STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of APRIL VANDUKER, MICHAEL A. ADKINS and NICHOLAS EDWARD ADKINS, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

LISA VANDUKER,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

MICHAEL ADKINS,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED
September 26, 2000

No. 219920
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 95-041351

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Saad and Meter, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent appeals as of right from the family court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

Respondent argues that the family court erred in terminating her parental rights. A two-prong test applies to a family court's decision to terminate parental rights. First, the court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b; MSA 27.3178(598.19b) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. *In re Jackson*, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). This Court reviews the findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). A finding of fact is clearly

erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. *Jackson*, *supra* at 25.

Once a statutory ground for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence, the court must terminate parental rights unless "there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child's best interest." *In re Trejo*, ___ Mich ___, ___; 612 NW2d 407 (Docket No. 112528, issued 7/5/00), slip op p 14; see also MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5). The trial court's ultimate decision regarding termination is reviewed in its entirety for clear error. *In re Hall-Smith*, 222 Mich App 470, 472; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).

We first note that this Court's review is limited by respondent's failure to respond to this Court's request for numerous lower court exhibits. Moreover, after carefully reviewing the record, we are not persuaded that the family court clearly erred in finding that subsections (3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the trial court's decision to terminate respondent's parental rights.

Furthermore, respondent's claim that the family court abused its discretion in allowing a protective services worker to testify was not properly preserved for appeal because respondent did not object below on the same ground raised on appeal. See *Anton v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co*, 238 Mich App 673, 688; 607 NW2d 123 (1999). Further, the issue is abandoned because respondent has failed to cite any authority in support of her claim. *Prince v MacDonald*, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999). Likewise, we need not consider respondent's claim that the court erred in admitting a particular exhibit into evidence because respondent does not raise this issue in her statement of questions presented, MCR 7.212(C)(5), and because respondent has failed to adequately brief the issue or support it by citation to authority. *Prince*, *supra* at 197.

Finally, we find no merit to respondent's claim that the family court's findings of fact were insufficient. The court's findings indicate that it was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law, and appellate review would not be facilitated by a remand for further explanation. See *Triple E Produce Corp v Mastronardi Produce, Ltd*, 209 Mich App 165, 176; 530 NW2d 772 (1995).

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Patrick M. Meter