

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of KRYSTA ROSE LAKE, Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

JENNIFER LAKE,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

LYONELL JOHNSON,

Respondent,

and

DUNNIE BOOTH,

Respondent-Nonparty.

UNPUBLISHED

January 26, 2001

No. 225770

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 98-370442

Before: Hoekstra, PJ, and Whitbeck and Meter, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-appellant appeals by right from the family court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27A.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

Respondent argues that the order terminating her parental rights should be reversed because the trial court violated the time restrictions in MCR 5.973(A)(2) and (B)(2) and MCL 712A.19(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19)(3). Although the trial court did not strictly adhere to these time restrictions, these provisions do not provide any sanction and violation of them does not

require reversal. See *In re Kirkwood*, 187 Mich App 542, 545-546; 468 NW2d 280 (1991). Further, respondent can show no prejudice where her circumstances did not change throughout the entire process that resulted in the termination of her parental rights. Rather than prejudice respondent, the delay afforded her an opportunity to improve her compliance with the court's orders and thus benefited her. *In re Jackson*, 199 Mich App 22, 28; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). Furthermore, respondent was provided a full hearing and an opportunity to be heard before the termination of her parental rights, and thus her due process rights were not violated. *Kirkwood, supra*.

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in admitting and relying on evidence that respondent had been a permanent ward of a probate court because her parents' parental rights were terminated. Regardless of the admissibility of the evidence, respondent cannot show prejudice. A review of the record demonstrates that aside from this evidence, clear and convincing evidence existed in the record to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27A.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j), and thus the error, if any, was harmless. MCR 2.613.

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred in failing to make any "best interests" findings. This argument is without merit because the trial court found that termination was in the best interests of the child and the record revealed sufficient factual findings to support this conclusion. *In re Trejo Minors*, 462 Mich 341, 354-356, 364-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

Affirmed.

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Patrick M. Meter