

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
COURT OF APPEALS

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In the Matter of JONATHON JESUS ESTRADA,  
HANNAH ROSE ESTRADA and CARLOS  
MIGUEL ESTRADA, Minors.

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DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

MICHELLE ESTRADA,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JESUS ESTRADA,

Respondent.

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UNPUBLISHED

October 25, 2007

No. 277427

Branch Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 06-003415-NA

Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Murray, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent mother appeals from an order of the circuit court terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) and (j). We affirm.

We review a trial court's finding that at least one ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Once a ground for termination has been established, the trial court must terminate the parent's parental rights unless it is clearly not in the best interests of the child to do so. MCL 712A.19b(5). *In re Trejo Minors*, 462 Mich 341, 357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) provides as follows:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.

The trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent has failed to rectify those conditions that cause the children to come within the court's jurisdiction. We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion and that the trial court's conclusion was not clearly erroneous. Specifically, various counselors and agency employees testified that little or no progress had been made since the initial referral and that the prospect of making sufficient progress was very long term at best.

The alternative ground for termination was MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which provides:

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

Respondent presents nothing more than a single sentence assertion that this ground was not met. But having concluded that the first ground for termination was properly established, we need not consider this ground.

Finally, while respondent's brief identified as a question presented whether termination was in the children's best interests, no actual argument on this point was presented. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent has abandoned this argument. *People v Matuszak*, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).

Affirmed.

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra  
/s/ David H. Sawyer  
/s/ Christopher M. Murray