



Richard M. Jackson, Sr. d/b/a/ RMJ Investigations (“Jackson”) appeals pro se the small claims court’s order that he be represented by counsel in his efforts to enforce an assigned judgment. Finding that his appeal is not properly before us, we dismiss.

On February 20, 2008, Ronald Meyer obtained a small claims money judgment against Benjamin Parks. On April 8, 2009, Meyer filed an acknowledgement with the small claims court that he had assigned his rights to the money judgment to Liberty Cook d/b/a Freedom Judgment Recovery (“Cook”). Cook subsequently filed a pro se verified motion for proceedings supplemental, which motion was granted by the small claims court on May 11, 2009. A hearing for the proceedings supplemental was set for June 24, 2009. However, on June 11, 2009, the small claims court vacated the scheduled hearing on the basis that Cook, as holder of an assigned claim, must be represented by an attorney pursuant to Indiana Small Claims Rule 8(C). On December 17, 2009, Jackson obtained the judgment by assignment from Cook and filed a pro se motion to substitute himself d/b/a RMJ Investigations as the new plaintiff in the proceedings supplemental. On February 8, 2010, the small claims court issued the following order:

The Court orders the Clerk to correct the caption of this case to the above caption to show Richard M. Jackson as the assignee of the original Plaintiff. The Court notes that pursuant to Small Claims Rule 8(C), an assignee must be represented by an attorney on a small claims case.

Appellant’s App. at 5. Jackson filed a pro se motion to correct error, and the small claims court denied that motion on March 2, 2010. Thereafter, on March 12, 2010, Jackson filed his notice of appeal.

We begin by noting that Jackson filed this appeal pro se. A litigant who chooses to proceed pro se will be held to the same established rules of procedure as trained legal counsel. *Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc.*, 831 N.E.2d 812, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, we will hold Jackson to the same standards as a licensed attorney. Jackson filed his notice of appeal seeking to appeal the “interlocutory order” of the small claims court that he may not proceed pro se but is required to be represented by counsel in the proceedings supplemental. Appellant’s App. at 55. Our rules of appellate procedure provide that we have jurisdiction over interlocutory orders only under certain conditions provided in Indiana Appellate Rule 14. *Young v. Estate of Sweeney*, 808 N.E.2d 1217, 1219-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 5(B)). Jackson’s appeal is not properly before this court under any of the conditions or procedures provided for interlocutory review and, thus, we do not have jurisdiction over this so-called “interlocutory appeal.”

Moreover, upon review of the record before us, we have determined that Jackson is not challenging a final appealable order of the small claims court. A final judgment “disposes of all issues as to all parties, to the full extent of the court to dispose of the same, and puts an end to the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues.” *Id.* at 1220 n.4 (citations omitted). “A final judgment reserves no further question or direction for future determination.” *Id.* (quoting *Thompson v. Thompson*, 259 Ind. 266, 269, 286 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1972)); *see also* Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1) (judgment is a final judgment if it disposes of all claims as to all parties). The effect of the small claims court’s orders in this case was limited to requiring that Jackson be represented by counsel in the proceedings

supplemental. The small claims court's orders do not end the proceedings supplemental as to all parties and issues. In sum, Jackson's appeal is not properly before this Court. Therefore, we must dismiss.

Dismissed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.