #1, ¶¶ 130-32.

4 As with their prior restraint argument, though, plaintiffs here too have failed to provide
5 any argument – or point to any evidence – in support of the above claims, and thus the Court
6 declines to give them any credence. See Carmicle, 533 F.3d at 1161 n.2; Paladin Associates.,
7 Inc., 328 F.3d at 1164; Kim, 154 F.3d at 1000. In addition, as discussed elsewhere herein, RCW
8 42.17.200 does not substantially burden the First Amendment right to engage in free speech or
9 right of association and is sufficiently tailored to an important governmental interest. Given that
10 plaintiffs’ argument regarding the right to petition the government is based on these other claims,
11 even if plaintiffs had properly presented this issue for the Court’s consideration, they would not
12 have succeeded in summary judgment.
13

14
15 G. There Has Been No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

16 Plaintiffs’ last claim is that RCW 42.17.200, RCW 42.17.160 and the PDC’s regulations
17 “place an arbitrary burden” on their First Amendment rights and those of others, but do “not
18 impose similar burdens on the First Amendment rights of the media and certain public officials.”
19 ECF #1, ¶ 136. Although not alleged in their complaint, plaintiffs also argue RCW 42.17.160(5)
20 impermissibly exempts from the reporting and disclosure requirements in RCW 42.17.200, those
21 “who restrict their lobbying activities to no more than four days or parts thereof during any three-
22 month period.” ECF #22, p. 22. The existence of these exemptions, plaintiffs claim, deprive
23 both them and others of the equal protection of the law. ECF #1, ¶ 139. Because “the challenged
24 exemptions are triggered based on the identity of the speaker *and* their subject,” plaintiffs further
25 assert, they are “content-based and must be subject to strict scrutiny,” a standard which cannot be
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1 met here. ECF #1, ¶ 138; ECF #22, p. 23 (emphasis in original).

2 Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause “all persons similarly circumstanced” are to be
3 “treated alike.” Gillbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 871 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
4 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). The issue, therefore, is whether others “similarly
5 situated” to plaintiffs are treated differently. Id. (quoting Milikotin v. City of Los Angeles, 643
6 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1981) (allegation of “unequal treatment of persons similarly situated . . .
7 [is] the gravamen of a complaint for denial of equal protection”). However, none of the entities
8 or individuals in the above exemptions is similarly situated to plaintiffs. Indeed, plaintiffs make
9 no argument that they should be included in the same category as the media, government
10 officials or those who come briefly to directly lobby the legislature, nor would they be able to
11 mount any serious argument in that direction.

12
13 “Like other classifications, regulatory distinctions among different kinds of speech may
14 fall afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 n.9 (1994).⁴⁵
15 But while the exemptions plaintiffs challenge here may be directed at specific types of speakers,
16 as discussed above they do not regulate speech *per se*, given that they are only exemptions from
17 the reporting and disclosure requirements contained in RCW Chapter 42.17. Accordingly, since
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20 ⁴⁵ As the Supreme Court explained:

21 . . . [A]n exemption from an otherwise permissible *regulation of speech* may represent a
22 governmental “attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in
23 expressing its views to the people.” . . . Alternatively, through the combined operation of a
24 *general speech restriction* and *its* exemptions, the government might seek to select the
25 “permissible subjects for public debate” and thereby to “control . . . the search for political
26 truth.”

24 Id. at 51 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs reliance on Citizens United here, therefore, is misplaced,
25 given that, as discussed previously, that case dealt with a *direct* regulation of speech with respect to corporate media
26 entities. See 130 S.Ct. at 898-99 (“Prohibited . . . are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing
speech by some but not others. . . . *Speech restrictions* based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a
means to control content.”). Indeed, as further discussed previously, Citizens United itself distinguished such direct
regulation of speech from the type of reporting and disclosure requirements here, which constitute “a less restrictive
alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech.” Id. at 915 (emphasis added).

1 those who do not come within the above exemptions are not thereby subject to a direct regulation
2 of their free speech rights by such requirements – than those who do come within the exemptions
3 avoid – the statutory framework creates no distinction among different kinds of speech. As such,
4 no constitutional violation has been shown here.

5
6 CONCLUSION

7 Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of
8 material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs have failed in all
9 instances to allege facts sufficient to form a constitutional violation. As such, plaintiffs’ motion
10 for summary judgment (see ECF #22) hereby is DENIED, and summary judgment for defendants
11 hereby is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ civil rights complaint therefore hereby is DISMISSED.

12 DATED this 8th day of November, 2011.

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16 Karen L. Strombom
17 United States Magistrate Judge
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