STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of MARTEZ DEON GLOVER, Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

KIM MARIE GLOVER,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

TONY N. WEBB,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED
October 20, 2000

No. 222264
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 83-237308

Before: Neff, P.J., and Talbot and J. B. Sullivan,* JJ.

PER CURIUM.

Respondent-appellant Kim Glover (hereinafter "respondent") appeals by delayed leave granted the termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i),[1] (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

We reject respondent's claim that she was not properly served with a summons for the adjudicative hearing in September 1998. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the record contains

[1] Respondent incorrectly states that the trial court terminated her rights under § 19b(3)(c)(ii). The record indicates that the court relied on § 19b(3)(c)(i), in addition to the other grounds cited.

* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

a return of service showing that respondent was personally served with a summons and a copy of the petition at the preliminary hearing in July 1998, when the date was set for the adjudicative hearing. Moreover, respondent was present at the adjudicative hearing and raised no objection based on lack of service. Accordingly, we find no merit in this argument.

The family court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Respondent did not begin to work on her treatment plan until approximately a month before the termination hearing. Moreover, she was required to seek substance abuse treatment or submit to drug testing, but failed to do either. Because respondent made no significant progress in these areas, and considering her past history, we conclude that respondent's parental rights were properly terminated under subsections 19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j).

Furthermore, respondent has not challenged the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights under subsection 19b(3)(a)(ii). Because only one statutory ground is required to terminate parental rights, *In re McIntyre*, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), and because respondent has not challenged the trial court's decision to terminate under subsection 19b(3)(a)(ii), she has not shown that she is entitled to appellate relief with regard to the question whether a statutory ground for termination was established.

We find no merit in respondent's claims that she was arbitrarily required to meet certain goals and that she was not offered reasonable assistance by petitioner to address the goals of her treatment plan. Respondent has also not shown that the findings of fact made by the trial court were clearly erroneous. *In re Miller, supra*.

Finally, the evidence did not establish that termination of respondent's parental rights was clearly not in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 364-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

Affirmed.

/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan