## STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of CHANTEL GEE, CAMILLE GEE, CLENARD GEE, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

 $\mathbf{v}$ 

MONA GEE,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JOHN GEE,

Respondent.

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Talbot and Meter, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondents-appellant appeals as of right from the family court order terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

After carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the family court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Because only one statutory ground is required in order to terminate parental rights, we need not decide whether termination was also warranted under the other statutory grounds. MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 360; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Further, we find no clear error in the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *Trejo*, *supra* at 354,

UNPUBLISHED December 1, 2000

No. 225734 Macomb Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 98-046534 364. Therefore, the family court did not err in terminating respondents'-appellants' rights to the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Michael J. Talbot

/s/ Patrick M. Meter