

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of KYLE ALLEN KIDD and DAVID
BRIAN KROWL, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

SANDRA JUNE CASTILLO, a/k/a SANDRA
JUNE KIDD, a/k/a SANDRA JUNE KROWL,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

ALVIN KIDD and DAVID BRIAN KROWL, SR.,

Respondents.

In the Matter of KYLE ALLEN KIDD, Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

ALVIN R. KIDD,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

UNPUBLISHED

April 28, 2000

No. 218515

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 98-362278

No. 218790

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 98-362278

SANDRA JUNE CASTILLO, a/k/a SANDRA
JUNE KIDD, a/k/a SANDRA JUNE KROWL, and
DAVID BRIAN KROWL, SR.,

Respondents.

Before: Collins, P.J., and Neff and Smolenski, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondents-appellants Sandra June Krowl and Alvin Kidd appeal as of right the termination of their parental rights to Kyle Allen Kidd pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

In Docket No. 218515, the family court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) were both established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Krowl. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Because only one statutory ground is required to terminate parental rights, *In re Huisman*, 230 Mich App 372, 384-385; 584 NW2d 349 (1998), we need not decide whether termination of respondent Krowl's parental rights was also warranted under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii) and (j). Because respondent Krowl failed to show that termination of her parental rights was clearly not in the child's best interests, MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5), the family court did not err in terminating her parental rights to the child. *In re Hall-Smith*, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).

In Docket No. 218790, the family court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Kidd. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, *supra*. Because only one statutory ground is required in order to terminate parental rights, *In re Huisman*, *supra*, we need not decide whether termination of respondent Kidd's parental rights was also warranted under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i) and (j). Because respondent Kidd failed to show that termination of his parental rights was clearly not in the child's best interests, MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5), the family court did not err in terminating his parental rights to the child. *In re Hall-Smith*, *supra*.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski