

**STATE OF MICHIGAN**  
**COURT OF APPEALS**

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In the Matter of Contempt of  
WILLIAM ROBERT ELDRIDGE.

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ELIZABETH ANN ELDRIDGE,  
  
Petitioner-Appellee,

v

WILLIAM ROBERT ELDRIDGE,  
  
Respondent-Appellant.

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UNPUBLISHED  
February 26, 2002

No. 225732  
Wayne Circuit Court  
Family Division  
LC No. 95-509557-DM

Before: Cooper, P.J., and Griffin and White, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court's order finding him in contempt of court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff \$22,000 for violating a prior order and sentenced defendant to ninety-three days in jail, sixty-three days of which were suspended. We affirm.

Defendant first argues that he could not be found guilty of criminal contempt because the personal protection order issued against him failed to meet the requirements of MCL 600.2950(11), and because he was improperly summoned to respond to charges of criminal contempt. We find no error. The amended personal protection order issued April 8, 1997 met all of the applicable requirements of MCL 600.2950(11). Moreover, that order was not superceded by subsequent orders that were intended to enforce its provisions. Indeed, the March 11, 1999 order specifically provided that "[a]ll other provisions of the Personal Protection Orders remain in full force and effect." Defendant was summoned to appear by an order to show cause, issued upon plaintiff's petition accusing him of violating a PPO and a March 11, 1999, order for contempt. This was appropriate under MCR 3.606(A)(1).

Defendant further suggests that he was not properly notified of the criminal nature of the proceedings and that he was compelled to testify against himself in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. We disagree. Defendant was fully notified that he faced a finding of criminal contempt and a possible jail term if the court found that he violated the PPO or the order for contempt. Both the PPO and the order for contempt provide that violations could be treated as criminal contempt and punished with incarceration. Plaintiff was also informed of

the nature of the proceedings and the potential of a jail sentence on the record before the evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the trial court informed defendant that he could be incarcerated for the latest violations and that plaintiff requested his incarceration. We also note that defendant was and is a licensed attorney in the State of Michigan. Clearly, defendant was not denied his due process right to notice. *In re Contempt of ACIA*, 243 Mich App 697, 713-714; 624 NW2d 443 (2000); *Jaikins v Jaikins*, 12 Mich App 115, 120; 162 NW2d 325 (1968). Nothing in the record indicates that defendant was compelled to testify. Indeed, defendant failed to object to being called as an adverse witness and never asserted his right against self-incrimination. Defendant waived his privilege against self-incrimination by testifying without objection. *People v Dixon*, 217 Mich App 400, 405; 552 NW2d 663 (1996).

Lastly, defendant claims that the fine imposed exceeded the statutory limit. The record shows that the parties agreed to the sanctions contained in the order for contempt. One of the sanctions agreed to required defendant to pay \$1,000 for each telephone call made in violation of that order. A party is bound by his own stipulations and may not later raise them as errors on appeal. *Weiss v Hodge (After Remand)*, 223 Mich App 620, 636; 567 NW2d 468 (1997).

Affirmed.

/s/ Jessica R. Cooper  
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin  
/s/ Helene N. White