

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of B .M., D. A. M., JR., D. L. M., JR.,
and C. M. M., Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

DEON MONROE,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JEANETTE ANN MORGAN,

Respondent.

In the Matter of B. M., D. A. M., JR., D. L. M., JR.
and C. M. M., Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

JEANETTE ANN MORGAN,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

DEON MONROE,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED
October 30, 2001

No. 231754
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-368868

No. 231853
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-368868

Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Neff and Hoekstra, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents-appellants appeal as of right from the trial court order terminating their parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further the evidence did not show that termination of respondents-appellants' parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondents-appellants' parental rights to their children.

Respondent mother also suggests that termination was improper because the FIA failed to offer her services to deal with the problems associated with parenting children with special needs. The FIA must either provide services to a parent facing termination of her parental rights or justify its decision not to provide services. *In re Terry*, 240 Mich App 14, 25, n 4; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). However, MCL 712A.18f does not require the FIA to provide every conceivable service to work toward reunification. Parents need only be offered reasonable services. MCL 712A.18f(4). The FIA did provide respondent-mother reasonable services. Unfortunately, respondent failed to benefit from the services offered.

We also reject respondent mother's claim that the trial court terminated her parental rights because her children had special needs. This is simply unsupported by the record. The trial court did not terminate parental rights because of the children's needs, but rather, because respondent did not demonstrate that she was capable of properly caring for these children and addressing their special needs.

Finally, respondent mother argues that the trial court should have considered alternatives to terminating the parental rights to all four children. Specifically, respondent suggests that the court could have terminated parental rights to only Derrick and Curtis. However, it is clear from the record that respondent mother was not capable of properly parenting even two children with special needs. She simply lacked the cognitive capacity to deal with children with disabilities.

Affirmed.

/s/ William C. Whitbeck

/s/ Janet T. Neff

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra