

**STATE OF MICHIGAN**  
**COURT OF APPEALS**

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In the Matter of RONECIA JA'NAY HUNT and  
LAJAI JA'NAY HUNT, Minors.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

DEKEYA JA'NAY HUNT,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JARRETT JARED HUNT,

Respondent.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

JARRETT JARED HUNT,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

DEKEYA JA'NAY HUNT,

Respondent.

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UNPUBLISHED

April 14, 2005

No. 255881

Macomb Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 03-055244-NA

No. 255950

Macomb Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 03-055244-NA

Before: Kelly, P.J., and Sawyer and Wilder, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, respondent mother appeals as of right and respondent father appeals by leave granted from the trial court order terminating respondent mother's parental rights to both of the minor children and respondent father's parental rights to the youngest child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), (j), and (k)(iii). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

The trial court did not clearly err in determining that statutory grounds for termination had been established by clear and convincing evidence and in terminating respondents' parental rights. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). The evidence established that one of the respondents intentionally inflicted the first- and second-degree burns upon the youngest child, who was ten months old when she was injured. Medical testimony established that the child was thin, slightly dehydrated, and severely burned when she was brought to the hospital, that respondent mother probably failed to take this child to a pediatrician on a regular basis, and that respondent father provided sporadic care of the child. Their lack of truthfulness about the child's injuries placed both children at risk of future harm, and their lack of credibility would make it impossible to gauge the effectiveness of any services.

Although termination of either respondent's parental rights could not properly be based on MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), since there was no evidence presented that either respondent failed to heed any warning signs that the other respondent was an abuser, the error was harmless because the trial court properly based termination of respondents' parental rights on the other statutory grounds. *In re Powers*, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the trial court's best interests determination was not clearly erroneous. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, *supra* at 356-357. A review of the entire record shows that the children's need for safety outweighed the bond that they shared with respondents.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder

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<sup>1</sup> We reject respondents' argument that the trial court erred in basing termination on MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(iii) because a clear reading of the statute leads us to conclude that "severe physical abuse" includes first- and second-degree burns inflicted on such a young child.