

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
COURT OF APPEALS

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In the Matter of C.C.W., N.A.W., D.D.W., N.R.W.,  
and J.J.W., Minors.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V

CARMEN WILSON,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

NATHANIEL BRAGGS and JAMES JONES,

Respondents.

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UNPUBLISHED

July 23, 2002

No. 235598

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 99-384754

Before: Hood, P.J., and Saad and E. M. Thomas,\* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j).<sup>1</sup> We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

We review a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial court determines that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more statutory grounds for termination, the court must terminate parental rights unless it finds from

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<sup>1</sup> The trial court's order also terminated the parental rights of respondents Nathaniel Braggs and James Jones, the fathers of four of the children. Braggs and Jones have not appealed the order. The father of the fifth child is deceased.

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\* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review the trial court's decision regarding the child's best interests for clear error. *Id.*, 356-357.

We hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established one or more statutory grounds for termination of respondent's parental rights. Petitioner initiated this action after it learned that respondent was homeless and suffered from alcoholism and depression. After the children became temporary wards of the court respondent visited them only sporadically, stopped visiting altogether after a time, and provided no financial support for the children. Respondent made little if any attempt to comply with the treatment plan provided to her. Respondent did not obtain suitable housing, did not maintain a legal, reliable source of income, and did not address her substance abuse problem. The undisputed evidence showed that respondent's circumstances at the time of the permanent custody hearing had not improved from the date the children were removed from her custody.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was warranted on the grounds of desertion, MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), that respondent failed to provide proper care or custody and could not be expected to do so within a reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and that it was reasonably likely that the children would be harmed if they were returned to respondent's home, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The evidence did not show that termination of respondent's parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCR 5.974(I); *Trejo, supra*.

Affirmed.

/s/ Harold Hood  
/s/ Henry William Saad  
/s/ Edward M. Thomas