



NUMBER 13-08-00639-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

VALDEMAR VASQUEZ, III,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee.

On appeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

**Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza**

Appellant, Valdemar Vasquez, III, was charged by indictment with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a), (b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Vasquez pleaded “not guilty” to the charge alleged in the indictment, and the case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Vasquez guilty of the offense, sentenced him to ten years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and imposed a \$10,000 fine. See

id. § 12.32 (Vernon 2003) (providing that a first-degree felony conviction is punishable by confinement “for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years” and “a fine not to exceed \$10,000”). The trial court certified Vasquez’s right to appeal, and he now brings this appeal. We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), Vasquez’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Although counsel’s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an *Anders* brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing *Hawkins v. State*, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); *Stafford v. State*, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with *High v. State*, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), Vasquez’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on Vasquez, and (3) informed

Vasquez of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response within thirty days.¹ See *Anders*, 386 U.S. at 744; *Stafford*, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and Vasquez has not filed a pro se response. See *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an *Anders* brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. *Penson v. Ohio*, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See *Bledsoe v. State*, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of *Anders* briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); *Stafford*, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with *Anders*, Vasquez’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See *Anders*, 386 U.S. at 744; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing *Jeffery v. State*, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (noting that “[i]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed

¹ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting *Wilson v. State*, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, no pet.)).

attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to Vasquez and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.² See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also *In re Schulman*, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; *Ex parte Owens*, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Memorandum Opinion delivered and
filed this the 20th day of August, 2009.

² No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Vasquez wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this Court, after which it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3; 68.7. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.