## STATE OF MICHIGAN

## COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of LA'TIMOTHAYA B. BOBO, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TIMOTHY BARHADUE BOBO,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JOYCE MARIE BOBO,

Respondent.

In the Matter of LA'TIMOTHAYA B. BOBO, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V

JOYCE MARIE BOBO,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

TIMOTHY BARHADUE BOBO,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED September 16, 2008

No. 283492 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 07-735257-NA

No. 283493 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 07-735257-NA Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.

## PER CURIAM.

Respondents Timothy and Joyce Bobo each appeal as of right from an order terminating their parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), (j), and (l). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We come to this conclusion because there was ample evidence supporting the trial court's decision and, as a result, we cannot conclude the trial court was wrong. In re Trejo, supra at 356. Joyce previously had her parental rights terminated to 11 other children, and Timothy's parental rights to one of those children were also previously terminated. These facts indisputably establish that termination was required under MCL 712A.19b(3)(1). Although that finding was enough to move on to a best interest hearing, the trial court also found that Joyce allowed a known sex offender to reside with herself and the child, and that person sexually The evidence satisfied the trial court's conclusions under MCL assaulted the child. 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). The trial court found that there was credible evidence that Joyce initially denied that sexual abuse occurred, and then later physically abused the child for disclosing the abuse and falsely claimed that she had reported the abuse to the police. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

The evidence also indicated that Timothy failed to act when informed that the child had been sexually abused, offered no plan for the child's care, and instead wanted the child returned to Joyce, despite her failure to provide proper care for the child and her prior history involving the termination of her parental rights to 11 other children. These findings were not clearly erroneous, and satisfied the statutory criteria for termination. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j). Additionally, Timothy was unemployed and without suitable housing. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).

Further, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondents' parental rights was not in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo, supra* at 354. On the contrary, and despite the bond between Joyce and the child, there was clear evidence that the child would be placed at risk if returned to respondents. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondents' parental rights to the child. *Id.* at 356-357.

Affirmed.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello /s/ Christopher M. Murray /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood