## STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

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In the Matter of CORNELL LEENARD MOORE, Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

UNPUBLISHED September 11, 1998

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

No. 204054 Wayne Juvenile Court LC No. 87-264933

BOBBIE RAGSDALE, a/k/a CLARK SMITH,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

PORTIA LORETTA MOORE, a/k/a PORTIA C. MOORE and PATRICIA MOORE,

Respondent.

Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Wahls and Cavanagh, JJ.

## MEMORANDUM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to Cornell Leenard Moore. We affirm. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

Respondent-appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (h), (i) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g), (h), (i) and (j). The written opinion in this case contains two different sections entitled "Conclusions of Law." The first section indicates that respondent-appellant's parental rights were terminated pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (h) and (j). The second section indicates that respondent-appellant's parental rights were terminated pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(g), (h) and (j), and does not refer to § 19b(3)(c)(i). Because both "Conclusions of law" sections refer to §§ 19b(3)(g), (h), and (j), we will only consider those subsections.

We conclude that the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that these statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, respondent-appellant does not argue that termination of his parental rights was clearly not in the child's best interests. *In re Hall-Smith*, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). Thus, the juvenile court did not err in terminating respondent-appellant's parental rights to the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5).

Affirmed.

/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr. /s/ Myron H. Wahls /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This subsection is inapplicable to respondent-appellant because it is clear from the record that the juvenile court referred to this subsection only with respect to the child's mother, who is not a party to this appeal.