

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of MONROE WILLIAM CRUSOE,
Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

MONROE DENNIS CRUSOE, SR.,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED
September 8, 2009

No. 291002
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-002312-NA

Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Shapiro, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (j), and (m). We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

Respondent has not shown that the trial court clearly erred in terminating his parental rights. *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). There was no dispute that respondent voluntarily terminated his parental rights to another child after initiation of protective proceedings, and respondent does not challenge the court's findings that statutory ground (m) was established. Because only one statutory ground is necessary and ground (m) is undisputed, this Court need not examine respondent's challenges to the other statutory grounds. *In re Huisman*, 230 Mich App 372, 384-385; 584 NW2d 349 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, *In re Trejo*, *supra* at 353 n 10.

Respondent also contends that the child's best interests would be served by preservation of his parental rights, MCL 712A.19b(5). However, the record showed that the child was taken into care because the child tested positive for cocaine at birth and that respondent had supplied the child's mother with the cocaine. Although the majority of respondent's drug screens during the pendency of the protective proceedings were negative, he had positive screens December 14, 2007, and March 28, April 11, September 8, and September 26, 2008, and missed screens on May 1 and December 19, 2008. The September 26 drug screen was positive for cocaine.

Testimony by service providers indicated that the child needed permanency and a safe, stable environment. Respondent did appear to do well in parenting time, but there was a great

deal of concern that this was because it was for a limited period of time and that in a different environment, such as an unsupervised visit at home, respondent would be unable to properly parent. Additionally, several service providers indicated respondent had received no benefit from the services that had been provided. After months of giving respondent poor progress ratings, his therapist noted improvement in her January 1, 2009, report, but still called his progress "slow and tedious." For a child who had been in care 16 of his 18 months, this limited progress was simply insufficient. There was no likelihood that respondent was going to be able to adequately parent the child and provide a safe, stable environment within a reasonable period of time given that it took almost a year and a half before he even showed some positive progress.

Viewing the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was not contrary to the best interests of the child.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro