

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of TERICK JOHN CHAPMON,
Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

UNPUBLISHED
November 15, 2005

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

ERIC CHAPMON,

No. 261451
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-412139-NA

Respondent-Appellant,

and

TIFFANY A. BENNETT, RUFUS WILSON, and
DAVID PARKER,

Respondents.

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Meter, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the order terminating his parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(c)(i), (g), and (h). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).

Respondent-appellant, who is incarcerated, argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because he could provide a safe and suitable home for his child if his criminal appeal were to be granted. Because respondent-appellant has failed to develop this argument sufficiently and failed to provide any authority to support his contention, he has abandoned this claim. *People v Kevorkian*, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639 NW2d 291 (2001); *Consumers Power Co v Public Service Com'n*, 181 Mich App 261, 268; 448 NW2d 806 (1989).

Moreover, the trial court did not err in finding that the conditions of MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (h) were established. Although the child was being cared for by his maternal grandparents, the fact remained that respondent-appellant was serving a twenty-year prison sentence and could not care for the child while incarcerated. In addition, there was no reasonable expectation that respondent-appellant would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering that respondent-appellant's release date is May 11, 2025. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).

Although the parties do not address subsection (3)(h) on appeal, the trial court relied on this subsection, and the evidence established that (1) the child would be deprived of a normal home for a period exceeding two years because of respondent-appellant's incarceration, (2) respondent-appellant had not provided for the child's care, and (3) there was no reasonable expectation that he would be able to provide such care within a reasonable time. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent-appellant's parental rights under this subsection.¹

Finally, respondent-appellant argues that termination of his parental rights was not in the child's best interests. Although respondent-appellant maintained some contact with his son while incarcerated, the child had been in the grandmother's care the majority of the child's life. This child, aged four at the time of trial, needed permanency, which respondent-appellant could not provide at the time of the termination hearing or in the near future.

Affirmed.

/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Patrick M. Meter

¹ We note that only one statutory ground for termination need be established to justify the termination of parental rights. *Trejo, supra* at 356. Therefore, we need not address the additional arguments respondent-appellant raises on appeal.