

**STATE OF MICHIGAN**  
**COURT OF APPEALS**

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In the Matter of KASEY VELTKAMP, Minor.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TREASA VELTKAMP,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

ANDREW CROWLEY,

Appellee.

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UNPUBLISHED  
February 23, 2001

No. 228817  
Kent Circuit Court  
Family Division  
LC No. 97-000390-NA

Before: Talbot, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent mother appeals from an order of the probate court terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) and (i). We affirm.

In making a termination decision, the trial court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, it must determine if a statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. *In re Sours Minors*, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Second, if a statutory ground has been established, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless there exists clear evidence on the whole record that it is not in the child's best interests to terminate parental rights. *In re Trejo Minors*, 462 Mich 341, 354; 603 NW2d 787 (2000).

The Court has carefully reviewed the record on appeal, the opinion of the trial court, and the respondent's brief. We are not persuaded that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were met and that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental rights. Specifically, with respect to respondent's argument that she was not afforded an adequate opportunity to comply with the parent-agency agreement, we disagree. Respondent

made a similar argument in the appeal from the termination of her parental rights to her two older children. We rejected that argument. *In re Veltkamp*, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No., 221543, decided 5/30/00). This case involved essentially the same parent-agency agreement. Because there was adequate time in the prior case, there of necessity must be adequate time in this case to have complied with the same agreement. As for respondent's argument that the trial court improperly considered a prior, unproven allegation of sexual abuse of one of respondent's older daughters, there is no indication from the record that the trial court did so. Furthermore, even if the trial court did, that would not affect termination under subsection 19b(3)(g) and, therefore, would not require reversal. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in terminating respondent's parental rights.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Talbot

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Jane E. Markey