Frame v Maynard
2009 NY Slip Op 33314(U)
January 30, 2009
Supreme Court, New York County
Docket Number: 601736/2004
Judge: Paul G. Feinman
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RESENT: HO	N. PAUL G. FEINN		PART <u>1</u>
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s /IAYNARD, KEN equence Number : PTHER	NNETH L.	e de la companya de la compa	N DATE 12-3-08 N SEQ. NO. 008
		is motion	to/for
	er to Show Cause — Affida — Exhibits		PAPERS NUMBERED
eplying Affidavits			I
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pon the foregoing pa	pers, it is ordered that this NOTION IS DECIDED IN ACC HE ANNEXED DECIDION ON	OPDANOE WAT	

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK: CIVIL TERM: PART 12 ----X

ALEXANDER M. FRAME.

Plaintiff,

against

KENNETH L. MAYNARD, 5008 BROADWAY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendants.

____X

R.H. GUTHRIE, BEATRICE GUTHRIE, PAUL HINES, and CAROLINE PAULSON, Cross-Claimants,

against

KENNETH L. MAYNARD, 5008 BROADWAY ASSOCIATES, LLC.

Defendants.

....-X

Appearances:

For Cross-Claimant Paul Hines William J. Dockery, Esg. 17 Battery Place, Suite 1226 New York NY 10004

For Defendants Kennth L. Maymerd & 5008 Broadway Associates, LLC:

Jes:
For Defendants Kennes

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By: James W. Kennedy, Esg.

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New York NY 10005
New York NY 10005

Papers considered in review of this motion to set aside the court's decision daries October 6, 2008

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PAUL G. FEINMAN, J.:

Cross-claimant Paul Hines moves the court pursuant to CPLR § 4404 (b) for an order setting aside the decision after trial of the court rendered on October 6, 2008, and substituting in its stead a decision directing entry of judgment in favor of the cross-claimant Paul Hines. In the alternative, Hines seeks an order directing a new trial on the issue of "reasonable reliance" in the interest of

Index Number: 601736/2004 Mot. Seq. No.: 008 Submission Date: 12/3/08 Cal. No.: 2 **DECISION AND ORDER**

justice. For the reasons which follow, the motion is denied.

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The underlying case, which is the basis of the movant Paul Hines' motion to set aside the court's decision, involved numerous causes of action, including a claim by the movant for breach of fiduciary duty. At the conclusion of the bench trial and review of the trial testimony and other evidence in the case, the court rendered a verdict finding that although the defendant Maynard owed a fiduciary duty to the limited partners, Hines, as a sophisticated investor, did not justifiably rely on the defendant's letter regarding the value of the partnership property. On this basis, the court then dismissed Hines' claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Hines seeks reargument based on what he believes is the court's misinterpretation of the facts and holding of *Global Minerals and Metal Corp. v Home*, 35 AD3d 93 (1st Dept. 2006), *lv denied* 8 NY3d 804 (2007), when it found that like the plaintiff in *Global Minerals*, Hines was a sophisticated investor who had a duty to investigate the terms of Maynard's offer. He also seeks to introduce new evidence, certain items in his personal and professional life which he did not bring to the court's attention during the trial, in particular concerning his health, which he contends if known by the court at the time it rendered its decision, would have caused it to treat him no differently from the other co-limited partners.

Addressing the second argument first, at trial Hines testified that he relied on Maynard's representations based upon his friendship with him and based on Maynard's fiduciary relationship, and that Hines was not represented by counsel at the time he received Maynard's offer letter nor through February 2002.¹ He testified that he did not participate in the management or operation of the partnership's business, and that he had no notice of wrongdoing. He also testified that he

¹The following is taken from the court's decision and order after trial, *Alexander M. Frame v Kenneth L. Maynard, et al.*, Sup. Ct., NY County, Oct. 6, 2008.

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graduated from Harvard Business School as well as Columbia Business School, that he was a certified public accountant and although retired, is doing consulting work, that his employment history includes 17 years at E.F. Hutton, where he was an Executive Vice President, Member of the Executive Committee, and Director, and was also the Chief Financial Officer working for the former United States Secretary of the Treasury where his job consisted primarily of investing considerable assets in various forms of investments, including a number of sizeable real estate projects. He testified also that he had made a couple of additional personal investments, including an investment in Marriott Hotels as a limited partner. Weighing the evidence, the court found that Hines is a sophisticated business person. Accordingly, it found that the decision in *Global Minerals and Metal Corp. v Home*, is persuasive authority, and that Hines had a duty to investigate Maynard's offer.

CPLR 4404 (b) allows a court to set aside its decision or judgment entered, and make new findings of fact or conclusions of law, render a new decision, or order a new trial of a cause of action or a separable issue. Hines asks the court to set aside its decision, consider his newly divulged evidence, and either order a new trial or issue a new decision that holds that similar to the other limited partners, and unlike the party in *Global Minerals*, he lacks the sophistication that would have triggered a duty to investigate the offering plan. He submits an affidavit that presents a different picture of his experience. Hines states that he has not practiced as a certified public accountant, and has "extremely limited real estate experience" (Hines Aff. in Supp. ¶ 3). He states that his position at E.F. Hutton did *not* involve real estate, although in his next position, he had "some responsibility for overseeing real estate investments as they related to [] overall investments," but that others "actually made investment decisions" (Hines Aff. in Supp. ¶ 4 [d], [e]).

He describes several unsuccessful ventures (Hines Aff. in Supp., pp. 3-5, 7). He also states that he has been disabled either physically or mentally, for "most of the last nineteen years," and that he suffers from a heart condition as well as severe periodic mental illness (Hines Aff. in Supp. ¶ 3, pp. 5 et seq.).

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None of this was introduced at the very lengthy and otherwise comprehensive bench trial, although Hines attempted to prove that Maynard should be held liable to him for the losses that he sustained because of Maynard's investment strategies. Hines states only that he had not believed this personal information was "relevant to the case at hand" (Hines Aff. in Supp. ¶ 2). In effect, he seeks a new trial because of his decision to withhold pertinent, albeit sensitive information.

The principal of claim preclusion embraces not only the matters which are actually litigated but those relevant issues which could have been litigated (*Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co.*, 93 NY2d 343, 347-348 [1999]). Hines chose not to put forward certain information at the time of trial which he argues is relevant for the court to have considered. Instead, he chose to present himself in one light, and only when the court ruled against him, has he come forward with a completely different characterization of his business acumen and background. He is not entitled to another bite of the apple and the court sees no reason to order a retrial on this issue in the interest of justice. The interest of justice also militates in favor of finality. The motion is denied. It is

ORDERED that the motion by cross-claimant Paul Hines to set aside the decision and judgment pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b) is denied.

