

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2010

In the Matter of Z. M. A. JACKSON, Minor.

No. 295964
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09053323-NA

Before: OWENS, P.J., and WHITBECK and FORT HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order of the trial court terminating her parental rights to her minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm.

Respondent's parental rights to her child were terminated after respondent admitted the allegations of the amended petition and did not contest the termination of her parental rights to the child. On appeal, respondent seeks reversal of the termination of her parental rights contending that the trial court did not adequately advise her of the consequences of her plea as required by MCR 3.971(B)(4) because the trial court did not inform her that termination of her parental rights did not necessarily terminate her child support obligations regarding the child.

Respondent is essentially challenging her plea, but she did not challenge it or raise this issue before appeal. As such, the issue is unpreserved, and we review for plain error. See *In re Hudson*, 483 Mich 928; 763 NW2d 618 (2009).

We reject respondent's contention that the trial court erred by not advising her regarding her child support obligations. In a child protective proceeding, a trial court is required to advise the respondent of the consequences of the respondent's plea, specifically, that the respondent's plea can be used against the respondent in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. MCR 3.971(B)(4); *In re Hudson*, 483 Mich at 928. Respondent's obligation to support her child financially, however, was an obligation that existed before her plea and was not a consequence of her plea. The trial court was not required to ascertain and advise respondent of what possibly would not change as a result of her plea. As a practical matter, there are myriad potential consequences of a plea and voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, and MCR 3.91(B)(4) does not appear to envision the trial court discerning and advising upon all issues that might arise as a result of a plea. Moreover, we note that the record does not support that respondent was actually ordered to continue to pay child support. She has not demonstrated the existence of plain error that affected her substantial rights. *Id.*; *In re Utrera*, 281 Mich App 1, 8-9; 761

NW2d 253 (2008). In light of the record and the lack of authority supporting respondent's position, it cannot be said that the trial court erred.

Affirmed.

s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood