

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of SHERRY LEDESMA, CHUCK
LEDESMA, and CHRISTOPHER GREEN, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

MAY LEDESMA,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

WILLIAM GREEN,

Respondent.

In the Matter of SHERRY LEDESMA, CHUCK
LEDESMA and CHRISTOPHER GREEN, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

WILLIAM GREEN,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

MAY LEDESMA,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2001

No. 232583
Muskegon Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 88-017635-NA

No. 232795
Muskegon Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 88-017635-NA

Before: Zahra, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from an order terminating their parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j) were each established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The evidence showed that both respondents failed to remedy the conditions that brought the children into care, that neither was able to provide proper care and custody for the children, and that the children would be at substantial risk of harm if placed with either parent. Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondents' parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondents' parental rights to the children.

Also, we reject respondents' claims that the trial court's written opinion fails to comport with the requirements of MCR 5.974(G). The trial court's opinion satisfies MCR 5.974(G)(3) because it expressly identifies the statutory bases for termination of respondents' parental rights. Additionally, the trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law refer to the specific reasons for the termination decision, thus comporting with MCR 5.974(G)(1), and are also sufficient to show that the court was aware of the issues in the case. *People v Armstrong*, 175 Mich App 181, 184; 437 NW2d 343 (1989).

Finally, we reject respondent father's claim that the 182-day requirement found in MCL 712A.19b was not satisfied. A review of the record clearly indicates that 182 days elapsed between the initial dispositional order and the termination of parental rights.

Affirmed.

/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy