

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of TREVON DINES, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

LATOYA DINES,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED

May 13, 2008

No. 282276

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 07-471275-NA

Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Murphy, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), (i) (parental rights to the child's sibling(s) have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect), (l) (parental rights to another child were terminated as a result of a proceeding under MCL 712A.2(b), or a similar law of another state), and (m) (parental rights to another child were voluntarily terminated after proceedings were instituted under MCL 712A.2(b), or a similar law of another state). Because clear and convincing evidence established a statutory basis for termination of parental rights and termination of parental rights was not clearly contrary to the best interests of the child, we affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(m) was established by clear and convincing evidence. *In re Archer*, 277 Mich App 71, 73; 744 NW2d 1 (2007). It was undisputed that the child's four siblings had become court wards following the initiation of child protection proceedings in Ohio, that respondent failed to complete the service plans for reunification, and that respondent voluntarily released her parental rights to three of those children. Because only a single statutory ground for termination need be proven by clear and convincing evidence, *In re Archer, supra*, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining statutory grounds.

Further, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondent's parental rights was not in the child's best interests. *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 354, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); MCL 712A.19b(5). She had other children who had been removed from her custody due to neglect, she was given several opportunities to participate in services to improve her parenting ability but failed to follow through, and there was no evidence that she had voluntarily obtained

services to rectify the conditions that caused her other children to become court wards. Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent's parental rights to the child. *Trejo, supra* at 356-357.

Affirmed.

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ William B. Murphy