

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of Thunder M. Arends, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

KRISTIANNE ARENDS,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

MATTHEW NELSON,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED

July 15, 1997

No. 195189

Oakland Probate Court

LC No. 94-058017

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and D.A. Teeple*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Kristianne Arends (“respondent”) appeals as of right from the probate court’s order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) [continuing conditions], MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) [parent could not provide proper care] and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(j) [child harmed if returned]. We affirm.

The minor child was born in May 1994, and the DSS filed a complaint for temporary foster care a few days after the birth. The DSS alleged that respondent was incapable of providing for the child because of her paranoid schizophrenia and her ten hospitalizations for mental illness over the previous four years. In June 1994, the probate court made the child a temporary ward of the court. In September 1994, the court indicated that another hearing would be held in six months, giving

* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

respondent “ample opportunity” to stay on her medication and follow the terms of her treatment program. However, at the June 1995 hearing, respondent had not gained employment, and had ceased attending drug treatment. She had completed parenting classes, and she attended twenty out of thirty-four visits with her child, however, she failed to apply the concepts taught in parenting classes during her visits and she did not feed the child properly. She had difficulty managing her apartment and her only source of income was SSI.

The probate court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The record reveals that the probate court examined the total circumstances, not merely respondent-appellant’s psychiatric evaluations. Although the caseworkers provided services to respondent, her mental illness precludes her from meeting the child’s parental needs. *In re Glass*, 173 Mich App 444; 434 NW2d (1988). Further, respondent-appellant failed to show that termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interest. *In re Hall-Smith*, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No 195833, issued 3/25/97), slip op p 3. Thus, the probate court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5).

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald A. Teeple