

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of O.N.L., E.J.G. III, and L.D.G.,
Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TINA RENE A LINDSEY,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

EDDIE JAMES GREGORY,

Respondent.

In the Matter of J.M.L., Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TINA RENE A LINDSEY,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED

April 16, 2002

No. 234811

Saginaw Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 01-026960-NA

No. 234812

Saginaw Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 01-026961-NA

In the Matter of B.L.L., Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TINA RENE LINDSEY,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

OTIS BUTTERFIELD,

Respondent.

No. 234813
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-026962-NA

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Sawyer and O'Connell, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j) and (l). Respondent now appeals and we affirm.

At the beginning of the termination hearing, the parties offered a stipulation under which respondent would admit to certain allegations in the petition and that her parental rights would be terminated; however, the termination order would be held in abeyance to allow respondent an opportunity to abide by certain conditions under the stipulation and thereafter have the termination order set aside. This is similar to the procedure employed in *In re Adrianson*, 105 Mich App 300; 306 NW2d 487 (1981). The trial court rejected the stipulation, concluding that by statute it was obligated to terminate respondent's parental rights once the grounds for termination were established unless the trial court found that it was not in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. The termination hearing proceeded and the trial court ultimately found that the grounds for termination existed and terminated respondent's parental rights.

Respondent's only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to accept the stipulation. We disagree. Respondent directs us to no authority which states that a trial court is obligated to accept a stipulation. In fact, a trial court is not obligated to accept a stipulation. See *In re Finlay Estate*, 430 Mich 590, 595; 424 NW2d 272 (1988) (a court is not required to accept the parties' stipulation of law); *Phillips v Jordan*, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183 (2000) (trial court not permitted to "blindly accept" a stipulation regarding the best interests of the child in a child custody case).

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell