Justia Federal District Court Opinions

The appellants in both cases were indicted by the same grand jury, and were tried and convicted by petit juries drawn from the same box. In each case there was an attack on the grand jury by motion to dismiss the indictment, and an attack on the petit jury by motion to quash the petit jury panel or venire. Both cases present the question of whether the method by which the jury list was compiled resulted in the impermissible exclusion of Negroes.

No question is raised as to the standing of the appellants to raise that question.¹ Joni Rabinowitz, the appellant in No. 21256, was a white Field Representative of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Albany, Georgia, indicted and convicted of perjury before a federal Grand Jury. A group of demonstrators had picketed a store owned by a member of a federal petit jury which had returned a verdict against a Negro, and the Grand Jury was investigating this use of pressure tactics. The five appellants in No. 21345 were Negroes also indicted and convicted of perjury.

It is conceded that the clerk of the court, his deputy, and the jury commissioner appointed by the court,² who compiled the jury list, were men of excellent character, and the charge is focused on the qualifications which they required of prospective jurors and on the method by which the jury list was compiled, rather than on any affirmative evil intent of the jury commissioners.

The jury list from which the grand and petit jurors were drawn was compiled in 1959. A list compiled in 1953 was used as a starting point. Those who had died, moved out of the district, or become too old or feeble to serve were eliminated. After the 1953 list was pruned, names of prospective jurors compiled separately by the clerk and the commissioner were added, and detailed questionnaires were sent to those on the combined list. One of the questions inquired as to race. The commissioner's recollection was that some 4,000 questionnaires were sent out, and the clerk estimated that the number was either 4,000 or 5,000. Of this number 2,500 or 3,000 were returned.³ From the questionnaires which were returned, 1,985 names were finally selected for the jury list. From a study of the questionnaires returned by those 1,985 persons whose names appear on the jury list, it was stipulated in the district court that Negroes comprised 117 or 5.9% of those on the list.

On appeal, the Government, with commendable candor, concedes the results of a later and more detailed analysis made of all of the questionnaires returned, as follows:

'Of the 1,985 persons on the 1959 list, 1,428 are carry-overs from the 1953 list and 557 are new names. Of the 117 Negroes on the list, 113 are carry-overs and 4 are new. Of the 1,868 persons on the list who are white or who did not designate their race on their questionnaires (there are 5 of the latter), 1,315 are carry-overs and 553 are new. Hence, of the new names added to the list in 1959, 553 are white or of unknown race and 4 are Negroes.

'A total of 2,338 persons returned questionnaires in 1959, and of these, 353 were not placed on the list for one reason or another. Of these 353, 297 were white, 53 were Negro and 3 did not indicate their race (although one of the 3 has been unofficially identified as a Negro). Of the 353, 196 had appeared on the 1953 list, and 157 were new names. Broken down by race, 150 whites were new names and 147 had appeared on the 1953 list, 7 Negroes were new names and 46 had appeared on the 1953 list, and all 3 unknowns had appeared on the 1953 list. Hence, Negroes comprised 7 of the 157 new names in this group.

'Of the 2,338 questionnaires returned, 1,624 were carry-overs from the 1953 list and 714 were new contacts. Of the 1,624 carry-overs, 1,465 were whites or of unknown race and 159 were Negroes (taking account of the person unofficially known to be Negro, the count would be 1,464 and 160). Of the 714 new contacts, 703 were white and 11 were Negro. Hence, a total of 170 Negroes returned questionnaires in 1959, or 7.3% of those returned (171 taking account of the person unofficially known to be Negro), 159 (or 160) being carry-overs and 11 being new contacts.

'The 353 persons not placed on the 1959 list were omitted for the following reasons:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Race
                                                       White  Negro  Unknown
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questionnaires returned too late ......................  63     4       1
Business (i.e., teachers, school busdrivers, etc.) ....  26     9       1
Age or health ......................................... 188    24       1
Women having small children to care for ...............  20     0       0
Other (felony conviction, illiteracy, civil service
  employment, etc.) ...................................   0    16       0
                                                       ---------------------
    Total ............................................. 297    53      3"
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The eighteen counties comprising the Macon Division of the Middle District of Georgia had an adult population in 1960 of 211,306 of which 73,014, or 34.5 per cent, were Negroes. As to each of the eighteen counties, the disparity between the proportion of Negroes whose names appear on the jury list and the proportion of Negroes aged 21 or over who reside in the county are shown on the following table:

                                                                       Negro-
                                                           Adult     Percentage
             Persons              Negro                    Negro      of Adult
               on
            Jury List  Negroes  Percentage     Adult     Population  Population
  County      from     On List   on List    Population      1960        1960
             County                            1960
----------  ---------  -------  ----------  -----------  ----------  ----------
Baldwin           137        8        5.8%        23668        8744     36.9
Bibb              666       36        5.4%        81133       24894     30.5
Bleckley           72        2        2.7%         5230        1246     23.8
Butts              58        2        3.4%         4920        1878     38.1
Crawford           47        5       10.6%         2948        1435     48.6
Hancock            64        3        4.6%         4877        3237     66.3
Houston            99        7        6.0%        20438        3815     18.6
Jasper             57        4        7.0%         3404        1554     45.6
Jones              67        5        7.4%         4490        1983     44.
Lamar              84        7        8.3%         5708        1925     33.7
Monroe             70        5        7.1%         5605        2392     42.6
Peach             123        8        6.5%         7398        3913     52.8
Pulaski            58        3        5.0%         4546        1697     37.3
Putnam             61        4        6.5%         3822        1988     52.
Twiggs             37        1        2.7%         4189        1997     47.6
Upson             130        6        4.6%        13835        3315     23.8
Washington         95        6        6.6%        10041        4925     49.
Wilkinson          60        5        8.3%         5054        2076     41.
  Totals         1985      117        5.8%       211306       73014    34.55%
----------

The list of names placed in the jury box was revised periodically as ordered by the Court. The first jury list was compiled in 1926. Revisions occurred in 1930, 1936, 1938, 1949, 1943, 1947, 1953, and 1959. Names of women were added in 1954. The 1940 list contained 2,114 names, of which 68, or 3.21 per cent, were Negroes. At that time the adult population of the division was 169,343, of which 76,399, or 45.11 per cent, were Negroes. The 1953 list contained 1,837 names, of which the Clerk of the Court estimated that 137 were Negroes. That is approximately 7.44 per cent. According to the 1950 census, the adult population of the division was 193,387, of which 74,443, or 38.49 per cent, were Negroes. The other jury lists contain names of Negroes in proportions similar to those in the 1940, 1953, and 1959 lists.

Mr. Simmons, the Jury Commissioner, Mr. Cowart, the Clerk, and Mr. Doyle, the Chief Deputy Clerk, each testified as to the method and procedure he employed in adding names to those left on the 1953 list, as the names of the prospective jurors to whom questionnaires were mailed.

According to Mr. Simmons:

'A lot of the additional names were the result of my own acquaintance, insofar as they were a result of suggestions by my friends whose opinions and integrity I valued. They were names of people who were active in other capacities, some of them in a civic life, a business way, some of them came from lists of church members. I carried around in my pockets for the several months we were at work a little book and a pad of paper on which I could record peoples' names as they happened to occur to me, or as I happened to see them to check and be sure that they were in the jury, on the jury list. Some of them came in personal conversations, and some of them I invited and received suggestions about, invited information from people who were residents in the county or counties involved.'

Mr. Simmons was asked why they decided to ask the question concerning race, and replied: 'I think perhaps our reasoning was, really, that we wanted to be sure that we had some Negroes on the jury list. I had no other reason. We asked for sex and age and race as well.' Mr. Simmons went through a list of delegates to a conference of the Methodist Church held in Macon and used some of the names appearing on that list. He conceded that the delegates were all white. He further testified:

'Q. Now in making this selective list, of course, you had to rely on people you knew? 'A. Yes, very definitely. 'Q. You don't know any Negroes in places like Twiggs County, Bleckley or Decatur or any of those? 'A. Yes, some in those counties, but not a great many, certainly. My acquaintance is generally predominantly, of course, with the White race.'

He further testified:

'Q. And would you tell us what type of person, as best you can recall, that you made inquiry of, to obtain names of prospective jurors? 'A. Well, this, of course, was in 1959 and some time has elapsed, but I inquired naturally of people that I knew and people whose reputation I knew. So, quite undoubtedly, I was confining myself to people whose integrity and character I respected and whose Judgment I would have respect for. For that reason they were people mostly whose paths I happened to cross occasionally, in a business way or in connection with other activities in the State that I've been interested in, including civic work and various things of that sort; not exclusively so. Quite a good many of them, of course, were business contacts that I had. 'Q. Did you contact people of all races for prospective jurors? 'A. Yes. Let me say, of course, that my contacts were heavier, of course, with the white race because my association was greater with that particular group; but certainly there was no effort to concentrate exclusive on any one segment of the population. I attempted to be as broad as I could in my inquiries.'

Mr. Simmons lived in Macon, Bibb County, but traveled in the course of his business outside of Bibb County, and thought that he made some inquiries in all of the counties. Asked separately concerning the following counties: Baldwin, Bleckley, Butts, Crawford, Hancock, Houston, Jasper, Washington, and Twiggs, Mr. Simmons could not recall having made any inquiries of Negroes, whether businessmen, school teachers, ministers, doctors, or civil service employees, though he had asked a number of whites to suggest the names of competent Negro jurors. He further testified:

'Q. * * * Did you tell them what you meant by competent Negro jurors? 'A. I feel sure I did. I undoubtedly recited the qualifications to them, including the statutory qualifications plus our desire here to have jurors of integrity and good character and intelligence. 'A. * * * there are a lot of people who can read and write and can't understand the kind of proceedings that go on in a courtroom, and we tried to avoid that. * * * We wanted an outstanding blue ribbon jury list of people who we thought would perform very good service and we did take their character into consideration or tried to; we tried to take their intelligence into consideration as indicated by these standards, and perhaps even went a little further than that; but those were factors that inevitably entered into our thinking * * *. 'Q. Well, how would you account for the vast disparities that have just been shown up here, relating to Twiggs, Hancock, Crawford and Jasper Counties; how would you account for this disparity if you did not set out to make some distinctions? 'A. Very easily, I think. Unfortunate as it may be, I think the Negro community in those counties does not qualify on the very grounds that we set up, of intelligence, integrity and ability to serve on those grounds alone.

'Furthermore, may I add this; furthermore, my acquaintance, and unfortunate again as this may be, but my acquaintance has been with people in other groups admittedly; so, if there were any errors here, they certainly are of omission and not of commission. No effort was made to exclude anyone. * * *

'Well, I think anybody who reads the papers and knows about the educational level of our State would have to admit, reluctantly if he wants, that there is no question but there is infinitely more illiteracy among the Negro group, which is regrettable and unfortunate; but I think we must admit that there aren't numerically as many of them that are qualified in terms of the same educational standards.'

Mr. Cowart, the Clerk, testified that he looked at the race designation on the questionnaire 'to see whether it was a Negro or a white man.'

'Q. Well, what significance did it have? 'A. I wanted to be sure I got some Negroes in the jury box. 'Q. When you say you wanted to be sure you got some Negroes, did you have in mind any particular number? 'A. I did not.'

So far as Mr. Cowart recollected there was no difference in the method of compiling names for the 1953 list and for the 1959 list. Mr. Cowart testified that,

'I wrote a good many letters to people that I knew, and I know a good many people in the Macon Division and in each and every one of the counties that I used as sources. Some were public officials, some just friends of mine. I did the same thing here in Macon. I think I acquired probably more names here in Macon than anyone else did, and I had a number of sources here in Macon from whom I got names.'

Mr. Cowart wrote to only one Negro, a Mr. Hutchings at Hutchings Funeral Home in Macon. Mr. Cowart did not know any Negro school teachers or Negro doctors--'I know of some. I don't know them.' He did not communicate with any Negro professionals-- school teachers, doctors, lawyers or engineers, 'or nurses or anybody else in that class which we assume has more than average education.' He conceded, 'I don't know too many Negroes.'

'Q. And would that account for the fact that there aren't as many Negroes, or would it be part of the reason that there aren't as large a proportion of Negroes on the jury list as there are in the population at large? 'A. I don't know whether that would account for it or not. 'Q. Well, can you think of any other reason that might account for it? 'A. I'm not trying to account for it. I got all of the names I could and I put them in the box. I don't undertake to account for it. 'Q. You don't feel that you are under any obligation to account for it? 'A. I did. I put some in there, and I think everyone I put in there is well qualified. 'Q. I have no doubt. The question is whether there are many who are well qualified that you left out. Are there? 'A. I don't know. 'Q. Did you make any effort to find out? 'A. I found out the names and put them in the box. I didn't make any effort to get acquainted with all the Negroes in the Middle District of Georgia, No sir. 'Q. Did you make an effort to get acquainted with any of the school teachers in the Middle District? 'A. I did not. 'Q. Or any of the professional people? 'A. I did not.'

Mr. Cowart further testified:

'Q. Mr. Cowart, did you make any contact with groups of persons in Macon in order to secure the names of persons in Macon, fraternal and church organizations? 'A. I did. 'Q. Were any of those Negro organizations? 'A. No, sir. 'Q. You didn't speak to any one from the NAACP, did you? 'A. No, sir. 'Q. Or from any of the Negro churches? 'A. No, not that I recall. I can recall the people I did talk to, and I may not even be able to recall all of them, but I didn't go to any group, if that is what you are talking about. 'Q. But you did go to the white groups? 'A. I got some of their rosters, their lists of names, yes. 'Q. You didn't ask for the list of names of any of the Negro organizations? 'A. No, sir. 'A. I sent Mr. Doyle, my deputy, into each one of the counties in the Macon Division for the purpose of looking over the jury list and knocking off the people who had died and the people who had moved away or become too aged and infirm to serve, and then to acquire additional names for us to send questionnaries to. He went into each one of the 18 counties in the Macon Division.'

Mr. Doyle, the Chief Deputy Clerk, testified as to the procedure he used when he went into the various counties to secure the names of prospective jurors:

'Q. * * * What procedure did you follow? 'A. Well, I went first, generally, to the county courthouse. I took the list with me of the present box, and I talked to the various officials in the county, asked them first of all, from their knowledge of the people in their community, to help me mark off of our list those who had deceased or moved away, and then to give me the names of additional jurors to whom we might send questionnaires. I talked to other people, but I generally went to the county courthouse and talked to the various people there first, because they, in my judgment, knew the people in the community perhaps better than anyone else. 'Q. Were any of them Negroes? 'A. No.'

The clerks of the county courts used their jury lists in making suggestions to Mr. Doyle. Those state lists, according to the evidence, had a smaller proportion of Negroes on them than the federal list. Mr. Doyle further testified:

'Q. * * * During all of the time that you visited in the various counties then I take it you did not speak to a single Negro? 'A. I did not. 'Q. Are you in any way familiar with the standards to be applied in choosing members of the jury list? 'A. I am familiar with the statutory standard requirements. 'Q. Only the statutory standards? Nothing else? 'A. Well, I have my own idea of what a qualified juror ought to be. 'Q. And what are those ideas? 'A. Well, he ought to be a person that is of good character, a person that is intelligent, that can understand the cases that are tried in court. 'Q. Would you say from your general knowledge of the area that there are Negro ministers in each one of these counties? 'A. Oh, I'm sure there are. 'Q. And that there are some Negro business men, store keepers, morticians, perhaps garage keepers, in each one of these counties, would you say? 'A. I'm not personally acquainted with them, but I am sure there must be. 'Q. But you didn't make any effort to speak to any of those to solicit names of their acquaintances as possible persons to be included on the list? 'A. I did not.'

In a supplemental brief, the Government concedes in the light of the additional information disclosed by its further analysis of the questionaires that,

'In the particular circumstances of this case, the addition of only four new Negro names in the compilation of the 1959 jury list and the failure during the period involved to make further affirmative efforts to add additional Negro names to the list leads us to suggest that this Court reverse the convictions in the exercise of its supervisory power.'

The Government's supplemental brief explains:

'This further analysis shows that in the 1959 revision, 1,428 names from the 1953 list were carried over and 557 new names were added, making up the total of 1,985 names on the 1959 list, 117 of whom were Negroes. Of the 557 new names, only four, or .7% were of Negroes. Without in any wise disparaging the sincerity and good faith of the members of the jury commission in their purpose and objective of obtaining a fair representation of Negroes on the list, it cannot but be recognized that this stark disproportion reflects deficiencies in their methods of attaining their objective which culminated in a result that we feel cannot be ignored.

'* * * A related factor which we feel appropriately should be considered is that the trial juries involved in these cases were drawn from a box which had not been revised over a period of four years-- from 1959 to 1963.'

The Government continues, however, to object to a dismissal of the indictments, saying:

'Not all of the considerations described above apply to the indictments. There were in fact five Negroes on the grand jury which returned them. Consequently, the failure to take remedial action does not appeal to have had a substantial impact upon its composition. Moreover, the Government feels that the Court's supervisory function may be adequately discharged by reversal of the verdicts of the petit juries-- on which Negroes in fact did not serve and whose decisions had a more immediate impact upon the appellants²⁴ -- and by reform of the jury box in the future. '

There is thus little or no dispute as to the composition of the jury list, as to the qualifications required of prospective jurors, or as to the methods and procedure by which the list was compiled. The only question necessary to be decided is whether there was an impermissible departure from the statutory scheme which requires not only a reversal of the conviction but a direction that the indictments be dismissed. First, we hold that the clerk of the court and the jury commissioner in compiling the jury list violated the federal statutory scheme by applying statutorily incorrect standards to prospective jurors. Second, we hold that the method of obtaining names of prospective jurors violated the statutory scheme. Either violation would require that we reverse the convictions and direct that the indictments be dismissed.

The concept of trial by jury devolved to us from King John's grant of certain liberties to his nobles in the Great Charter of 1215.⁴ Justice Strong noted in Strauder v. State of West Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. 303, 308-309, 25 L.Ed. 664:

'The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed to every citizen of West Virginia by the Constitution of that State, and the constitution of juries is a very essential part of the protection such a mode of trial is intended to secure. The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, od his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, says, 'The right of trial by jury, or the country, is a trial by the peers of every Englishman, and is the grand bulwark of his liberties, and is secured to him by the Great Charter.' It is also guarded by statutory enactments intended to make impossible what Mr. Bentham called 'packing juries."

It was this concept of 'trial by the peers of every Englishman' that the founding fathers transplanted in the New World and which has laid the foundation for the principles governing jury trial today.⁵

Through time, the concept of trial by jury came to presuppose a jury drawn from a pool of persons broadly representative of the community. The rudiments of a properly selected jury were succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Murphy in Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 472, 86 L.Ed. 680, as follows:

'Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government. For 'It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.' Smith v. (State of) Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (61 S.Ct. 164, 165, 85 L.Ed. 84).

'Jurors in a federal court * * * are to be selected by the clerk of the court and a jury commissioner. * * * This duty of selection may not be delegated. And, its exercise must always accord with the fact that the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the community', and not the organ of any special group or class. If that requirement is observed, the officials charged with choosing federal jurors may exercise some discretion to the end that competent jurors may be called. But they must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community. Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on this essential right. Steps innocently taken may one by one lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.'

Courts have never doubted these abstract principles of justice. The battlefield has always been the domain of application and administration.

From 1789 to 1948 Congress made few inroads upon the discretion of federal judicial officials and state governments in development and application of jury qualifications. Congress in the first judiciary act selected for the federal courts the qualifications and exemptions prescribed by the State in which each base line federal court sat.⁶ Until 1948 that remained the basic federal rule.⁷

In an effort to improve the functioning of the jury system the Judicial Conference appointed a committee headed by Judge Knox to study the problems of qualification and selection of federal jurors. This committee recommended uniform qualifications, exemptions and disqualifications for federal jurors. They also recommended a board statute detailing the functions of the jury commission Senator Van Nuys introduced these measures in the second session of the Seventh-eighth Congress.⁸

The proposed legislation was reintroduced in both houses of the Seventy-ninth Congress.⁹ The House Judiciary Committee held hearings in June of 1945 and then undertook revision and adoption of the proposals as part of the overall revision of the Judicial Code.¹⁰ In March of 1947 the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the proposed code but little was said about juror qualifications.¹¹ In April of 1947 the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference Committee,¹² and in April of 1948 the Senate Jidiciary Committee held hearings on the Judicial Code as adopted by the House, which incorporated some of the substance of the proposed jury changes.¹³

We first treat the question of qualifications. The original bill treated qualifications, statutory exemptions, and the power of a judge to exclude or exempt persons from jury service as a single process.¹⁴ The substance of what became sections 1861, 1862 and 1863 of the Judicial Code of 1948 was contained in a single section. As introduced, the procedure would have liberated federal courts from any reference to State qualifications or exemptions. In the hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, many representatives resisted the deleting of State qualifications and exemptions.¹⁵ These members argued that women should not be permitted to serve on federal juries where they were excluded from jury service under State law. They also argued that State exemptions of farmers or other groups were reasonable. It was in reference to these arguments that Judge Knox, on three occasions, referred to the federal qualifications as minimum qualifications.¹⁶

Judge Knox explained (H.R. Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3379, H.R. 3380, H.R. 3381, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945) 18):

'It is our thought that a uniform standard of minimum qualifications should be adopted for all Federal jurors. It should provide for wide qualifications and few exceptions, leaving to the district judges a degree of discretion in determining whether or not certain individuals or classes of persons should, at particular times, be subject to jury service. For example, there is the case of farmers at harvest time. You could leave them off, or out of the wheel.'¹⁷

When Judge Knox referred to a 'minimum,' it was in connection with the judge's power to regulate jury service. Thus, he argued that a judge might exclude women in States where women were ineligible under State law. Under existing State laws, farmers might be excluded at all times, but Judge Knox saw an improvement by first including them under the general qualifications and then by order of the judge excluding them only at harvest time. In this way farmers would be made eligible for federal jury service throughout the remainder of the year. It is also significant that, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, Judge Knox never referred to the qualifications as 'minimum' qualifications.¹⁸

Witnesses before the House and Senate Committees continuously compared the proposal to the Uniform Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.¹⁹ If the proposed qualifications were to be only minimum standards, this comparison to the Federal Rules would be in appropriate.

In reporting favorably on the bill as originally introduced, the Senate Report stated (S.Rep.No.314, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 1947 at 1):

'This bill would establish uniform qualifications of jurors in the Federal courts. Under existing law, the qualifications of jurors in these courts are the same an those prescribed for jurors in the State in which the Federal court is sitting (28 U.S.C. 411). The bill would substitute for this provision a uniform body of qualifications.'

After stating the qualifications that are now contained in the present federal statute, the Senate Report continued (S.Rep.No.314, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, at 2):

'The enactment of this bill would be a desirable step toward uniformity and simplicity of administration. * * * It is suggested that a uniform system of selecting and qualifying jurors in the Federal courts is far superior than 48 different systems. * * *

'The amendments proposed by the Committee are for the purpose * * * to remove any temptation on the part of a judge to exclude from jury service by a sweeping edict any particular class of persons, since the whole purpose of the bill is to broaden the base from which jurors may be chosen.'

The reviser's notes to the Judicial Code of 1948 tell us that Congress adopted 'uniform standards of qualifications for jurors in Federal Courts.'²⁰ Out of deference to the States, however, and in an effort to avoid controversy²¹ congress chose to disqualify for federal jury service all persons who were incompetent to serve on juries in the State in which each base line federal court sat.²² While there was theoretically one uniform federal set of qualifications, Congress later found that it had failed of its objective because the divergent laws of the several States still imposed 48 separate standards for federal jury service. This was the situation that persisted from 1948 until 1957.²³

The Eighty-fifth Congress in 1957 found itself debating what was to become the first broad Civil Rights Act since the reconstruction era. Injected into this charged arena of public affairs was the issue of whether persons accused of judicial contempt should be given a jury trial-- the O'Mahoney amendment. One argument most strongly advanced by opponents of the amendment was that State law disqualified large numbers of Negroes from jury service in many parts of our country, especially in the South.24 While supporting the Civil Rights Act, of 1957, these opponents of the O'Mahoney jury trial amendment feared that predominantly white southern juries would prevent the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act by crippling the courts' power to enforce its injunctions through contempt proceedings. In an effort to make the O'Mahoney amendment more palatable and to vitiate many of the objections to contempt jury trials, Senator Church introduced a modification which was then incorporated into the O'Mahoney amendment.²⁵ In introducing this modification, Senator Church explained (103 Cong.Rec. 13154):

'Mr. President, the amendment is designed to eliminate whatever basis there may be for the charge that the efficacy of trial by jury in the Federal courts is weakened by the fact that, in some areas, colored citizens, because of the operation of State laws, are prevented from serving as jurors. Thus the argument has been made that no jury trial should be permitted in civil rights cases, even in a proceeding for criminal contempt, because such cases concern relationships between the races, and in the South they would be tried by an all-white jury.

'Mr. President, the cases which will be brought under any civil-rights bill will be prosecuted in Federal courts. There is no reason why Congress should not modify Federal law so as to safeguard against discrimination on the basis of race, color, or creed, in the selection of jurors who are to serve in Federal courts.

'We believe the amendment we have now incorporated in the RECORD will accomplish at least three important and long overdue objectives:

'First. It will establish reasonable and uniform qualifications for jurors serving in Federal courts, eliminating the 48 different sets of qualifications which now obtain. This is in complete accord with the generally accepted principle that Federal rules should govern Federal practice.

'Second. It will place the selection of jurors entirely in the hands of the Federal courts, thus avoiding practices under State law that, in effect, may systematically exclude citizens from jury duty in Federal courts on account of race or color.

'Third. Through the accomplishment of the above two objectives, it will confer another civil right-- the right to serve as a juror-- on a large segment of colored citizens, who now, in practice, may be prevented from doing so.'

Making crystal clear that the Senate knew that the purpose of the Church modification of the O'Mahoney amendment was to adopt one uniform set of federal jury qualifications to be applied as a single national standard, Senator Kefauver²⁶ asked (103 Cong.Rec. 13154):

'Thereby it establishes a uniform system in Federal courts all over the United States, so that there can be no possible discrimination with respect to anyone because of his race or color. Is that correct?

'Mr. O'Mahoney: The Senator is correct. * * *.'²⁷

As a result of the Church modification, all reference to state qualifications was removed and the statutory standard applicable to federal jurors, when Rabinowitz and Jackson were indicted and tried, were as follows:

'1861. Qualifications of Federal jurors

'Any citizen of the United States who has attained the age of twenty-one years and who has resided for a period of noe year within the judicial district, is competent to serve as a grand or petit juror unless--

'(1) He has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored by pardon or amnesty.

'(2) He is unable to read, write, speak, and unddrstand the English language.

'(3) He is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmities to render efficient jury service.'

'1862. Exemptions

'The following persons shall be exempt from jury service:

'(1) Members in active service in the armed forces of the United States.

'(2) Members of the Fire or Police departments of any State, District, Territory, Possession or subdivision thereof.

'(3) Public officers in the executive, legislative or judicial branches of the government of the United States, or any State, District, Territory, or Possession or subdivision thereof who are actively engaged in the performance of official duties.'

When the issue of exclusion of Negroes from jury service was first raised in the district court, the United States took the position that Congress 'merely set a minimum qualification * * * and that the jury commissioners were not compelled to use only that; that they could then go on their own experience and their own judgment.'We do not agree that the standards prescribed by Congress are mere minimum standards. The statute and the legislative history of the 1957 Civil Rights Act clearly demonstrate Congress' intent to adopt uniform federal juror qualifications, subject only to certain adjustments within the discretion of the district judge. If each set of officials primarily responsible for compilation of jury lists were free to propound its own set of qualifications, taking section 1861 as a base, the same disunity would result that Congress sought to proscribe.

In urging the adoption of the Church-O'Mahoney amendment, Senator Jackson²⁸ said (103 Cong.Rec. 13155):

'* * * It is significant to point out that if the amendment is accepted, it will for the first time add an additional civil right, and we will have uniform rules of procedure throughout the United States in the selection of Federal jurors. I think this is a significant step forward.'

Even those who opposed the amendment realized that it would create one set of uniform federal qualifications.²⁹ The objections of the opposition were based on the fear that federal officials would fail to use these new uniform qualifications affirmatively. They believed that the lack of familiarity with the Negro community and the retention of the key man system would persistently result in disproportionately white juries, irrespective of qualifications. Therefore, the opponents of the Church-O'Mahoney amendment desired to go even further and require proportional representation of Negroes on federal juries.

Chief among these opponents were Senators Clark and Douglas. The thrust of their attack was not a denial that the new standards would be uniform nationally, but that the selection system would lead to 'blue-ribbon' juries regardless of the qualifications set by Congress.³⁰ Other Senators, such as Senator Saltonstall, opposed the amendment because in their view it encroached on States' rights by setting a 'lower' standard for federal jurors than for state jurors.³¹

Even if those who would have the O'Mahoney amendmant defeated had argued that the standard would not in fact be uniform, the Supreme Court's admonition in NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 1964, 377 U.S. 58, 66, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1068, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 would alert us to the danger of relying on the opponents' point of view. In Fruit and Vegetable Packers, the Court said;

'But we have ofter cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. 'The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.' Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395 (71 S.Ct. 745. 750, 95 L.Ed. 1035); see also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. (National) Labor (Relations) Board, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (76 S.Ct. 349, 360, 100 L.Ed. 309); United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, n. 9, at 358 (77 S.Ct. 1138, 1143, 1 L.Ed.2d 1394).'

The detailed history of the 1957 amendment to section 1861 leaves no room for doubting that the Congress wished to enact uniform national standards for service on federal juries.³² These standards were intended to be lower than those than existing in many States, with the purpose of increasing the number of Negroes serving on federal juries in order to better reflect a fair cross-section of the community. The action taken by the jury commissioners here in question has derogated from each of these congressional purposes. By applying their own test for good jurors, they have defeated any hope of uniformity. Instead of lowering the standards to the prescribed federal level, they have artificially raised the standards; in so doing they have eliminated many Negroes otherwise eligible to serve.³³

The jury commissioners in compiling the 1959 list treated the statutory standards as minimum qualifications to which they added their own ideas as to good character, intelligence and ability to 'understand the cases that are tried in court.' The statutory standards of qualification may not be extended by such broad and vague subjective tests as were employed in compiling the 1959 jury list.³⁴ It was conceded in testimony by the officials who compiled the list³⁵ that many more Negroes than whites failed to meet the increased standards of character and intelligence. The proportion of Negroes in the district who had completed five years of school is nearly 1 Negro to every 3 whites, and decreases rapidly so that of those who have completed four years of high school the proportion is about 1 Negro to every 9 whites.³⁶

The Civil Rights Act of 1957 amended 28 U.S.C. 1861 so as to leave very definite tests of character and intelligence to render one incompetent to serve as a juror in federal court; namely, conviction of felony and inability to read, write, speak and understand the English language.

Our conclusion that section 1861 is not just a minimum standard vesting discretion in the court clerk and jury commissioners to set higher standards is furhter supported by the procedure prescribed by Congress for excusing or excluding juriors in its companion section, sec. 1863. Section 1863 reads as follows:

'1863. Exclusion or excuse from service

'(a) A district judge for good cause may excuse or exclude from jury service any person called as juror.

'(b) Any class or group of persons may, for the public interest, be excluded from the jury panel or excused from service as jurors by order of the district judge based on a finding that such jury service would entail undue hardship, extreme inconvenience or esrious obstruction or delay in the fair and impartial administration of justice.

'(c) No citizen shall be excluded from service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States on account of race or color.' (Tit. 28, U.S.C.)

Subsections (a) and (b) were enacted for the first time in 1948, while subsection (c) was carried over from the old statute.³⁷ These subsections reflect the congressional realization that there must be some degree of flexibility in the jury selection system.

As originally introduced in 1945 the proposed jury legislation also contained a provision vesting broad powers in the jury commissioners. Under 'duties' the bill read: 'It shall be the duty of the commission, under the supervision of the senior district judge * * * to select * * * the names of qualified persons who may be called to serve as jurors in the district court and who in their opinion are intelligne, honest, fairminded, of good reputation, and capable of rendering satisfactory service, and to keep suitable records regarding them.'³⁸ The House Committee on the Judiciary in preparing the Judicial Code eliminated that portion of the proposed legislation dealing with jury commissioners, and instead carried forward the existing law with slight modifications.

The present section 1864 as enacted in 1948 reads as follows:

'1864. Manner of drawing; jury commissioners and their compensation

'The names of grand and petit jurors shall be publicly drawn from a box containing the names of not less than three hundred qualified persons at the time of each drawing.

'The jury box shall from time to time be refilled by the clerk of court, or his deputy, and a jury commissioner, appointed by the court.

'Such jury commissioner shall be a citizen of good standing, residing in the district and a well known member of the principal political party in the district, opposing that to which the clerk, or his deputy then acting, may belong. He shall receive $5 per day for each day necessarily employed in the performance of his duties.

'The jury commissioner and the clerk, or his deputy, shall alternately place one name in the jury box without reference to party affiliations, until the box shall contain at least 300 names or such larger number as the court determines.

'This section shall not apply to the District of Columbia,' 28 U.S.C.A. 1864.

Neither the hearings nor the reviser's notes provide light on why the statutory language proposed by the Judicial Conference was rejected. The Judicial Conference has continued its efforts to persuade Congress to adopt its proposal.³⁹

One plausible explanation is that the proposal merely sought to clarify the procedure as it then existed. Judge Knox testified that the procedure under consideration was in use in some districts.⁴⁰ Other witnesses testified that the Commissioners under the existing statute were 'quite perfunctory'⁴¹ or that prospective jurors were merely drawn at random.⁴² Chief Judge Law of the D.C. District Court, testified that up until '6 or 7 years' before the hearing 'the clerk of the commission undertook a personal examination of some of the prospective jurors.' He said, 'A group of lawyers thought perhaps he was exceeding his authority, and he stopped doing it.'⁴³ We do not think that it would be appropriate to find that Congress in declining to accept the proposed language, in effect, adopted the system prevailing in a few district courts, on which the proposed legislation was modeled. Since some aspects of the jury commissioner proposal proved to be controversial, it is more likely that Congress in 1948 did not address itself to the problem Thus leaving the law uncertain.

The suggested discretion was to be vested 'subject to the requirements of section(s) (1861, 1862, and 1863).' Therefore, the sections 1861-1863 circumscribe whatever latent discretion the jury commissioner and the clerk were to have. The change in the statute in 1957 must be seen as a further block on any discretion possessed by the court clerk and the jury commissioner. There is no evidence that Congress intended to subject its notion of proper jury qualifications to immediate change by some latent discretion vested in the jury commission.

It would seem anomalous for Congress to create elaborate procedures for the district judge to excuse or exclude persons from jury service⁴⁴ and at the same time to silently vest even broader discretion in the unregulated hands of the clerk and the jury commissioner.⁴⁵ To the extent that the 1948 Judicial Code vested discretion in the court clerk and the jury commissioner, we think it related to source of names and not to setting of general standards.

Moreover, the past practice of applying broad, nebulous criteria, is not persuasive as to the proposition that Congress vested that power in the court clerk and the jury commissioner. Most States have statutes which, like those of New York, prescribe broad, nebulous qualifications. For example, in New York City jurors must be by State statute 'intelligent; of sound mind and good character; well informed.' In other parts of New York State jurors must be 'of fair character; of approved integrity; of sound judgment; and well informed.'⁴⁶ While Congress provided for jury commissioners, until 1948 it was primarily the State qualifications which applied. The discretionary powers of the court clerk and the jury commissioner were by necessity coextensive with the substantive qualifications prescribed by the State; i.e., the discretion of the court clerk and the jury commissioner was derived by implication from that portion of the statute adopting State qualifications and not from the part creating their offices. In 1948 when Congress disqualified for federal service all persons disqualified under the higher State standards, it in effect left unchanged the need for discretion in applying the State standards. See United States v. Dennis, 2 Cir. 1950, 183 F.2d 201, 220-221.

But the change occasioned by the 1957 Civil Rights Act substantially altered the situation. The State statutes with all their nebulous qualifications no longer applied. Therefore, the State statutes ceased to confer discretion on the court clerk and the jury commissioner. The federal qualifications are objective and precise, requiring in their application no discretion on the part of the court clerk and the jury commissioner. Since Congress only conferred discretion on the clerk and the commissioner by implication from the State statutes, their discretion ceased to exist when the State qualifications were entirely swept away.

It is also important to remember that in 1957 Congress made no reference to the suggestions of the Judicial Conference, nor was it enacting a primarily judicial statute. On the contrary, Congress was enacting a Civil Rights Act and intended to confer an additional civil right, i.e., the right to be a federal juror.

In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 1946, 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181, the Supreme Court disapproved the use of discretion by the clerk of the court and the jury commissioner in formulating a blanket exclusion of daily wage earners. The Court clearly distinguished the concept of jury qualifications from the method of selection.⁴⁷ In his dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter treated at great length the problem of flexibility in formulating procedures that allow the selection of a proper jury list.⁴⁸

One problem is that when a group in the community is excluded by the clerk of the court and the jury commissioner, it is not generally known. Section 1863(b) allows the district judge to exclude or excuse a group from jury service after 'a finding.' Such a procedure insures that blanket exclusions or excuses will be open and known, thus subjecting them to possible appropriate review. Again, the purpose of Congress in seeking uniformity to the extent practicable is evident. Review of well-defined exclusions at the Circuit or Supreme Court level will promote uniformity where possible, but will leave room for individual districts to meet their unique problems.⁴⁹

The discretion of the district judge is not limited to cases of 'hardship' or 'extreme inconvenience,' but extends to problems that would cause a 'serious obstruction or delay' in the administration of justice. In our view, this allows the district judge to tailor the qualifications prescribed in section 1861 to the needs of his district.⁵⁰ For example, section 1861(2) requires that a juror be able 'to read, write, speak and understand the English language.' It may be that so far as consistent with the concept of a cross-section of the community, a judge, in an effort to obtain an effective functioning jury selection system, may find that a sixth grade education satisfies this requirement and promulgate an order to that effect.⁵¹ As Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted (Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 1946, 328 U.S. 217, 232, 66 S.Ct. 984, 991, dissenting opinion):

'The object is to devise a system that is fairly representative of our variegated population, exacts the obligation of citizenship to share in the administration of justice without operating too harshly upon any section of the community, and is duly regardful of the public interest in matters outside the jury system.'

In compiling the jury lists both the need for competency and the need for a fair cross-section of the community are important elements.⁵² In order to have a practical system of compiling jury lists and to insure that literate jurors are selected, some persons must be excluded. But the desire for competency must not be pursued to the extent that a fair cross-section is prevented.⁵³ In promulgating orders under section 1863, the district court must be aware of this relationship and realize that Congress in prescribing the qualifications for jurors has attempted to insure a fair cross-section and has severely limited the court's discretion. The line of demarcation is clear-- a person need only be able to read, write, speak, and understand English, he need not enjoy that degree of excellence found only among the more fortunate classes of our society. Any attempt to gain competent jurors that would result in a less representative cross-section than a selection drawn from the statutorily qualified pool would destroy the 'right' to serve on juries which Congress intended to confer, as well as destroy the broad based cross-section Congress has designated for federal juries.⁵⁴

Apart from the jury commissioners' failure to apply the proper qualifications to prospective jurors, these cases evidence a flaw in the method of compiling the jury roll. Even before the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code the Congress through its jury legislation had evidenced its desire to insure that a federal jury be "a cross-section of the community' and truly representative of it. Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 86 (62 S.Ct. 457).' Ballard v. United States, 1946, 329 U.S. 187, 191, 67 S.Ct. 261, 263. The records in these cases clearly show that the jury list did not represent a fair cross-section of the community.⁵⁵ Moreover, as new lists were compiled the trend was toward the list becoming less representative of the community.

In defense of the jury commissioners, it is said that they did not specifically intend to exclude Negroes from federal juries. The jury commissioners must be held to have intended the natural result which flowed from their conduct. Compare Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457; Smith v. State of Texas, 1940, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84. Radio Officers Union, etc. v. NLRB, 1954, 347 U.S. 17, 45, 74 S.Ct. 323, 98 L.Ed. 455. In these cases the qualifications required and the method of selecting prospective jurors have over a long period of time, list after list, resulted in Negroes being substantially underrepresented. The fruits of the harvest were clear to anyone who cared to look.

'If one factor is uniform in a continuing series of events that are brought to pass through human intervention, the law would have to have the blindness of indifference rather than the blindness of imparticlity not to attribute the uniform factor to man's purpose. The purpose may not be of evil intent or in conscious disregard of what is conceived to be a binding duty. Prohibited conduct may result from misconception of what duty requires. Such misconception I believe to be the real situation on the record before us.'⁵⁶

The Constitution and laws of the United States place an affirmative duty on the court clerk and the jury commissioner to develop and use a system that will probably result in a fair cross-section of the community being placed on the jury rolls.⁵⁷ Chief Justice Vinson speaking for the Court in Avery v. State of Georgia, 1953, 345 U.S. 559, 561, 73 S.Ct. 891, 892, 97 L.Ed. 1244,⁵⁸ said:

'The Jury Commissioners, and the other officials responsible for the selection of this panel, were under a constitutional duty to follow a procedure-- 'a course of conduct'-- which would not 'operate to discriminate in the selection of jurors on racial grounds.' Hill v. (State of) Texas (1942), 316 U.S. 400, 404 (62 S.Ct. 1159, 1161, 86 L.Ed. 1559). If they failed in that duty, then this conviction must be reversed-- no matter how strong the evidence of petitioner's guilt. That is the law established by decisions of this Court spanning more than seventy years of interpretation of the meaning of 'equal protection."

In Akins v. State of Texas, 1945, 325 U.S. 398, 399, 403, 65 S.Ct. 1276, 1279, 89 L.Ed. 1962 the Supreme Court said:

'But such defendants are entitled to require that those who are trusted with jury selection shall not pursue a course of conduct which results in discrimination 'in the selection of jurors on racial grounds."

Again, in Cassell v. State of Texas, 1950, 339 U.S. 282, 289, 70 S.Ct. 629, 633, Mr. Justice Reed writing for the Court said:

'When the commissioner were appointed as judicial administrative officials, it was their duty to familiarize themselves fairly with the qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and color. They did not do so here, and the result has been racial discrimination.'If a fair cross-section is consistently lacking, then, without more, it is established that the commissioners have failed in their duty. In Smith v. State of Texas, 1940, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 61 S.Ct. 164, 166, Mr. Justice Black speaking for a unanimous Court observed:

'Where jury commissioners limit those from whom grand juries are selected to their own personal acquaintance, discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no Negroes as well as from commissioners who know but eliminate them. If there has been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand.'

In Eubanks v. State of Louisiana, 1958, 356 U.S. 584, 587, 78 S.Ct. 970, 973, 2 L.Ed.2d 991, Mr. Justice Black quoted with approval from patton, as follows:

'In Patton v. (State of) Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 469 (68 S.Ct. 184, 187, 92 L.Ed. 76), this Court declared, in a unanimous opinion, that 'When a jury selection plan, whatever it is, operates in such a way as always to result in the complete and long-continued exclusion of any representative at all from a large group of Negroes, or any other racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against them by juries thus selected cannot stand.' This is essentially the situation here.'

Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Stone in Hill v. State of Texas, 1942, 316 U.S. 400, 404, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 1161, speaking for the Court said that the constitutional duty of the jury commissioner was:

'* * * not to pursue a course of conduct, in the administration of their office which would operate to discriminate in the selection of jurors on racial grounds. Discrimination can arise from the action of commissioners who exclude all negroes whom they do not know to be qualified and who neither know nor seek to learn whether there are in fact any qualified to serve. In such a case discrimination necessarily results where there are qualified negroes available for jury service.'

See also, United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F.2d 53, 65; Collins v. Walker, 5 Cir. 1964, 335 F.2d 417, 424; Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, 3 Cir. 1955, 224 F.2d 414.

The federal statutes themselves were intended to insure that a fair crosssection of the community was placed on federal juries. In supporting the proposed adoption of uniform federal qualifications for jurors, Judge Harron testified (Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 17, S. 18, S. 19, 80th Cong.1st sess. (1947) 34):

'* * * S. 18 is only on keeping with the modern age and with the basic concept in our law that the jury must be drawn from a cross-section of the community, that the jury must be a body truly representative of the community.'

The Chairman of the Federal Legislative Committee of the New York Bar Association, Mr. Wood, stated the import of the proposed uniform qualifications this way (Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 17, S. 18, S. 19, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) 85-86):

'It seems to me that one of the things that we ought to strive for in the jury system is to have the juries drawn from the widest possible cross-section of the people. * * * But you would start with the basic proposition (under the proposed statute) that, with certain very obvious exceptions, everybody, every citizen, ought to be subject to jury duty. That, we think, is important both because it gives you juries chosen from the widest possible cross-section of the people and gives you a fairer sampling of the people, and also, secondly, because it distributes the obligations (of jury service) more equitably and prevents them from falling too heavily on any one group.'

In explaining the total effects of the legislative package, including the jury commission proposal, Judge Knox said (Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 17, S. 18, S. 19, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947) 80):

'What I am trying to do there is to broaden the scope of the jury commission, so that it may, under the direction of the judge, get a cross-section of the entire community, and have them serve as jurors.'⁵⁹

Lest we be misunderstood, we repeat the caution of the Supreme Court in Swain v. State of Alabama,⁶⁰ 1964, 380 U.S. 202, 208, 85 S.Ct. 824, 829, 13 L.Ed.2d 759.

'But a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit jurors are drawn. Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate strength of every identifiable group. 'Obviously the number of races and nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our citizens would make it impossible to meet a requirement of proportional representation."

What the law clearly does require is that the standards and designs prescribed by Congress be followed. We conclude that there were impermissible departures from the statutory scheme both as to the qualifications required of prospective jurors and as to the method and procedure by which the list was compiled.⁶¹ One result was that Negroes were excluded from the jury list which formed the source of the grand and petit juries in these cases.

As we said earlier, the Government argues that the indictments should stand since there were, in fact, 5 Negroes on the grand jury. We think this evidences a basic misconception. The focus of the law is on the list from which the jury is drawn and not on the composition of a particular jury or grand jury. The efforts by Congress to broaden the base of the jury system in federal courts was an attempt to do more than improve the administration of justice at the point where it most directly touches members of the legal profession and litigants. It constituted an effort to improve the judicial system where it most directly touches the lives of the average citizen. For many citizens their only contact with the courts arises from their service on grand or petit juries.

Even more important is the fact that many citizens will have no direct contact with the administration of justice, but will judge its efficacy on how the judicial process functions. Congress and the courts are aware of this fact. 'The injury is not limited to the defendant-- there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.'⁶² When the basic jury list was poisoned, the fruits of that list were also infected. To cure the infection, it is necessary to start the process anew. The legislative story we have summarized impels two inescapable conclusions with regard to this case. Those responsible for compiling the jury lists violated the statutory scheme by applying the wrong standards and by using grossly inadequate sources. To ignore the mood⁶³ of Congress summarized by its legislation would be to abdicate our judicial responsibility. Johnson v. United States, 1 Cir. 1908, 163 F. 30, 32, 18 L.R.A.N.S., 1194 (opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes). We do not legislate for Congress; we do effectuate that policy which Congress through its legislation has directed us to implement. The judgments of conviction are, therefore, reversed and the cases remanded with directions that the indictments be dismissed.

Reversed with directions.

TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and WISDOM and THORNBERRY, Circuit Judges, concur.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge Concurring specially.

GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge Concurring in opinion by GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge.

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

APPENDIX A.

Legislative History of the 1948 Judicial Code as it relates to the process of selection of federal jurors.

In an effort to improve the functioning of the jury system, the Judicial Conference appointed a committee headed by Judge Knox to study the problems of qualification and selection of federal jurors. The statutes proposed by Judge Knox's committee are reproduced at the end of this appendix.

One proposal was that a set of uniform federal juror qualifications and exemptions be enacted. Judge Knox stated the 'gist' of his committee's recommendations as follows (H.R. Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3379, H.R. 3380, H.R. 3381, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945), hereafter H.R. hearings 1945, at 15):

'1. In order that grand and petit jurors who serve in United States district courts may be so drawn as to be truly representative of the community, the sources from which they are selected should include all economic and social groups. From whatever sources drawn, those chosen should possess as high a degree of intelligence, morality, integrity, and common sense as can be found by those who make the selection.

'2. The choice of specific sources from which names of prospective jurors are selected must be entrusted to the good faith of the clerk and jury commissioner, acting under the direction of the district judge, but should be controlled by the following considerations:

'(a) The sources should be coordinated so as together to include all groups in the community;

'(b) Economic and social status, including race and color, should be considered only to the extent necessary to assure that there is no discrimination on account of these factors;

'(c) When women are eligible by law for jury service, they should be selected and called to serve in the Federal courts;

'(d) Political affiliations should be ignored;

'(e) Unsolicited requests of persons who seek to have their names placed upon jury lists and unsolicited recommendations of names should not be encouraged; and

'(f) In determining the parts of the districts from which jurors are to be drawn, the courts should bear in mind the desirability of conserving the time of jurors and preventing exorbitant travel expenses to the Government.'

See also Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 17, S. 18, S. 19, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947), hereafter S. hearings 1947, at 29-30.

Chairman Sumners of Texas voiced the fears of many representatives, as follows (H.R. hearings 1945 at 6):

'What we are up against, Judge Knox, is that we represent people of the various States, and it is not going to be easy to get popular consent to establish a Federal procedure with regard to jurors in a State different from that which the people of the State are accustomed to in their States.'

Other representatives had more specific objections. Congressman Russell, for example, believed that the State qualifications were intelligent and should not be disturbed. See H.R. hearings 1945 at 17. Other opponents of the uniform qualifications feared that women might serve on federal juries in States in which they were excluded from State service. See Judge Parker, S. hearings 1947 at 6; Judge Harron, S. hearings 1947 at 34-35. See also Moore's Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code P.0.03(47), p. 373.

While Judge Knox used the term 'minimum qualifications' on three occasions while testifying before the House Committee, it is clear that this fact taken in context does not detract from the bulk of the testimony that the proposal was for uniform standards to be uniformly applied throught the federal system. His use of 'minimum' related to the excusing of such groups as farmers and women from jury service and was only used when the committee expressed fear that these groups would be forced to serve to their disadvantage. See H.R. hearings 1945, at 7, 18, 19.

Judge knox did not believe that the Committee's proposal would be used as a vehicle for procuring upper-class, blue ribbon juries. He said (H.R. hearings 1945 at 14): 'What we have in mind is that every economic and social group in the community shall be represented upon the jury list.' Judge Knox also said (S. hearing 1947 at 32): 'In order to increase the number of persons who will be available for jury work, our proposed legislation limits exemptions and disqualifications to six classes * * *.'

Chairman Sumners explained the Committee's understanding of the bill before it when he said (H.R. hearing 1945 at 24): 'We have a suggestion that there be a uniform law of general application dealing with the qualifications of jurors who are eligible for service in the Federal courts.'

Numerous witnesses compared the bills before Congress with the Uniform Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure. Mr. Harper testified (S. hearings 1947 at 10):

'The same considerations which have led Congress to establish uniform rules of procedure in civil and criminal cases suggest uniform qualifications in the selection of jurors. The present requirement of conformity to State law leads to some absurd results. * * * It seems wise to permit the judge to adapt the exemptions to the needs and customs of the local community.'

Judge Harron explained (S. hearings 1947 at 35-36):

'The judges of the Federal courts, through the Judicial Conference, undertook in recent years to develop a general program to increase the efficiency of the Federal courts and to mold them into a unified and integrated system.

'The provisions of S. 18 are part of the general policy that rules and standards of the Federal courts shall be uniform and shall be derived from acts of the Congress rather than from the State statutes. S. 18 was proposed to establish uniform qualifications of jurors in the Federal courts. * * * Senate bills 17, 18 and 19 have been offered to the Congress to enable it to carry out further the policy it has already approved of authorizing uniform rules and standards in Federal courts.'

Judge Diamond in writing to Congress stressed the national uniformity of these standards (S. hearings 1947 at 22): '* * * It would seem appropriate to extend to Alaska the provisions of S. 18 in order to have uniformity in all of the Federal courts on a subject of such consequence.'

Attorney General Clark also stressed the importance of national uniformity (S. hearing 1947 at 57): 'I strongly recommend the enactment of the three bills under consideration by this subcommittee which would provide uniformity in the selection and qualifications of jurors in the Federal courts.'

Senator Moore stated (S. hearing 1947 at 82): 'I feel inclined to believe that the Federal courts should be conducted as nearly as possible in a uniform way.'

Senator O'Connor in urging the Senate to give 'studied attention' to S. 18 said (93 Cong.Rec. (1947) at 5712):

'The primary proposal, Senate 18, establishes for the Federal courts, uniform qualifications for jurors called to serve in those courts. It thus frees the Federal courts of the present requirement that in selecting jurors they must follow the qualifications prescribed by the laws of the State where the Federal district court sits. The proposed change would make all adult citizens eligible for both grand and petit jury service except those who have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving mo