STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of COREY JAMES AUSTIN,
DOMINIQUE MARCHE COLLINS, NATASHA
MICHELLE COLLINS, and SAVONE
MARCELLIS COLLINS, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

   Petitioner -Appellee,

v

JOANNA AUSTIN,

   Respondent,

and

COREY COLLINS,

   Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 2000

No. 225816
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-374045

Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Kelly and Sawyer, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

  Respondent father appeals from an order of the probate court terminating his parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

  In making a termination decision, the trial court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, it must determine if a statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. *In re Sours Minors*, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Second, if a statutory ground has been established, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless there exists clear evidence on the whole record that it is not in the child's best interests to terminate parental rights. *In re Trejo Minors*, 462 Mich 341, 354; 603 NW2d 787 (2000).

  The Court has carefully reviewed the record on appeal, the opinion of the trial court, and the parties' briefs. We are not persuaded that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory

grounds for termination under subsections (3)(c)(i) and (3)(g) were met and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights.[1] Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in terminating respondent's parental rights.

      Affirmed.

/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ David H. Sawyer

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[1] Plaintiff concedes that there was no basis for terminating respondent's parental rights under subsection (3)(b). As for subsection (3)(j), because we conclude that termination was proper under other statutory grounds, we decline to address the question whether termination was proper under subsection (3)(j).